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Abstract
The central aim of this thesis is to present a new kind of realism that is driven 
not from the traditional realism/anti-realism debate but from the practice of 
physicists. The usual debate focuses on discussions about the truth of 
theories and how they relate with nature, while the real practices of the 
scientists are forgotten. The position I shall defend is called 
“phenomenological realism”.
The realist doctrine was recently undermined by the argument from 
pessimistic meta-induction, also known as the argument from scientific 
revolutions. I argue that phenomenological realism is a new kind of scientific 
realism that can overcome the problem generated by the pessimistic meta­
induction, and which reflects scientific practice. The realist has tried to 
overcome the pessimistic meta-induction by suggesting various types of 
theory dichotomy. I claim that the different types of dichotomy normally 
presemted by realists do not overcome the problem, for these dichotomies cut 
through theory vertically. I argue for a different kind of dichotomy, one that 
cuts horizontally, between high-level and low-level theoretical 
representations. I claim that theoretical forms in physics have two distinct 
types depending on the way they are built. These are theoretical models that 
are built depending on a top-down approach and phenomenological models 
that are built depending on a bottom-up approach. I argue that for the 
most part only phenomenological models are the vehicles of 
accurate representation.
I present two case studies. The first case study is from 
superconductivity, where I contrast the BCS model of superconductivity 
with the phenomenological model of Landau and Ginzburg. The other case 
study is a fresh look at the Bohr-Einstein debate.
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Preface
A long time ago I read a passage from the Italian philosopher Antonio 
Gramsci in his prison notebooks, which I think, still holds. I will quote the 
full paragraph here:
Engels’ expression that ‘the materiality of the world is 
demonstrated by long and laborious development of philosophy 
and the natural sciences’ needs to be analysed and made precise.
By science does he mean the theoretical or the practical- 
experimental activity of the scientists or the synthesis of the two 
activities? In this we could be said to have the typical unitary 
process of reality, in the experimental activity of the scientist 
which is first model o f dialectical mediation between man and 
nature, the elementary historical cell by which man, putting 
himself into relation with nature through technology, knows it 
and controls it. Undoubtedly, the promulgation of the 
experimental method separates two worlds of history, two 
epochs, and begins the process of dissolution of theology and 
metaphysics and the development of modem thought, whose 
crowning is Marxism. Scientific method is the first cell of new 
method of production, of the new form o f active union between 
man and nature. The scientist-experimenter is also a worker, not 
a pure thinker, and his thought is continually controlled by 
practice and vice versa, up to the point where a perfect unity o f 
theory and practice is formed. (Gramsci 1980, pi 07 my italics)
This passage was part of a critique of the Russian scholastic type of Marxism 
that transformed Marx’s ideas into a mechanistic materialism strange to his 
dialectical approach. The basic two points that are relevant to my work here 
are: the unity between practice and theory and the conception of scientific 
practical activity as a mediator between man and nature.
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Two questions are important in this context. These are: what is the 
relation between the experimental and the theoretical and how can the 
theoretical represent nature? In my MSc dissertation I focused on thought 
experiments and real experiments in quantum mechanics. At that stage I was 
not sure that a thought experiment would have the same elements as the real 
experiment and would have the same effect on scientific discourse. A deep 
look into the Bohr-Einstein debate gave a definite positive answer.
The French philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard has been 
another source of inspiration. His idea of phenomeno-technology helped me 
to understand the deep embodiment of the human technological and scientific 
activity in nature and also helped in highlighting the concept of ‘perfect unity 
between man and nature’. Also, his idea of merging different philosophical 
positions which are apparently in conflict led me to look into the relation 
between the realist position and the anti-realist from a different angle, and to 
try to develop ‘the best of both worlds’.
Nevertheless, the realist position was the dominant. I want to hold 
onto it. Usually, realists try to hold that scientific theories are the 
vehicles of representation. Such a position has been challenged, 
philosophically and empirically, for most high-level theoretical 
representations. Nonetheless, the low-level theoretical representations 
prove to be able to withstand the challenge.
When I came to study at the LSE, I saw in Nancy Cartwright’s1 work 
on models the perfect soil to grow a realist position that holds onto its realist 
routes while accepting some of the anti-realist critique to high-level theories.
In this dissertation I try to present such a position: phenomenological 
realism. I am not arguing against realism. So, in my debate with structural 
realism I am not contrasting their position with that of anti-realists, but I am 
contrasting their position with practice in physics. Because of that I rely on 
arguments and discussions in the physics literature rather than that in the
1 See her 1983, 1989, 1994a, 1994b and 1995.
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philosophical literature. For example, in chapter two, in the discussion 
related to the correspondence principle I present the types of formal 
correspondence accepted in physics. Of course, the philosophical literature is 
full of papers and discussions on the correspondence principle but I do not 
approach the discussion from that angle.
In chapter one I argue against structural realism.2 By far, the most 
successful current scientific realist position is that of structural realism. 
Structural realism advocates a structure-content dichotomy, asserting that 
the structure represents the underlying relations between real objects while 
the content is mere interpretation and might change through theory change. 
By doing so, structural realism claims that it has been able to have both the 
no-miracle argument and the argument from scientific revolutions on its side.
The important device, which secures the structural realists’ claim of 
having the argument from scientific revolution on their side, is the 
correspondence principle. In chapter two I argue that the structural realists’ 
definition of the correspondence principle does not fit physics. Furthermore,
1 claim that because of the many ways that formal correspondence can be 
applied in physics it is not as important as has been suggested in the 
philosophical discourse.
In chapter three I argue for the division between low-level and high- 
level theoretical representations. I argue that such a division is exemplified by 
the theoretical models for the latter and phenomenological models for the 
former. In chapter four I illustrate the advantages of this new division by 
means of a case study from superconductivity. There I contrast the BCS 
model of superconductivity, the model that was accepted for a long period of 
time as ‘the theory ’ of superconductivity, but failed to account for all types 
of superconductors, with the Landau and Ginzburg phenomenological model, 
which proved a more plausible model to be a representative of
2 There is more than one version of structural realism, here I discuss only one (that of John 
Worrall and Elie Zahar) as a way to contrast it with my own version of realism.
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superconductivity, and which was able to even account for the new high 
temperature superconductivity.
These advantages give strong support for phenomenological realism. 
In chapter five I argue for phenomenological realism. I claim that the 
pessimistic meta-induction is not an argument against phenomenological 
models in the same way in which it is against high-level theories. Because of 
the way they are built, phenomenological models have a good chance of 
surviving through theory change. I claim also that the no-miracle argument 
can work in favour of phenomenological models. Hence, there exists a 
distinction within scientific practice that would provide a basis for being a 
scientific realist and which would overcome the pessimistic meta-induction: 
realism about phenomenological models but not about theories.
Third, I illustrate the difference between structural realism and 
phenomenological realism by means of the Bohr-Einstein debate. In the last 
chapter I take a fresh look at that debate in the light of my distinction 
between the two types of theoretical forms in physics.
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1:1 Introduction
In this chapter I argue that major replies of scientific realism to the 
pessimistic meta-induction argument depend on introducing a dichotomy on 
the theoretical level. I looked particularly at structural realism. In this case 
the dichotomy is between structure and content. I argue that this dichotomy 
does not help: In order for structural realism to have the argument from 
scientific revolution on its side, it needs to adopt a restricted concept of 
correspondence principle. In chapter two I argue that such a concept does 
not fit physics.
Recent attacks on realism have succeeded in presenting a serious 
challenge to it. This challenge eventually affected the beliefs of even a deep 
believer in realism like Hilary Putnam (1990), who changed his position 
under the influence of such critiques. Hitherto, the core point in the realist 
position was that theories are true representations of nature, or 
approximately so. The strongest argument for realism is that suggested by 
Poincare and re-affirmed in Putnam’s early work: the no-miracle argument. 
As Putnam puts it: “the positive argument for realism is that it is the only 
philosophy that does not make the success of science a miracle” 
(Putnam 1975, 73).
Realists do not accept that all theories are true (or approximately 
true) representations of nature, just the successful ones are. However, 
realists do not agree on the criterion of what to accept as a true or successful 
or approximately true theory. In his Smoke and Mirrors, James Robert 
Brown presents one definition of successful theories:
...By calling these theories successful I chiefly mean that: 1) they 
are able to organise and unify a great variety of known phenomena;
2) this ability to systematize the empirical data is more extensive 
now than it was for previous theories; and 3) a statistically 
significant number of novel predictions pan out, i.e. our theories
13
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get more predictions right than mere guessing would allow 
(Brown 1994, 4).
Contrary to Putnam, Brown does not accept that the critiques of realism are 
good. He is a Platonist realist who believes that our theories reveal the true 
properties of nature.
The major recent attacks on realism come from pessimistic meta­
induction on the one hand and new versions of empiricist arguments on the 
other. These positions are associated with Larry Laudan1 (the former) and 
Bas van Fraassen2 (the latter) — van Fraassen defines his position as 
“constructive empiricism”. Laudan relies on the history of science to claim 
that the realists’ explanation of the successes of science does not hold. He 
argues that the success of theories cannot offer grounds to accept that these 
theories are true (or even approximately true). He presents a list of theories 
that have been successful and yet are now acknowledged to be false. Hence, 
he concludes, depending on our previous experience with scientific 
revolutions the only reasonable induction would be that it is highly probable 
that our current successful theories will turn out to be false. Van Fraassen 
claims that despite the success of theories at accounting for phenomena (their 
empirical adequacy), there could never be any grounds for believing any 
claims beyond those about what is observable.
In reply to these attacks many realists have suggested that the way 
forward is not in accepting the theories as a whole as correct representations 
of nature, nor is it in rejecting them as a whole, but rather in adopting a kind 
of division between different parts of the theory. That is to say that some 
parts might be accepted as correct representations of nature while the rest as, 
e.g. in Philip Kitcher’s case, presuppositional posits. These kinds of 
dichotomy divide the theoretical forms vertically, cutting through low-level 
as well as high-level theoretical forms. I claim that such vertical divisions do
1 See for instant his 1981 and 1984.
2 See for instant his 1980 and 1985.
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not solve the problems realists’ face. In Chapter three I will suggest an 
alternative division, not in terms of accepting theories as real representations 
of nature, but by claiming that there are two kinds of theoretical forms in 
physics. One takes a top-down approach toward accommodating 
experiments; the other is phenomenological and takes a bottom-up approach. 
I claim that the theoretical outcomes that result on the phenomenal level, 
which I call “phenomenological models”, often hold true representations of 
nature, while the high-level theoretical forms, which I label “theoretical 
models”, seldom are true representations of nature. This division is 
horizontal: it divides between low-level and high-level theoretical forms.
As for now, I will try to show how a particular form of realism fails 
to overcome the difficulties generated by the critiques of Laudan and van 
Fraassen and also fails to reflect the real practice in physics. Among the 
realists the particular form of scientific realism I have chosen to discuss is the 
structural realism programme. This is because I think it is the most defensible 
of the current positions in realism, and because it takes into consideration the 
attacks on realism launched by different anti-realists during the last three 
decades. I start by laying down the bases of structural realism. Structural 
realism aims to present a plausible position that would hold the two 
arguments from realism and from scientific revolutions to its side. It suggests 
that the type of division that realism ought to make within theories is that of 
dividing the theory into structure and content, where it accepts that the 
structure (by which they mean the mathematical structure) represents nature 
while the content can be filled indifferently and changed (sections 1:2).
Other examples of such a division within theory include Philip 
Kitcher’s distinction between two different posits: “presuppositional Posits” 
vs. “working posits”. The former are the non-referring terms in a theory 
which “have to exist if the instances of the schemata are to be true” (Kitcher 
1993,149), while the latter are the referring terms which feature in a 
successful explanatory schemata. Stathis Psillos suggests another distinction
15
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as I will show below. The problems for structural realism, as well as for 
Kitcher and Psillos, are depicted by the questions: why should we accept 
some parts of theory to be true representations of reality while refusing this 
status to other bits of the same theory? And, how would we be able to draw 
the line between these two parts? (Section 1:3) I suspect that a deep study 
into the history of science would reveal, most of the time, that there is at 
least one counter example to each of these divisions.
In sections 1:4 and 1:5 I will show that the kernel of the structural 
realism programme is the correspondence principle. Structural realism 
depends on an important heuristic device in order to secure an ‘optimistic’ 
interpretation of scientific revolutions. This heuristic device is the 
correspondence principle. Although structural realism accepts that there are 
different kinds of correspondence between old theories and new ones, I 
believe that only one special kind of formal correspondence can best express 
their concept of structural continuity.
1:2 Structural Realism
The attacks against realism deploy a well-defended argument. That is the 
pessimistic meta-induction. John Worrall puts it as follow:
Revolutionary changes have occurred in accepted scientific 
theories, changes in which the old theory could be said to 
“approximate” the new only by stretching the admittedly vague and 
therefore elastic notion of ‘approximation’ beyond breaking point 
(Worrall 1989, 107).
So, in an attempt to overcome the difficulties facing realism, John 
Worrall and Elie Zahar suggest that realists should focus on the form or 
structure of theories rather than on content. They trace this position to 
Poincare, Zahar also traces this view to Duhem. The core idea, as Worrall 
puts it, is to have the best of both worlds: realism and instrumentalism. There
16
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are two main arguments in the realism/anti-realism debate, or so — at least -- 
Worrall claims. The chief argument for realism, as it is accepted by most if 
not all realists, is the no-miracle argument. The one against realism is the 
argument from scientific revolutions, which gives a pessimistic interpretation 
of theory change: if we look at the history of science we would conclude that 
even the most well supported theories turn out to be wrong.
Structural realism suggests that if we consider only the highly 
supported mathematical structure of the old theories, then it is possible to 
present a good argument that would hold the evidence from scientific 
revolutions to the side of realism. This argument runs as follows. If a given, 
and highly supported mathematical form that accounts for a set of 
phenomena {Pi} is preserved through theory change, either as it is or via the 
correspondence principle, then it is highly probable that it represents, or at 
least approximately represents, the true underlying structure of nature.
Hence, this neglected position of Poincare’s, can offer the 
only hopeful way to have the best of both worlds: to give the 
argument from scientific revolution its full weight and yet still 
adopt some sort of realist attitude toward presently accepted 
theories. (Worrall 1989, 99).
Worrall states that there are no essentially new arguments in the 
current realism/anti-realism debate. For him, Poincare and Duhem put 
forward the two chief arguments in that debate. Worrall puts the no-miracle 
argument as follows. It is impossible for highly empirically successful 
theories (i.e. theories that are explanatory and predictive), to be true
without what the theory says about the fundamental structure of 
the universe being correct or ‘essentially’ or ‘basically’ correct. 
(Worrall 1989, 101)
Zahar takes a more elaborate position on the matter. He puts the argument 
as follows:
17
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It is highly unlikely that organically compact hypotheses should 
either explain the facts in a systematic and non ad hoc way or 
should establish hitherto unsuspected connection between these 
facts, without simultaneously being at least approximately true; i.e. 
without reflecting, in a way more or less approximate, real 
connections between individuals. This is because the various 
components of a unified system are so closely knit together that a 
considerable departure of any one of them from the truth would 
have repercussions throughout the system, hence lead to a 
refutation somewhere in its empirical domain (Zahar 1994a, 1).
This way of putting the argument concentrates on the structural form of the 
theory and its hypotheses, and the fact that this structure is “closely knit” in a 
unified system.
Due to his belief that these are the two chief arguments, Worrall 
claims that only a position that can have both arguments on its side can be 
satisfactory. He thinks that structural realism is such position, i.e. a position 
that
both [underwrites] the ‘no miracles’ argument and [accepts] an 
accurate account of the extent of theory change in science (Worrall 
1989, 117).
So, what is structural realism, and how it can have both arguments on 
its side?
Zahar suggests a rank of realism. He begins with metaphysical 
realism3 and methodological realism4, which do not bear centrally on my 
concerns here. Structural realism, according to Zahar, is a kind of scientific 
realism that adds a further thesis
3 Metaphysical realism claims that there is one structure of the universe of which our mind 
is a part, so that the mind, while trying to reveal this structure, will be governed by the 
same laws which it wants to reveal.
4 Methodological realism adds a further assumption to metaphysical realism that the 
structure of reality is an intelligible representation of that reality.
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that successful theories, i.e. those unified systems which explain 
the data without ad hoc assumptions, are approximately true. That 
is: such systems reflect, in one way or another, the order of things 
as they are in themselves. Successful hypotheses model and in 
some sense ‘correspond’ to real structure of the world (Zahar 
1994a, 20).
Structural realism differs from other kinds of scientific realism in 
accepting that the only part in the theory that generally should be interpreted 
realistically is the mathematical structure which is said to convey the real 
structure of nature, or at least to approximate that structure. Hence, 
structure gets preserved while content changes. That gives structural realism 
the ability to claim that a theory, despite being a false theory, has the power 
to predict it is the mathematical structure that gives this power to the 
theory. But what does it mean to say that the mathematical structure has the 
power to predict?
Consider, for example, a mathematical structure of a certain 
phenomenon given by a function of the fourth order (F (x) = Ax4+... .+Dx 
+E). This function has two positive peaks. Now, if the experimental data 
give us information about the first peak, but do not provide any data about 
the second peak, then the mathematical structure provides the power to 
predict that there would be another peak. To illustrate this point, I will take 
Worrall’s example, which I will discuss below. In Fresnel’s theory, the 
mathematical equations predict that light incident on a plane surface from a 
direction away from the normal will be reflected according to the light’s state 
of polarisation. It interprets the light to be mechanical vibrations propagating 
in an ether medium. In Maxwell’s new interpretation of light propagation, he 
accepts that light will be reflected according to its state of polarisation, but 
he states that light is an electromagnetic wave propagating in an 
electromagnetic field. In both cases the phenomenon of the light (reflection 
or refraction) is dependent on its state of polarisation. And the same
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mathematical equations were used. Here structural realism will claim that 
such an example shows that while the mathematical structure continued to 
hold, the content changed.
The predictive power, as structural realism claims, is contained in the 
ability of the mathematical equations to give certain results whenever input 
numbers are provided; whether these numbers are interpreted as 'cats' or as 
'lions' is another matter. This is what leads Worrall to argue that the structure 
is what holds a real representation of nature. He thinks that the content of 
the theory can be changed with scientific revolutions, i.e. that the 
interpretation of the variables as cats or lions might change with theory- 
change while the mathematical structure ought to be preserved. Hence, after 
describing the realists’ claims, such as those of Putnam and Boyd, about 
theories in science and how new theories should resemble the old ones, 
Worrall says that the realist’s
intuitions are better captured in a rather different position which 
might be called structural or syntactic realism (Worrall 1989, 112).
1:2:1 Fresnel’s theory
As I mentioned, ‘structure’ - in structural realism - refers to the mathematical 
structure of a theory. The idea is that the highly confirmed theories of mature 
science, those that have the power to predict and unify, have a mathematical 
structure that is capable of surviving scientific revolutions.
To illustrate his position, Worrall gives an example from optics: 
Fresnel’s theory. Fresnel’s theory of diffraction states that light consists of 
vibrations that propagate through a mechanical medium (ether). It states that 
any unpolarised light could be analysed into two components: vertical and 
horizontal. And it gives the reflection and transmission (refraction) 
coefficients of the light polarised in the plane of incidence to be:
20
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„ _ tanC^ -fl)
-*% — tan((9j+^ )
rp _  4sinflI c°sfl1 
■*// sin2^2+sin2^
While the coefficients of the light polarised perpendicular to the plane of 
incidence are
n    sin(fl2~ fl)
1 sin(flj+^ )
rp   2 sin 02 cos 0,
•^1 sin(02+0j)
Where 02 is the angel of reflection or refraction and 0i is the angle of 
the incidence5.
This theory was ‘falsified’ by Maxwell’s theory of optics. The new 
theory assumes that the medium is the field rather than the ether6. Worrall 
claims that the mathematical equations (structure) of Fresnel’s theory can be 
derived from Maxwell’s theory. The important point for Worrall is that the 
structure of Fresnel’s theory is preserved in the new theory. Hence, Fresnel’s 
mathematical equations are still an accurate basis for calculation. This 
success in preserving the structure leads Worrall to conclude:
Thus if we restrict ourselves to the level of mathematical equations 
- not notice the phenomenal level - there is in fact complete 
continuity between Fresnel’s and Maxwell’s theories (Worrall 
1989, 119).
In this example Worrall accepts that even if Fresnel’s theory is built 
on the false assumption that there exists an ether medium, its mathematical 
structure is ‘right’. Now under the new theory -  Maxwell’s - the same 
structure continues to capture the phenomenon. The new theory needs only, 
(due to the fact that the content of Fresnel’s theory was found to be wrong,) 
to reinterpret the symbols of the structure in a different way; i.e. to suggest a 
new content. Fresnel’s theory asserts that the vibrations, which are
5 See Smith and Thomson 1982.
6 It is more accurate to say that Maxwell’s theory rejected the idea of the light’s need for 
an ether medium and assumed a totally different theoretical frame, that of saying that the 
light waves are electromagnetic waves that propagate through a field.
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responsible for the way in which the theory represents the coefficients, are 
vibrations in the ether medium. Maxwell’s theory replaced this identification 
of the vibration (with the ether medium) with another identification related to 
the electromagnetic field. Worrall claims that if we “do not notice the 
phenomenal level” we can see that the mathematical form of Maxwell’s 
theory resembles that of Fresnel’s. So, Worrall thinks the mathematical 
structure was capable of surviving through scientific revolutions while the 
content of Fresnel’s theory was replaced with another content.
The main idea here is that if the old mathematical structure continues 
to yield correct results, and if the new theory retains the mathematical 
equations of the old theory, then this is a very good reason (in structural 
realism’s term), to be optimistic in suggesting that this mathematical 
structure reflects the underlying structure of the universe.
Structural realism ignores all the elements that constitute the theory 
except the mathematical equations. The rest of the theory elements, 
according to Worrall, would be on what he calls the ‘phenomenal level’. But 
any theoretical model (or even a phenomenological model for that matter) 
consists, as I will argue in the next chapter, of: the mathematical equations, a 
description of the phenomenon under study including its environmental set­
up, and a story that usually connects the symbols of the mathematical 
structure with the real entities of the world.
In Fresnel’s case we do not have a fundamental theory like that of 
Newton’s or Einstein’s which is associated with different types of 
phenomena; we have a theoretical representation related to the reflection and 
refraction of light. Fresnel’s ‘theory’ represents a kind of theoretical model. 
It gives a story telling us that light propagates through an ether medium. It 
associates certain properties of the phenomena with the symbols in the 
mathematical equation, such as associating the properties of the vibration of 
light with the refraction (T) and reflection (R) phenomena. It is also 
important to mention that the only measurements that take place are the
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angles of refraction and reflection7. So, from Fresnel’s perspective the 
ontology in which the phenomenon occurs is the ether medium. The new 
theory associates the phenomenon with a different picture that would prove 
that the previous understanding of the phenomenon is false. Therefore, it 
needs to present another story.
I think structural realism would face a problem here. The new theory 
has a different understanding of the phenomenal set-up than the old one, in 
the sense that it assigns to it a different ontology. It claims that ‘light is an 
electromagnetic wave that propagates in an electromagnetic field’ rather than 
‘light is a wave that propagates in an ether medium’. Now, if a person wants 
to accept that theories represent nature then they should not rule out the 
importance of the ontological bases in both theories: ether versus fields ~  
there exists one nature and either it is a nature with fields or a nature with 
ether. Structural realists claim that the only aspect of reality we have good 
reason to believe that we are describing correctly, is its structure. As 
Poincare puts it:
These are merely names of the images we substituted between 
these real objects which Nature will hide from us for ever from 
our eyes. The true relations between these real objects are the 
only reality we can attain, (quoted in Worrall 1989, 118)
These relations are given by the mathematical structure even if we do not 
know what these entities are. They claim that we can change our 
understanding of these entities when a change of evidence occurs, while the 
mathematical structure that relates these entities will not change. But, the 
structure is not the only thing that will survive scientific revolutions; and not 
all structures will be retained.
7 Some times these laws are stated using the concepts of refiaction and reflection indexes. 
It will make no difference on calculations because these two indexes are defined using the 
refraction, reflection and incidence angels, nevertheless I prefer using the angles, because 
they are directly related to the phenomena.
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Psillos (1995a, 15-46) challenges the structural realist claim -- that 
the new theories preserve only structure but not content -- by saying that in 
the new theories, some of the physical interpretation of the mathematical 
structure is also retained. He analyses Worrairs example of FresnePs law and 
shows that some non-structural features of Fresnel's interpretation of the 
wave-equation, for example:
transversality, ability to sustain potential and kinetic energy, finite 
velocity of propagation and others (Psillos 1995a, 19) 
were retained in Maxwell’s theory. Although this claim might be true for 
Worrall’s (1989) position it might not hold against Zahar’s (1994) position. 
Zahar agrees that some of the content of older theories might get retained in 
the new ones. But the important point for him is that only structure is what is 
regularly retained in the new theory, in cases where it takes over the 
predictive successes of the old. Any necessary change would be applied to 
the content. If some of the content is preserved after that, then that is fine 
but it ought not be a presupposition that the new theory would preserve any 
content. But before I go into Psillos critiques of structural realism let me 
discuss how structural realism thinks it answers the pessimistic meta­
induction critique and how it thinks it can hold the argument from scientific 
revolutions on its side.
1:3 Structural Realism and the pessimistic meta-induction
Structural realism tries to overcome the difficulties suggested by the fact that 
even the highly successful theories, like Newton’s, had turned out to be false 
due to new discoveries. As I mentioned earlier, the debate about realism was 
overshadowed by two main arguments: the no-miracle argument and the 
pessimistic meta-induction. The pessimistic meta-induction argument against 
realism has two parts:
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1) The empirical evidence supporting a theory does not give enough 
warrant that the theory is true or even approximately true. The 
history of science shows that many theories that had good 
empirical support have proved to be false. Current scientific 
theories are not in a better status than their ancestors are and it is 
highly probable that they too will turn out to be false. Hence, there 
are no grounds to believe that our current successful scientific 
theories do represent the world.
2) Even if some of the new scientific theories are using the same 
terminology as the old theories, there is a discontinuity of what 
these terms mean, as well as a discontinuity at the 
structural level.
Structural realism answers these objections mainly by two ‘steps’:
1) The history of science shows that mature scientific theories with a 
high empirical support often have a structure that can survive 
scientific revolutions. So, yes, some of the scientific theories 
cannot be true or even approximately true unless we want to 
stretch the meaning of approximately true ‘beyond the breaking 
point’ (Worrall 1989, 107); but mature theories often have 
mathematical structure which can ‘mirror reality’. Everything else 
in the scientific theory is likely to be false, and if some of the 
content of a theory survived through theory change, then that is a 
bonus. Through theory change there is continuity on the structural 
level and not necessarily on the content level.
2) In the case of structural change, the structure of the new scientific 
theory should yield that of the old theory at a certain limit. The 
correspondence principle is the key device that ensures scientific 
continuity and realism.
By using such an argument, structural realism secures the no-miracle 
argument by claiming that it is no miracle that scientific theories work
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because the structures of these theories represent true relations in nature, or 
at least approximately do so. Nevertheless, the argument from scientific 
revolutions still holds, because sometimes, as structural realism would argue, 
to say that a theory (with its structure and content) is (even) an 
approximately true theory cannot hold except by taking the concept of 
approximately true beyond its breaking point.
So, according to structural realism, the argument from scientific 
revolutions is right on one part of theories, but wrong on the other. This 
argument is right if the content of a theory is accepted to be as the 
representative part of that theory. But it is not right if the realist take only the 
structure to be the representative part of the theory.
Other scientific realists argue that there might be a way out for 
scientific realism from the pessimistic meta-induction, without giving in to it. 
Psillos disagrees with structural realism because it differentiates between the 
structure of the theory and its content. He claims that the mathematical 
equations of scientific theories are not semantically free. He says:
a scientific realist can explain the fact that mathematical 
equations are retained in theory-change, on the grounds that they 
form an integral part of well-supported and (approximately) true 
theories. But she would not claim that all that is retained is 
empirical content and (un-interpreted) mathematical equations.
Nor would she claim that there is a dichotomy between the 
structure and the content of physical process. (Psillos 1995a, 19)
He claims that scientific realism can offer a proper reply to the 
pessimistic meta-induction, without the concessions that structural realism 
make. He claims that if the forms that are preserved from the abandoned 
theories are those responsible for the empirical success of these abandoned 
theories, then scientific realism can be defended in face of the pessimistic 
meta-induction.
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To overcome the pessimistic meta-induction Psillos suggests another 
type of theory division. Let us first look at his general claims about scientific 
realism. Psillos (1994, 1995a, 1995b, 1996) claims that scientific realism 
offers the following theses:
1) Through theory-change, not only the structure is retained but also 
“some of the properties incorporated into the physical 
interpretation of the mathematical equation.”
2) Scientific knowledge is cumulative: the new ‘full’ physical content 
of new theories, which incorporated some of the old content, is 
“better supported by current evidence”. New theories can interpret 
the mathematical equations better than their ancestors can because 
the evidence we have supports them more than it supports the 
interpretation of old theories.
3) Due to the fact that new theories enjoy better support than old 
theories, we should be optimistic rather than pessimistic about the 
development of science: New theories are more likely to be true 
than false.
Psillos divides Laudan’s list of ‘successful-yet-false’ theories into two 
categories: Theories that were taken to be merely speculations, while others 
were “taken to be rather firmly supported by the evidence and entrenched 
background beliefs” (Psillos 1995b, 7). Psillos accepts only two theories 
from Laudan’s list to be in the second category. These are “the caloric theory 
of heat and the whole family of ether-theories” (Psillos 1995b, 9). However, 
Psillos argues that in order to overcome Laudan’s attack, the realist ought to 
prove that the central terms of the theories from the second category refer. 
This is because these theories are firmly supported by evidence, and because 
realists believe in the no-miracle argument; therefore, the limited success of 
these theories means that they capture real aspects of nature and this success 
by itself is not a mere miracle. Psillos shows, in two case studies, that what
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would be considered as central terms in these theories had been retained in 
the new theories.
The move that Psillos introduces is what he calls “divide et impera” 
(Psillos 1996, 1): scientific theory can be divided into two parts, one consists 
of the claims that contributed to successes in science: working postulates; 
and second consists of the idle components. This move, he says,
suggests that if it turns out that the theoretical constituents that 
were responsible for the empirical success of otherwise abandoned 
theories are those that have been retained in our current scientific 
image, then a substantive version of scientific realism can still be 
defended (Psillos 1996, 3).
Here, his strategy is similar to that of structural realism in that we ought to 
divide the theories -- although they disagree on where the division lies. 
According to structural realism, the division is clear: structure versus 
content. Psillos poses two questions: 1) what justifies the claim that not all 
components of a theory contribute equally or equally well to successes in 
science? And 2) is the division really in agreement with the development 
in science?
Psillos wants to focus on ‘specific* successes of old theories. Like 
Worrall, he considers Fresnel’s theory of diffraction as an example. 
He says:
if an opaque disk intercepts rays emitted by light source, a bright 
spot will appear at the centre of its shadow (Psillos 1996, 5).
He claims that the hypotheses essentially involved in generating this 
successful prediction, i.e. that the light-waves have a transversal character, 
were “carried over” to the new theory of light.
But what Psillos claims is persevered here, is not a hypothesis of a 
theory, even if the theory will deploy such a fact as a hypothesis. Elsewhere, 
(Psillos 1996, pp 34-35) Psillos admits that Fresnel reached his original
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hypothesis from his experimental observations (with Arago). He quoted 
Fresnel saying:
we [i.e. Fresnel and Arago] both felt that these facts would be 
explained very simply, if the vibrations (oscillatory movements) 
of the polarised waves took place in the plane itself of these 
waves [i.e. if they are transversal] (Psillos 1996, p 34).
He also admits that Fresnel did not use mechanics in his hypothesis. This 
theoretical hypothesis correlated with the experimental observation led 
Fresnel to believe that a bright spot would appear at the centre of 
the shadow.
But later this fact, i.e. that a bright spot would appear at the centre of 
the shadow, was proved through experimental verification to be a 
phenomenal fact, i.e. a fact that is observed experimentally and is very well 
described independently of the high-level theoretical representation of 
Fresnel’s theory. I am not speaking here about the mere empirical 
observation of a bright spot at the centre of the shadow. I am speaking about 
the phenomenal level, that is the empirical observation with the description of 
the set-up and of the movement of the light. I.e. the simple description 
deployed by Fresnel and Arago plus the experimental verification and the 
experimental set-up which led to this verification8, without the assumption 
that light propagates in an ether medium. At that level, it is a fact that the 
bright spot would appear at the centre of the shadow and this fact is very 
well described by the movement of light in relation to the set-up. This is 
regardless of the high-level theory that suggests that the light movement is 
propagation in an ether medium or in a field.
Now, the new theory would of course carry over such a hypothesis 
exactly because it is experimentally verified, and hence it is from the point of 
view of the new theory part of the empirical and phenomenal basis of that
8 This kind of theoretical explanation is called phenomenological model. This will be 
discussed in details in chapter three.
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new theory. What I mean is that this fact is not a hypothesis from the point 
of view of the new theory anymore. This is because when Fresnel suggested 
such a hypothesis, sets of experiments were performed in order to verify the 
hypothesis. The mere fact that it was found to be true, is what renders it as a 
phenomenal fact. Hence, and after such verification, the new theory cannot 
proclaim it as a hypothesis.
In the cases Psillos cites, it is easy to show that: these theoretical 
forms are a straightforward theoretical account of the phenomenal/ 
experimental facts and are called, as I will argue in chapter three, 
phenomenological models. In these cases there is a lot of theorising going on 
but that does not lead to the conclusion that the theories, which the models 
take their tools from, are to be taken as true as the phenomenological model 
would be. The reason lies in the way these models are constructed and when 
and why the theoretical description and explanation come into place (as in 
the case of Fresnel and Arago’s simple description). High-level theoretical 
representations, which are expressed by theoretical models, contain more 
than this descriptive move. Theoretical models have an unaccepted 
explanation of the phenomenon, claiming that this explanation is ‘the real’ 
cause that ‘explains’ why the phenomenon exists. Some examples of these 
models would be: Cooper pairs in superconductivity, mesons in high energy 
physics, strings in super strings theory and Fermi surface or Fermi sea in 
solid state physics. These kinds of models don’t have straightforward 
experimental support, while the phenomenological models do have such 
support.
A simple example of the description associated with low-level 
theoretical models would be the case of electrons. In a chemical electrical 
circuit we know that the number of negatively charged particles on the 
cathode should rise, whenever the circuit is closed, until the anode is ionised 
completely. Now our description that there ‘exist negatively charged 
particles called electrons’ is supported by the observation of the rise of the
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negative charge detection at the cathode. This account is not enough to claim 
that electrons are real, because up to this point, we did not test this existence 
in a different experimental context to verify this claim. A further move is 
needed: if we can, after accepting this description, develop another 
experimental set-up, in which we would use the properties of electrons and 
we succeeded then the claim that electrons exist and they are real entities has 
good empirical and phenomenological support. Such a move might be the 
development of electrical equipment9.
The problem for Psillos’ position would be captured by the question: 
how would we be able to define accurately which parts of the theory we 
ought to accept as real representatives of nature from the parts which are 
merely a working postulate which might turn out to be wrong?
One might say that a careful look at the failed theories, in relation to 
what we accept as good theories at the current moment, might give us the 
information to decide which parts of the old theories still hold. This is a 
redundant exercise, because even if we know now what parts of the failed 
theories were retained, that would not give us any information about the 
current theories and their parts, which should be accepted as real 
representations of nature from those parts which are not. It appears that 
there is little in common between the parts that have been retained in the 
past. Sometimes it is the structure; sometimes it is this or that postulate 
related to the content. Therefore, we would not be able to assert which parts 
of the current theories would have the same fate. I think that finding a way 
out from such a dilemma would not be possible by merely looking for 
common grounds in theoretical forms. Rather there is a need to look at the 
processes in which these theoretical forms were constructed and which ones 
were retained in relation to these processes.
9 Ian Hacking gives another instance where we “manipulate” electrons: the electron 
microscope. Nevertheless, Hacking confines himself to accept only the entity realism but 
not any theoretical description associated with the entity. See Hacking 1983 for details.
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So, while structural realism gives us a clear-cut account of what is to 
be interpreted as a real representation of nature — the mathematical structure 
—, Psillos fails to clarify this distinction in the case of “divide et impera”, 
other than by pointing to the properties which are related to 
phenomenological models. If these are all that we can accept from the old 
theories then phenomenological realism seems the way to go.
1:4 Mathematics and scientific discoveries
In this section I want to explore more aspects of structural realism’s view on 
structure and its importance for scientific discovery. For structural realism 
the structure is the essential part of any scientific theory which would be 
preserved through theory change. A realistic interpretation of the 
mathematical terms would help, according to structural realism, in presenting 
a coherent, and physically meaningful structure. Here I will only state the 
structural realist’s view, and I will leave discussing it to chapter two.
So, how could a realistic interpretation of the mathematical equations 
serve science from the point of view of structural realism? Zahar answers this 
question in two ways. First, by interpreting the mathematical terms 
realistically they can become
physically meaningful, hence testable, at least in principle. The 
theory remains syntactically unchanged, but its observational 
content, i.e. its content with ‘observable’ reality, is extended 
(Zahar 1980, 8).
Second, it leads to new discoveries. Zahar claims that a realistic 
interpretation of the theory (mathematical equations) would lead to the 
discovery of new relations between elements of nature, relations not yet 
known. Zahar states that if a hypothesis H in a previous theory needs to be 
modified because it is in disagreement with a well-confirmed set of laws, a 
hypothesis H*(t) would be suggested as a substitution of H. Now t can be
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given an interpretation that subsumes it under a certain category obeying 
certain laws. Suppose H*(t) violates these laws. Then H*(t) should be 
modified yet again. A real
breakthrough is achieved when H*(t) is modified into H’ (t) 
which conforms to the laws in question (Zahar 1980, 8).
Zahar claims that the set of procedures that is taken in modifying H 
into H’ (t) would seem purely deductive (on a metalevel).
Zahar concludes from the claim about the role of interpreting the 
mathematical equation realistically in new discoveries, a more general one, 
which goes from the mathematical structure of a given physical theory to the 
possible mathematical structures. He says:
The mathematical form of a successful theory models and hence 
reveals the structure of a universe which remains largely 
inaccessible to our senses. Therefore, by speculating about the 
possible mathematical structures of our physical laws, we may be 
able to devise fruitful heuristic strategies (Zahar 1994a, 28).
Such a belief in the mathematical structure as revealing the 
inaccessible structure of the universe is justified by structural realism’s 
account of scientific discovery. Zahar stresses:
Our knowledge of the external world is thus coextensive with that 
of the syntax or of mathematical structure of empirically successful 
theories. I.e. the syntax of the unified theories, which predict novel 
facts or establish unsuspected connections between disparate data, 
must be taken to reflect the ontological order o f things (my Italics. 
Zahar 1994a, 13).
Thus the mathematical structures, as the structural realist will claim, are the 
best structures we have that can reflect the structure of an ontological order 
o f things o f an otherwise inaccessible universe. Thus structural realism 
claims that a realistic interpretation of the mathematical equations can serve 
the development of science.
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One should not fail to note that experiments constrain the 
interpretation of the mathematical equations, that it is the phenomena that 
give the experimental data, and that the mathematical representation of these 
experimental data is provided, most of the time, after the data. So, the 
relations between the elements and properties of the phenomena are provided 
by experimentation. Therefore, what physicists’ face is not a case of having a 
vague mathematical equation presented to them by God and all they need is 
to interpret its symbols. What physicists’ face is a set of relations provided by 
what they can apply of their knowledge to test the phenomenon.
Let me give an example. In deriving the laws of uniformly accelerated 
motion, we prepare a set of experiments to discover the relations between 
distance and time, acceleration and time, and so on. From these experiments 
we obtain a large amount of experimental data that can provide reasonable 
plots from which we can infer mathematical forms. The set of relations and 
the story, as I will show later in chapter three, provide the bases in which a 
mathematical form is suggested as a part of a representative model of the 
phenomena under study. As I will argue, there are two distinct types of 
theoretical forms in physics. The main difference between them is in the way 
they are built. One depends on a top-down approach and the other on a 
bottom-up approach. Both types of theoretical forms require some sort of a 
story to link the mathematical equation with the properties of the 
phenomena. The difference between these two types of story is that one 
depends entirely on elements drawn from the set of experimental activities, 
while the other depends on the theoretical coherency with the theoretical 
frame. In the high-level theoretical representations the story would depend 
on other theoretical models that are, mostly, questionable. Structural realism 
suggests that in a new theory the terms of the mathematical equation be 
reinterpreted. This means that the underlying approach toward the theoretical 
forms is that of a top-down approach.
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1:5 Structural realism and the correspondence principle
We need one final ingredient to understand structural realism: the use of the 
correspondence principle. I shall introduce the correspondence principle here 
for completeness, but delay a critical discussion until the next chapter. In 
certain cases, the new theory presents a structure which does not resemble 
the old, well-supported structure. Take Einstein’s theory for example. It 
presents a “totally” new structure that differs from Newton’s theory. In such 
cases, in order for structural realism to claim that there is a justified 
mathematical connection between the mathematical structure of the new 
theory and that of the old, it needs a type of correspondence between the 
two theories. As Zahar says, the relation between new theories and old ones 
is described by the Correspondence Principle, along with secondary 
requirements like Lorentz-covariance, derivability from a principle of least 
action or variation principle and the possibility of a Hamiltonian formulation 
of the laws to be constructed (Zahar 1994a, 4). This position is essential for 
structural realists. Mathematics is a deductive science, and, they argue, if 
there is to be a mathematical continuity between the mature old and highly 
confirmed theory and a new one, then the mathematical structure of the new 
theory should yield the ‘old’ one at a certain limit. And due to the 
importance of the mathematical structure, from structural realism point-of- 
view, the type of correspondence needs to be formal.
So, how does structural realism state the Correspondence Principle? 
Suppose we have a highly confirmed and logically consistent theory T (i.e. 
mature) that gives a well confirmed law (p which accounts for phenomena 
{pi} in the domain D. Suppose also that some new experimental evidence 
leads to the breakdown of q> outside the domain D (i.e. a refutation of T). A 
theory T’ is suggested. If T’ has constructed a new equation Q that accounts 
for the same phenomena {pi} and avoids the refutation of cp, then structural
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realism suggests that £2 ought to yield cp at a certain limit. That is if £2 is a 
function, let us say of X, then £2 -» cp as X -» 0, when X is an appropriate 
parameter of £2 (such as v/c) that picks out in some way the old domain D in 
which T was successful.
Zahar gives the relation between Planck’s version of the second law 
of motion and that of Newton’s as an example of a correspondence between 
a new and an ‘old theory’. Planck suggested that
Now the correspondence between this structure and that of Newton can be 
achieved by taking v/c -> 0
(I will discuss this example in detail in the next chapter.) Hence, the new 
theory yielded the old one in a certain limit.
One other thing is important here: that the propositions of the old 
theory are approximately preserved through revolutions. Zahar claims:
There ought to be a translation of the old system into the new one, 
such that:
a) all observational functions and predicates remain unchanged, 
and
b) the old axioms are transformed into theorems, or into limited 
cases of theorems of the new theory (Zahar 1994a, 18).
1:6 Conclusions
In this section I will outline the basic elements of this chapter. Structural 
realism is a type of scientific realism that asserts a distinction between the 
structure and the content of a theory. This is where the mathematical
v/c-*0
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structure is the true representation of the structure of nature, while the 
content of the theory is related to the interpretation of the terms. Through a 
scientific revolution, the structure can be passed on to the new theory, either 
without any change or as a limiting case of the new structure, while the 
content can be reinterpreted. The key element in this continuity between the 
old and the new theory, according to structural realism, is the 
correspondence principle. Due to the fact that the most important element in 
the theory is the mathematical structure, it is claimed that this 
correspondence between the new and old theory is a formal one.
Hence, structural realism states that it is highly unlikely that the 
mathematical structure
should either explain the facts in a systematic and non ad hoc 
way or should establish hitherto unsuspected connections 
between these facts, without simultaneously being at least 
approximately true; i.e. without reflecting, in a way more or less 
approximate, real connections between individuals (Zahar 
1994a, 1)
(i.e. the no-miracle argument). It also states that through theory-change this 
mathematical structure is retained (i.e. an optimistic interpretation of 
scientific revolutions).
Such a position appears to accommodate the two main arguments in 
the realism/anti-realism debate on its side. That is, by differentiating the 
structure of the theory from its content, it succeeds in holding onto a realist 
position which claims that the structure of the theory capture the structure of 
reality. But it also accepts the argument from scientific revolutions by 
assuming that although the structure survives scientific revolutions through 
the correspondence principle, the content is nevertheless reinterpreted. But 
can such a position be mapped onto scientific practice?
First: the position, in a way, goes too far in putting the emphasis on 
the mathematical structure. This does not leave any weight for the
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interpretation of that mathematical structure. But theories need this 
interpretation to provide any kind of relation to reality. Hence, the 
mathematical structure is not sufficient to represent nature. Strong emphasis 
on the mathematical structure leads to loose relations to nature. In addition 
this is not what happens in physics. In most cases in physics the theoretical 
forms give a story that gives an account of why the mathematical structure 
ought to be accepted. This story is important in judging the acceptability of 
any model as a real representation of nature.
Second, to secure structural continuity between the old and the new 
theory, at least in a certain limit, structural realism relies on the 
correspondence principle. The correspondence principle acts as a heuristic 
devise to make sure that the well-confirmed structures are preserved. But, 
being totally formal, the structural realists’ definition of the correspondence 
principle does not comply with physics10. The aim of next chapter will be to 
further illustrate and support this point.
10 Many philosophical discussions had concentrated on the importance of a generalised 
correspondence principle, (See for instant Radder 1991 and 1997, French (ed.) 1991), I do 
not pursue the same line of argumentation. I will draw my conclusions out of the 
correspondence principle as applied and understood in physics.
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2:1 Introduction
The Correspondence Principle
In this chapter I will show that the structural realist understanding of the 
correspondence principle does not fit physics. I will put forward two theses:
1) If we take the cases where structural realism claims that structural 
continuity is preserved via the type of correspondence its authors 
describe, we will find that some of these cases are not in 
agreement with the claims of structural realism. I illustrate this 
point by means of an example from quantum mechanics in 
section 2:3.
2) I will also show that structural realism tailors its definition of the 
formal correspondence principle to suit the needs of structural 
continuity. The types of “formal” correspondence that are 
accepted in physics would not support their claims. As a result, the 
structural realist definition of the correspondence principle makes 
too much and too little of correspondence. Too much because in 
order to secure what it sees as a defensible kind of realism, it 
demands a very restricted type of correspondence which often 
does not obtain. And too little because it downplays the 
importance of other kinds of correspondence that have been 
centrally employed in science.
2:2 Zahar and the Correspondence Principle 
as a meta-statement
Zahar asserts that until recently there was a sharp distinction in the 
philosophy of science between the ‘context of discovery’ and the ‘context of 
justification’, where only the second lies in the
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domain of methodology, whose proper task is to evaluate 
theories supposed to be laid on the table, i.e. supposed to have 
already been constructed. (Zaharl983a, 243).
He argues that this distinction does not hold any more and it is possible to 
speak about the context of discovery on a methodological level. His idea is 
both to underline the continuity between science and common 
sense knowledge and to remove some of the mystery 
surrounding the notion of heuristics by showing that, at any rate 
in some programmes, they operate purely deductively (at the 
metalevel) (Zahar 1983a, 245).
Accordingly, he wants to develop a general method of constructing theories 
by examining the methods actually used in constructing them. In doing so, 
Zahar is trying to answer two questions: “is there in physical science such a 
thing as rational heuristics, and if so, how does it operate?” He replies by 
confirming that there are “rational heuristics”, which include “The 
Correspondence Principle”.
Zahar has a very restricted account of the correspondence principle: 
he thinks that it works from the old theory to the new one. He says: “yet in 
all that [ways of correspondence], we remain strictly within the boundaries of 
deductive logic” (Zahar 1983a, 247). He interprets Poincare’s position on 
the correspondence principle as saying
if an old hypothesis H turns out to have been systematically 
‘convenient’ throughout some domain D, it is improbable that this 
should be due to pure chance; it can be assumed that H reveals 
true relations which ought to reappear perhaps in a slightly 
modified form, within a new theory T. In other words T must tend 
to H whenever certain parameters, by tending to zero, restrict T to 
the domain D (Zahar 1983b, 163).
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Zahar claims that by using the correspondence principle the new 
theory’s mathematical form can be seen as derived from the old theory. He 
acknowledges the fact that the correspondence principle was applied in 
physics long before Bohr introduced it in quantum mechanics. It is helpful to 
quote one of Zahar’s examples in full. He says:
As an important illustration of the correspondence principle let us 
examine Planck’s modification of Newton’s second law of motion. 
Planck used the equation:
/  =js(mv) (2.1)
in order to derive
7  = 1 ( t ^ )  (2 .2)
which is in general incompatible with classical dynamics. Planck 
proceeded as follows: taking stock of Einstein’s approach, he 
demanded that Newton’s second law
f - m a  = f - ^ ( m v )  = 0 (2.3)
be replaced by a Lorentz-covariant equation vj/ = 0. Planck knew
that the Lorentz transformation tends to the Galilean one when
— ► — ►
v/ c -» 0 . He thus required that y/ -» ( J - m a )  when v/ c -» 0. It
—► —>
follows by continuity that y/Q = { f - m a ) , where \j/0 denotes the
value of \j/ for v = 0. He had then to find a particular case where 
both some force and its transformation law are known 
independently of the motion caused by the force. Lorentz, Einstein 
and Poincare had already determined the transformation rules for 
the electromagnetic field and, and long before that, Lorentz had 
found the force acting on an electron to be equal to 
e(E+ 7 x H ) ; ... Planck chose a moving inertial frame in which the
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electron is instantaneously at rest; he applied the law f ' -ma '=  0
to the immobile electron, thus obtaining eE'-ma'=0... he finally 
applied an inverse Lorentz transformation which took him back to 
the stationary frame and yielded the equation
Since the left-hand side is the so-called Lorentz-force, Planck 
equated the force with the dynamical vector
which had hitherto been regarded as the foundation stone o f the 
whole o f physics, by a proof involving the Correspondence 
Principle applied to that same law (my italics, Zahar 1983a, 247- 
248).
Zahar thinks of the correspondence principle as a ‘rational heuristics’ 
which guides scientific discovery. This heuristic rule can operate in a 
deductive way on the meta-level, given a rich enough set of other 
assumptions. Zahar claims that such a rule helps to present a reconstruction 
of a presumed logical deduction of the new theory out of the old. He 
assumes that Planck used equation 2.1 in order to derive equation 2.2. This 
goes as follows. On Zahar’s account, Planck required that the new theory \|/ 
ought to retrieve Newton’s law of motion at a certain limit. Then he was 
able, using this heuristic rule and using other premises like the transformation 
rules, to derive \j/ logically. So, according to Zahar the structure of Planck’s 
derivation is: if the old theory is O, the correspondence principle will guide 
us to accept that any new theory N ought to yield O at certain limit. So, we 
try to find N by assuming O with some other scientifically plausible premises
(2.4)
(2.5)
Thus he overthrew Newton's law o f motion
f  = a(mv)  (2.6)
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(P), such that (O and P) |— N. Hence Zahar’s final remark “thus we 
overthrew Newton’s law of motion ... by a proof involving the 
correspondence principle applied to that same law.”
Because structural realists think of structural continuity as a 
continuity at the mathematical level, they need only to make sure that, in 
theory-change, the mathematical equations of the old and highly successful 
theory are preserved at least under limiting conditions. In their view, this 
preservation of the mathematical structure secures the empirical success of 
the old theory, since the mathematical structure represents nature. Hence, by 
securing mathematical or structural continuity between the old theory and 
the new one, the empirical success of the new theory, at least in the old 
domain, is supposed to be guaranteed. This kind of correspondence is known 
as formal correspondence. Other kinds of correspondence such as numerical 
correspondence and conceptual correspondence do not interest structural 
realism. This is simply because the conceptual continuity between the old 
theory and the new one is merely a bonus, and the numerical continuity is 
preserved via the structural continuity, or this is at least what structural 
realists might claim1.
So, structural realism makes the following assumptions about the 
correspondence principle:
1) The correspondence principle is, as Zahar puts it:
Let q> = 0 denote a known law which is to be modified; the 
correspondence principle could read as follows: ‘The new law is 
of the form \j/ = 0, where \|/ is a function of a quantity X such that 
\j/ —> cp as X —> 0’ (X may be some known parameter like v/c) 
(Zahar 1983a, 249)
1 It is important in this context to acknowledge that in certain cases with the development 
of the technical equipment and with the change of the theoretical understanding of certain 
observations the numerical value of the new form would not resemble the old value.
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2) The correspondence principle is a formal device to secure structural 
continuity.
3) Structural continuity is required if the new structure is to retain the 
old successful and well-confirmed structure.
4) Hence, the correspondence principle works on the meta-level from 
the old theory to the new theory.
Let us therefore concentrate on formal correspondence, to see whether the 
structural realism definition and understanding of the correspondence 
principle fits physics.
2:3 Formal correspondence
Consider quantum mechanics and its correspondence to classical mechanics. 
The leading figures who introduced this notion of the relation between the 
emerging new theory in physics and its counterpart in the traditional 
perception of physics were Planck and Bohr. Planck stated in 1906 that by 
taking the limit of Planck’s constant as it goes to zero, such a connection 
could be maintained. Bohr introduced another limit, that of the quantum 
number becoming very large to the extent that the quantum system would 
not anymore be counted as quantum and the classical picture would emerge. 
Nevertheless, in the current status of the quantum theory we would find four 
kinds of formal correspondence between quantum and classical mechanics.
2:3:1 The old correspondence principle
Planck formulated the correspondence principle for the first time in 1906:
l i m [Quantum physics] = [Classical physics]
/>-> o
He demonstrated that the radiation law for the energy density at frequency v:
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hv1
(2.7)
corresponds in the limit »-* o to the classical Rayliegh-Jeans law:
&7i k'Tv2
“00 =  — - 3—  (2.8)
V
 (2.8)
where k is Boltzmann’s constant, T is the temperature and c is the speed of 
light. This kind of correspondence entails that the new theory should 
resemble the old one not just at the mathematical level but also at the 
conceptual level as well. Let us remember that this kind of correspondence 
was important for Planck to assert the relation between his ‘radical’ 
assumption of discrete energy levels that are proportional to the frequency, 
and the classical theory. Hence, Planck insists that the terms in the new 
equation refer to the very same classical properties.
The old correspondence principle secures continuity at the conceptual 
level as well. Hence, it is not a paradigm case for structural realism because 
structural realism maintains that such approximation between the new and 
old theory at the conceptual level can generally only be accepted “by 
stretching the admittedly vague and therefore elastic notion of 
‘approximation’ beyond breaking point” (Worrall 1989, 107).
2:3:2 Configuration correspondence principle
This claims that the quantum laws correspond to the classical laws when the 
probability density of the quantum state coincides with the classical 
probability density. Take, for example, a harmonic oscillator that has a 
classical probability density:
(2.9)
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where x is the displacement. N ow  if we superimpose the plot o f  this
probability with that o f  the quantum probability density \ i f / n \ 2 o f  the
eigenstates o f the system and take (quantum number) n —» oo, we will obtain 
figure 1 below. As Richard Liboff, a leading expert in the field, notes 
Clearly, the classical probability density Pc does not follow the
quantum probability density \ y / n\2 . Instead, we see that it follows 
the local average in the limit o f  large quantum numbers n:
(2 .10)pc(* )  =  ( f e w )  =  ( k f )  =  i  \\v.(y
the interval e decreases with increasing quantum number n (Liboff 
1984, 52).
Prob. Density 
C
I ■ I I
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C= classical prob.  
Q= quan tum  prob.
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Figure 1
Structural realism argues that by the correspondence principle, the 
new theory ought to  retain the structure o f the old theory. But in the case o f 
the configuration correspondence principle, the new equation does not retain 
the exact structure o f  the old. As it can be seen from equations 2:9 and 2:10 
the average value o f  P in the new theory coincides with the value o f  P in the 
old theory, i.e. the structure o f the old theory was not retained.
Hence, this kind o f  correspondence will not serve the purposes o f  
structural realism. Let us remember that structural realism concentrates on
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the mathematical forms rather than on the numerical values. In this case, the 
average of the probability density in the limit of large quantum number 
coincides with the classical probability. This coincidence is merely numerical. 
If the old and well-supported form is not preserved via correspondence then 
this kind of correspondence is no good for structural realism. For that we 
would need to show that the limit of quantum probability density is the 
classical probability and not that the limit of the average of quantum 
probability coincides with the classical probability.
2:3:3 The frequency correspondence principle
The third type of correspondence is that known in quantum mechanics’ 
books as the Bohr Correspondence Principle (or Frequency correspondence 
principle)2. This claims that the classical results should emerge as a limiting 
case of the quantum results in the limits n ->  oo (the quantum number) and 
h -> 0 (Planck’s constant). Then in the case of frequency the quantum value 
should be equal to the classical value, e.g. oQ = vc . In most cases in 
quantum mechanics we find that the quantum frequency would coalesce with 
the classical frequency in the limit n -> oo and h —» 0.
This kind of correspondence might also generate problems for 
structural realism. One obvious problem relates to the assumption that 
Planck’s constant goes to zero. What is the meaning of saying that ‘a 
constant goes to zero’?3 A constant is a number which has the same value at 
all times and having it as zero is contradictory, unless it is zero. Zahar might 
reply by saying that in correspondence we ought to take the real limiting
2 Oliver Darrigol claims that this kind of correspondence is not what Bohr had in mind 
when he suggested the correspondence principle (Darrigol 1992 and 1995).
3 Of course this point can count also against the old correspondence principle of Planck 
(the first in our list) because it is build on the assumption that the limit is of Planck 
constant going to zero.
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value and not the abstract one. In the case of relativity the limit “c goes to 
infinity” is an abstract one and the real limit should be “v/c goes to zero”. In 
the case of quantum mechanics to classical mechanics one might say that we 
ought to take the limit n -» oo as a better one than h —» 0. The point here is 
that values like c and h are constants and would not tend to go to zero or to 
infinity, but n and v/c are variables - n = (0, 1, 2, 3...) and v/c varies between 
0 when v = 0 to 1 when v = c. This point will not help structural realism 
because it needs both limits to yield the classical equations, as I will 
argue below.
Another objection might be that the value of h should be neglected 
because even if we considered it, it would not affect the outcome. It is 
important to notice here that the choice of the limits is related to our 
previous perception of the relation between the new and the old theory. In 
the case of quantum and classical it tends to say that in the large quantum 
number the quantum system can no longer be perceived as a quantum 
system. The other limit is that of assuming Planck’s constant to go to zero 
because at that limit when Planck’s constant would not affect the system then 
the system is not quantum anymore. Nevertheless, this kind of 
correspondence would continue to have a problem, because in some cases 
the limit n -» oo, as we will see below, would not resemble 
classical mechanics.
Structural realism would need to take that n -» oo and h -» 0 as 
universally equivalent, which means that the results obtained from limiting n 
to infinity should be the same as the results obtained from limiting Planck’s 
constant to zero4. This is so because the limits are applied to the same 
structure and this structure would need to resemble the same classical
4 Let us remember here that Zahar says that ‘various components of a unified system are 
so closely knit together that a considerable departure of any one of them from the truth 
would have repercussions throughout the system’ (1994a, 1).
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structure in order to accept that this classical structure represents true 
relations in nature.
But n —> oo and h ->  0 are not universally equivalent, because at least 
in the case of the quantum frequency (Liboff 1975 and 1984), the limit 
n —> oo does not yield the classical one, while the limit h -> 0 does. What 
occurs here is that, in certain quantum systems, when we take the limit of a 
system when h->0 and take the limit of the same system when n -» oo, we 
will find that the two results are not universally equivalent. In some cases in 
quantum mechanics, like a particle trapped in a cubical box, the frequency in 
the high quantum number domain turns out to be displaced as:
V; +1 =vnq +h/2md
where m is the particle’s mass and d is the length of the box. Such a 
spectrum does not collapse toward the classical frequency in the limit of 
large quantum numbers, while the spectrum of the particle does go over to 
the classical continuum in the limit h -» 0 .
In the case at hand, although the quantum frequency resembles the 
classical frequency in the classical limits in most of the cases, it does not in 
some cases because the empirical set-up of the case would mean that a 
correction term is needed to present the quantum frequency. This correction 
term contains Planck’s constant, but is not related to the quantum number. 
Hence in such cases the two limits will not yield the same result.
In general if we apply the limit h —» 0 to the equation 
v”+1 = v ” + h /2 m d t then the correction term h/2md would vanish and the
quantum frequency will yield the classical frequency. But if we apply the limit 
n —» oo then the correction term h/2md would not vanish. Hence, the 
outcome structure of applying the two limits is not the same structure.
The mere fact that the frequency correspondence fails to account for 
some cases between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics would rule
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it out of the structural realism account of correspondence. Structural realism 
asserts that the role of the correspondence principle is to show the 
connection between the new structure and the old structure of the two 
successful theories in their domains of application. The fact that the two 
limits, n —» oo and h -> 0 turn out not to be universally equivalent means that 
the new structure would not retain the old structure in both limits. Therefore, 
it fails to correspond two “real” structures to each other. Hence, one of the 
two highly successful structures is bound to be not even an approximately 
true representation of nature. This would not be in agreement with what 
structural realism wants of the correspondence principle. That is because: 1) 
the new structure should yield the old one at the limit(s), and 2) the structure 
expresses real relations between objects, therefore 3) if the two limits do not 
give the same structure, then there exists more than one real relation between 
the same objects => (contradiction).
So, if we want to think about frequency correspondence from a 
structural realism point-of-view, it runs into two sorts of problems. First the 
acceptance of a constant to vanish, and second the disagreement between 
limiting the same structure to the old one by using two different accepted 
limits, i.e. n -> oo and h -> 0 are not universally equivalent. Hence it would 
not support a realist interpretation of the structure as a representation of the 
underlying blue print of nature.
2:3:4 Form correspondence principle
The last type of correspondence is the Form Correspondence Principle. 
which claims that we can obtain correspondence if the functional 
(mathematical) form of the new theory is the same as the old theory. This 
kind of correspondence is especially fruitful in particular cases where other 
kinds of correspondence do not apply. Let us take the example used in
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frequency correspondence (quantum frequency). As we saw, in the case of 
the particle in a cubical box the outcome of n —» oo does not coincide with 
the outcome of h -> 0. Hence the two limits fail to achieve the same result. 
In cases like this form correspondence might overcome the difficulties facing 
frequency correspondence. The aim of form correspondence is to prove that 
the classical frequency and the quantum frequency have the same form. So, 
if oQ denotes quantum frequency, uc  classical frequency, and E 
energy, then form correspondence is satisfied if vc (E) has the 
same functional form as vQ{E) (Liboff 1984, p 52).
In the special case of the particles in a box, Liboff (1975) shows, by using a 
dipole approximation, that the quantum transition between state s + n and 
state s where s »  n, gives the relation:
v nQ(E )* n { E J 2 m a 2f 2. (2 .11)
He also noticed that if we treat the same system classically (particles of 
energy E in a cubical box), the calculation of the radiated power in the n-th 
vibrational mode is given by the expression:
u" (E) = n(E / 2ma2)m . (2.12)
Both frequencies have the same form, even if one is characterising quantum 
frequency while the other the classical, and even if their experimental 
treatment differs. Hence, the Form Correspondence Principle is satisfied.
Despite the fact that this seems to be a strong case for structural 
realism because of similar equations, there are deep problems even here. An 
important objection that would affect the idea of correspondence as 
represented by structural realism is that in the classical case E denotes the 
average energy value of an ensemble of nth harmonic frequency, while in the 
quantum case it denotes the eigenenergy of that level. Also, in the quantum 
case the energy is discrete, and the only way to assert that the quantum 
frequency yields the classical one is by saying that when the quantum number
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is very big the number of points which coincide with the classical frequency 
will increase, using the dipole approximation, which asserts that the distance 
between the points in the quantum case is assumed small. Hence the quantum 
case does not resemble the classical case as such but it coincides with the 
average of an ensemble of classical cases.
Let us look next at another interesting case of form correspondence 
which complies with the structural realism criteria (that the domain of the 
new theory is an extended domain of the old one), but which seems to be in 
conflict with the structural realism understanding of the correspondence 
principle. This case is from corresponding quantum chaos to classical chaos. 
The argument runs as follows. Classical chaos exists. If quantum mechanics 
is to be counted as a complete theory in describing nature, then it ought to 
have a notion which corresponds to classical chaos. That notion can be called 
quantum chaos. What theoretical physicists did at this stage was to think 
about ways that resemble a chaotic behaviour in quantum systems. They 
came to accept that certain systems behave chaotically. Now, it turns out 
that, according to our knowledge of classical chaos and of the new quantum 
formalism of the so called quantum chaotic systems, a direct correspondence 
between the notion of chaos in quantum mechanics and that of classical 
mechanics does not exist.
The way out was to accept a kind of form correspondence. How? 
Because it was impossible to find a parameter in the quantum chaotic system 
such that when limiting it to zero (or to infinity), the results resemble the 
form of classical chaos, the physicists tried to find a first approximation type 
of correspondence. They tried to limit both systems to a third and mutual 
form. The classical chaos goes in a certain limit to the form (j), and quantum 
chaos goes also to the same form at the same limit:
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h im  classical chaos -  <j>
n—>00
L im  quantum chaos -  <j>
n-¥  oo
Hence because both chaotic systems, the classical and the quantum, tend to 
the same form at the same limit then they correspond: a certain kind of form 
correspondence is satisfied. This is a form correspondence between both 
classical and quantum to a third form, but because we only have classical and 
quantum theories, the physicists involved argue, then the correspondence is 
from one to the other5.
Taking these points into consideration, this kind of correspondence 
does not support the structural realism correspondence either. Because:
1) The correspondence is between a form in quantum mechanics 
with a classical form which expresses an ensemble of the nth 
harmonic frequency as a function of average system energy;
2) In the case of quantum chaos the form correspondence is not 
between an old theory and the new one but between both the old 
and the new with a third equation.
Structural realists might say that the third equation is part of a future theory 
that will accommodate both quantum chaos and classical chaos as limited 
cases. But such a claim is speculative and would not affect my type of 
argumentation because I accept only what is accepted already in physics.
Having criticised the use of form correspondence by structural 
realism, I need to stress that form correspondence can be a very useful 
heuristic device in constructing new models. What I have in mind is cases 
where the mathematical form of a certain phenomenon gets transformed into 
a phenomenon of a different domain. I will try to examine in some detail a
5 For details about the correspondence between the quantum chaos and classical chaos 
see: Belot and Earman, forthcoming.
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case in superconductivity and show how a form correspondence principle 
applies to this case.
2:4 Superconductivity and the form correspondence
The main thrust of form correspondence, in the case of superconductivity, is 
the claim that it is possible to put a quantum formula into classical equations 
if we can change the quantum formula in the limit into a form where it looks 
similar to a classical form6.1  will here discuss the key link between quantum 
and classical descriptions in superconductivity: Josephson junctions, which 
are an important factor in building SQUIDs (superconducting quantum 
interference devices).
First, a necessary requirement for a system in superconductivity to 
count as a quantum mechanical system on a macroscopic level is that the 
temperature T should be low enough to satisfy the inequality
kBT«ho)0 (A),
where kB is Boltzmann’s constant and ©0 is the classical frequency of the 
system. If (A) is not satisfied the thermal disorder would blur the quantum 
mechanical effect. Such systems occur in superconductivity where the 
superconductor is placed in a very low temperature7. Then the magnetic flux 
of a LC-circuit satisfies the Schrodinger equation; i.e. the magnetic flux is 
quantized. But even then it would be impossible to detect that the magnetic 
flux satisfies the Schrodinger equation. The reason lies in the form 
correspondence principle which
guarantees that whenever the characteristic ‘scale’ Vo of the 
potential energy is large compared to the spacing of energy levels,
6 See Leggett 1980,1984 and 1985.
7 I will discuss in details the conditions under which the superconductivity phenomenon 
occurs in chapter three.
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which in turn is approximately h times the characteristic frequency 
of classical motion ©o, then the predictions of quantum mechanics 
for quantities such as the mean position reduce to those of classical 
mechanics. (Leggett 1986, 592)
So, in order to detect a macroscopic quantum behaviour we need to go 
beyond the correspondence limit8. The key to the problem is to look at how 
superconductivity treats the Josephson junction.
A Josephson junction consists of two superconductors that are 
separated by a thin film insulator, as in figure 2a. (The weak link in a 
SQUID ring (as in figure 2b) can also be treated as a Josephson junction 
in a similar way.) Because the insulator is a thin film, we can expect that 
the superconducting current, which can be thought of as a fluid of pairs 
of electrons, can tunnel through it. According to Feynman’s analysis of 
the junction, if'F i is the amplitude of finding an electron on one side, and 
*F2 the amplitude of finding it on the other, the two amplitudes would be 
related as follows:
= (2.13) 
m ^ -  = hTVv
where hT represents the effect of the electron-pair transfer interaction across 
the insulator. T is a measure of how many electrons might penetrate the 
insulator. If the insulator is thick, T will be equal to zero.
8 Leggett claims that the situation in SQUIDs is a place where the quantum formalism is 
applied on a macroscopic level. He claims that in the case of macroscopic quantum 
tunnelling the experimental set-up can provide a way of testing quantum interference 
without being affected by the correspondence limit. He goes on to saying that the only 
way to do so is by looking into SQUIDs where he claims that the quantum mechanical 
effect can be detected. As I will show below this claim is questionable. Moreover, the new 
experiments in SQUIDs show that the superposition of the two currents manifests itself as 
a classical current outside the ring and we detect only one of the two currents at any time 
inside the ring (Cartwright and Shomar, forthcoming).
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Insulator
Superconductor
(a)
Fig. 2.2
weak
link
SQUID ring
By assuming that W\ -  n^etGl and Wi = n^e '01, where ni and ri2 are 
the density of electrons on the two sides of the junction, we can prove that 
the flow of the current probability density from 1 to 2 will depend only on 
the phase difference 8 - 02- 0 x \
J  = J0 sin 8 = J 0 sin(02 -  6j ) (2.14)
where J0 is proportional to T. The important point I want to make here has to do 
with form correspondence. Equation 2.14 can be accepted as corresponding in 
form to a classical equation, I  = I 0 sin 8 , which is how current is treated in a 
classical circuit. Once we have done so, we no longer treat the Josephson 
junction as a quantum device, but as a part of a classical circuit. The Josephson 
junction (or alternatively the SQUID ring) can now be presented as a circuit with 
an equivalent classical electrical circuit (figure 2.3).
X Isin0
G(v) C
Fig. 2.3
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Another form correspondence would be applied at this stage. In a 
classical circuit, as that of figure 3, when an external current (or external 
magnetic flux) is applied through the circuit, the total current T  is equal to 
the sum of the currents in the three branches:
/  = / c sin£ + £ + C f-  (2.15)
where R is the resistance, C is the capacitance, and V is the voltage.
Now, as Josephson proved, the relation between the phase difference 
and the voltage is given by §  =2£ V , i.e. the voltage V = -£"§\ Then by 
asserting that the Josephson junction would behave as a classical circuit 
(using the form correspondence), then the total current would be:
/  = / .s in *  + 3f c *  + £ #  (2.16)
At this stage we have an equation that relates the current with the
phase difference only without any direct reference to the voltage^. The 
analysis continues to use another analogy that employs form correspondence. 
That is of comparing this form (2.16) with a form in mechanics. This would 
help us to understand more about the mechanism of the junction. Equation 
2.16 is analogous to an equation of a pendulum in a situation as that in figure 
4. The total torque x on pendulum would be:
r  = rosin0  +£>-f + M ^ r  (2.17)
where M is the moment of inertia, D is the viscous damping and x is the 
applied torque.
9 As Anderson emphasises, the phase difference in this case has become a classical 
variable, and in any future experiment is interpreted as a classical one (Anderson 1987).
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Fig 1.4
Both these equations have the general mathematical form:
Y = Y0smx + B% + Ai%t (2 .18)
Now, from this accumulation o f form correspondences it was possible to 
draw a quasi-classical picture o f a quantum system (Josephson junction). 
Also we could anticipate a new limit in Josephson junctions, namely the 
critical current. The idea goes as follows. In the pendulum case there is a 
critical value that the applied torque has, after which the pendulum collapses. 
Similarly, in the Josephson junction case, if the current is higher than the 
value o f  the critical current, the system will not exhibit any tunnelling effect.
These two simple examples are among many similar treatm ents where 
form correspondence is applied in superconductivity and in SQ UIDs10. One 
might say that such a treatm ent is no more than a way to treat a phenomenon 
with any tools that can give us an accurate phenomenological model to  
represent it, whether it is classical or quantum.
10 As we can see here Leggett’s criterion for when we might be able to detect a 
macroscopic quantum effect would be questionable. This is because in the case of 
magnetic flux the equation of total flux would have a similar form, as that of the total 
current and the same analogy with the classical pendulum will be valid. Hence, the more 
complex representation of the weak link that is presented by the Leggett programme would 
not have the same weight that Leggett tried to attribute to. The quasi-classical 
representation would have the same form as that of the classical formalism. Thus why 
would we accept Leggett’s suggestion that such a system is a quantum one on a 
macroscopic level that does not have a classical treatment?
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Of course, this kind of correspondence is different from the concept 
of correspondence employed in structural realism for several reasons. First, 
in the case of Josephson junctions, form correspondence allows a density 
current to be mapped into a current equation, and hence the quantum 
mechanical density current is substituted by a classical current. Second, in the 
case of corresponding the current equation with the torque equation, form 
correspondence does not relate a new theory with an old theory where both 
theories have the same domain of application (with perhaps an extended 
domain of the new theory). Rather the correspondence is between the form 
of a new theory with a well-known form from an old theory whose domain 
has no relation with the phenomena under study. So in effect the form 
correspondence depends deeply on the idea of analogy between various parts 
of physics. This analogy is related solely to the type of behaviour the system 
under study might exhibit in fact.
Let me clarify this point. As Zahar declares, the new theory N had to 
explain the empirical success of the old theory O. Now assume O is 
successful in a domain D, and breaks down outside D. N is successful in the 
extended domain D + D*. N ought to resemble O when limiting a certain 
parameter in N to zero. Here both N and O are related to the same domain 
D and its extension D*. In the cases of form correspondence I have just 
discussed, the form FI is a successful form in a model related to a domain 
Dl; the form F2 is related to the phenomenon understudy in a different 
domain D2. There is no intersection between Dl and D2; i.e. D2 is not an 
extended domain of Dl. For structural realism, although the terms in N 
might be interpreted differently than their interpretation in O, N and O are 
still related to the same empirical successes. FI and F2, however, would have 
totally different empirical successes. Hence, it would no longer be considered 
as representing the underlying structure of nature. Therefore, it would not 
agree with the structural realist claims.
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Form correspondence seems a suitable candidate for the kind of 
correspondence advocated by structural realism, since its main concern is 
with the form regardless of the content. Structural realism might accept a 
weaker version of the correspondence principle, such as form 
correspondence, since it still depends on the mathematical structure. But I do 
not think that they will accept that this kind of analogy can exemplify the 
important kind of correspondence that, in their view, supports realism. This 
is because the two parts of physics that the same form operates in are 
remotely related. We are not corresponding, let us say, quantum mechanics 
to classical mechanics, but in some cases we are relating current with torque. 
Now if they restricted the use of form correspondence to the related domains 
of applicability, then they would stand a better chance in fitting their 
correspondence with the cases in physics.
2:5 Conclusions
Structural realism presented its version of the correspondence principle 
having in mind the aim of presenting an optimistic interpretation of scientific 
revolutions, that is to present a heuristic device which can secure 
mathematical continuity between the well supported structural forms of the 
old theories in the new ones. Now in the cases we have seen from the types 
of formal correspondence applied in physics, we see that there is a factor in 
each of them which is similar to factors in the structural realist definition of 
correspondence. Nonetheless, in all of the kinds of correspondence employed 
in physics we would find elements that would not support the kind of realism 
advocated by structural realism.
Now what we have here is a correspondence principle which is built 
precisely to match a certain type of understanding of realism. This sort of 
correspondence might succeed in explaining certain types of structural
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continuity in a way that would support the type of realism advocated by 
structural realism. But, as we saw, it would not match most of the types of 
correspondence used in physics. Furthermore, if we wanted to restrict 
ourselves to the cases where a structural realist correspondence might be 
applicable to accept the forms as representative of nature, we would find that 
we have very few cases.
Scientific practice might need different kinds of correspondence to 
achieve new relations and to relate certain domains of applicability to other 
domains. But is it a necessary claim for all kinds of realism to account for the 
developments in science? I do not think so. For I take theories as merely 
tools to construct phenomenological models that are capable of representing 
nature. In that case whether these theories correspond to each other in some 
limit or not will be irrelevant. Correspondence of theories concerns realists 
who think that fundamental theories represent nature and approximate 
its blueprint.
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3:1 Introduction
Theoretical Dichotomy
In this chapter I introduce a new kind of dichotomy at the theoretical level. 
The motivation for such a dichotomy is to present a defensible position in 
scientific realism that can overcome the pessimistic meta-induction. This 
dichotomy is a horizontal one that divides low-level from high-level 
theoretical representations. It depends on the process by which different 
kinds of models are constructed. This process is related to the 
physicists’ practices.
Fundamental theories, like Maxwell’s theory, cannot usually be 
directly ‘applied’ to a certain phenomenon. Generally, a theoretical model is 
constructed out of the first principles of the theory. In Maxwell’s theory the 
four basic equations (first principles) are:
1) d iv  D -  p f
2) d iv  B = 0
3) cu rl E = — -— 3:1
'  d t
d D
4) cu rl H = j f + ——> J /  0 t
where D is the electric displacement vector of a field, B is the magnetic field, 
E is the electric field, H is the magnetic intensity vector, p  is the charge 
density and j is the current density. Then there will be a process of 
‘concretization’ in order for such a model to apply to a set of 
boundary conditions.
Take a typical textbook case, as presented in the book by I. S. Grant 
and W. R. Phillips. They do not take Maxwell’s equations from the beginning 
and try to apply them to the various problems. This is nearly the last thing 
they do in the book (it is in chapter 10). This would not show anything if 
after learning these equations the student knew how to solve the problems by 
directly applying them. But there is a lot of fiddling to do in order to find the
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solutions to the equations which “fit the boundary conditions and 
distributions of charge and current appropriate to different problems.” (Grant 
and Phillips 1982, 344) At that point the authors remind us that
Often one’s physical insight enables approximate solutions to 
be found which illustrate the most important features of a 
particular situation. (Ibid., 344)
This is exactly what one needs to know how to do: one needs to develop 
‘physical insight’.
Earlier in the book, when the electric displacement vector was first 
introduced, it was made clear that it was not a physical entity. The 
authors say:
unlike the electric field E (which is the force acting on unit 
charge) or the polarisation P (the dipole moment per unit 
volume), the electric displacement D has no clear physical 
meaning. The only reason for introducing it is that it enables 
one to calculate fields in the presence of dielectrics without 
first having to know the distribution of polarisation charges 
(Ibid., p 73)
This clear separation between the parts of a theoretical representation which 
have physical meaning from those who are merely tools for calculations is 
not a feature unique to these authors. This is a trend we are constantly being 
reminded of throughout typical physics courses.
Maxwell’s equations are the basis of his theory of electromagnetism. 
This theory does not apply directly. It needs models to relate it with the 
particular cases under study. Even when these models are produced at a 
derivational level as solutions to Maxwell’s equations, they usually do not fit 
real physical problems except, sometimes, as an approximation. Additional 
factors will be employed to construct a proper model for the particular 
physical situation. The first set of solutions that is derived directly from 
Maxwell’s equations under certain hypothetical boundary conditions is what
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might be called ‘theoretical models’. While the other models produced with 
the additional factors related to the physical situation might be called 
‘phenomenological models’.
Models, in my opinion, act as mediators between the high theories 
and: either hypothetical situations or real concrete situations1. Models in 
physics, as I use the term, all (theoretical or phenomenological) have 
three parts:
1) They have a set of mathematical equations.
2) They describe the environmental set-up and/or the boundary 
conditions in which the phenomenon under study can exhibit itself. 
In doing so there will be a referential assertion between the data 
acquired (or expected ~  if any), and some of the mathematical 
symbols. This will depend on an implicit or explicit reference to a 
body of antecedent knowledge that provides meaning for these 
symbols independent of any further meaning they acquire by 
relation they will be given to features of the situation being 
modelled.
3) They present a story.
The third point needs further attention. Usually, a story:
a) presents a coherent account of why a certain phenomenon behaves 
in such and such a way. In doing so, the story might either adhere 
to the need of theory coherency (in the case of theoretical 
models), or it might adhere to the physical coherency in relation to 
the phenomenal facts (in the case of phenomenological models).
b) needs, in order to present such a coherent account, to relate the 
mathematical symbols with the real features of nature (or the 
hypothetical situation). This might be done also in two ways either
1 In this thesis I accept models as mediators between theory and experiments in a special 
way as dialectical mediators See Gramsci 1980 and Bachelard 1984a. The development of 
this idea I follow is not Margaret Morrison’s idea of mediator models (1990a, 1990b and 
forthcoming), although I agree with her, but of Gaston Bachelard’s idea.
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to stick to already agreed terminology in relation to a certain 
theoretical framework (theoretical models), or to associate the 
symbols with certain properties exhibited by the phenomenon 
without strictly accepting the existing terminology 
(phenomenological models).
c) gives an account of how the model can represent the known 
properties of the phenomenon under study.
It should be noted that all models I consider in this thesis are 
theoretical in character. The kinds of models we are considering all use 
concepts whose criteria of application are not exhausted by measurement 
procedures but include constraints taken from a body of formerly 
presupposed theories. Consider acceleration. We can measure the time, 
distance and the change in distance with respect to the change in time. These 
are our data. At that level alone there is very little theorisation. But as soon 
as we introduce even the concept of acceleration or speed or force, there 
will be.
Usually, fundamental theories are used in constructing models, either 
by derivation (theoretical models) or merely as tools2 (phenomenological 
models). Although I insist that the models which can be constructed by 
applying the bottom-up approach -- even in the cases where only one 
fundamental theory is used as a tool in such construction and even if the 
fundamental theory used in that construction is itself the theory which could 
produce the same mathematical equations of the model by derivability ~  are 
phenomenological models, they are not the only kind of phenomenological 
models.
In a lot of situations in physics we do not have a fundamental theory 
that provides a set of theoretical models. Rather we are left with a set of 
experimental observations and phenomenal observations of which we have
2 See Cartwright, Shomar and Suarez 1995, also see forward chapter four for the use of 
fundamental theories as tools in constructing a phenomenological model.
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little understanding. In these cases we also try to build models that represent 
the studied phenomenon. In most cases, the model needs to employ more 
than one fundamental theory. I shall call these models, too, 
‘phenomenological*. Better: most of what intuitively seem to be 
phenomenological models in physics are built in this way. Let us now look 
into the specifications of each type of theoretical forms.
3:2 Two types of theoretical forms
As I said, in general two distinct types of theoretical forms can be found in 
physics. The main difference between them is the process by which they are 
built. One starts from a theoretical framework to accommodate experimental 
observation and the other goes from observation to theoretical 
representation. These two types can be labelled as theoretical models and 
phenomenological models.
In spite of the general properties (mentioned above) of both 
theoretical and phenomenological models, each type has distinct properties 
of its own related to these general ones. I will characterise the distinction 
between these two types of theoretical forms, but this distinction need not be 
a clear 100% one. It is not so important to come up with a precise definition 
rather than a rough characterisation of the difference, since my thesis is not 
that models fall into two natural kinds - theoretical and phenomenological - 
and only the second kind can represent accurately or will survive scientific 
revolutions. Rather I claim that the ones that are constructed in a bottom-up 
approach are more likely to. So it is not a matter of deciding beforehand that 
these characteristics sum up all those of all models. Let us now see the 
difference between them in accordance with the general definition of models.
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In physics all models have a set of mathematical equations. In the case of 
theoretical models, the mathematical equations need to be derived from the 
mathematical bases of the fundamental theories: they try to solve the 
mathematical equations of the fundamental theories in relation to a set of 
hypothetical boundary conditions. By contrast in the case of 
phenomenological models they stem from the phenomenological level and 
use fundamental theories as tools in constructing their mathematical 
equations.
I differentiate between the mathematical basis of a ‘fundamental 
theory’3 (like Maxwell’s equations) and the equations of the theoretical 
models produced by derivations from this mathematical basis which accounts 
for different situations.
Let me illustrate my point by means of a rather simple example from 
electromagnetism. The displacement current equation (1 in 3:1) is the sum of 
the electric field E and the polarisation P:
div D = £0div E +div P = pf  (3.2)
(or, D = £qE + P ). This is not a realistic description, simply because by 
definition the displacement current is not as real as the two parameters E and 
P. One might say that if I accept that both E and P are real then a logical 
consequence of such assertion is to accept that D is real. I do not see this as 
a straightforward conclusion. In practice we use this law because it is 
difficult to find the distribution of the polarisation charges, so it is easier to 
assume the displacement current, which we find by using the integral form of 
equation (3.2):
3 It is important to say that the expression ‘fundamental theories’ is widely used to express 
a cluster of theories that are highly abstract and give mathematical generalisations that 
might be used in different concrete situations.
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\D .dS  = \ p f dz  (3.3)
S V
In effect, we are assuming that the flux of D that is going out of an imaginary 
surface (just as in Gauss’ law)4 is equal to the total free charge enclosed in 
that surface. So, in concrete physical situations we know that only E and P 
are occurring but we assume D for simplifying the calculations. Hence, D is a 
mathematical tool to arrive at simple solutions. In effect physicists know, 
when they apply the law of the displacement current, that such a current is a 
mere assumption to help them to find approximately the real values which 
are difficult to measure. This statement is also true of Gauss’ law. Models 
related to the displacement current and Gauss’ surface are, despite their 
importance in calculating the expected value of the real parameters, 
theoretical models that express elements which do not have any counterpart 
in reality.
If we go a step down in this hierarchy we find two parameters E and 
P. Take the electrical field. A general model can represent it5:
1 _  f ( r - r W M r '  1 r (r -  r')a(r')ds' 
l ' - ' f  4 x E 0 all irfaoa k ^ ' l ’
where r is the distance from the charged surface, r’ is the distance of the 
charge from the centre of the axis, p  is the volume charge density and a  is 
the surface charge density.
This model is also a description for the electrical field and can be 
applied in any hypothetical electrical field situation whether it is an electrical 
field surrounding a charged particle or a charged surface or a charged 
volume. In each practical phenomenon the theoretical model will be reduced 
to a specific model which deals with the boundary conditions of the 
phenomenon. But in most cases the surface would not be smooth and easy to
4 Some texts accept this form as the generalised Gauss’ law.
5 It is important to clarify what I mean by a model. It is the equation with the relevant 
description and story, in accordance with my definition above. Nevertheless, and for 
simplicity only, I use here the model’s equations as a pointer to that model.
70
Theoretical Dichotomy
deal with in terms of finding the centre of the axis and the type of charge 
distribution over the surface or the volume. A further assumption is 
employed. This is: any surface can be contained in another symmetrical shape 
that will contain all the charge distribution on the surface (Gauss’ Law). So 
in the case of an ionised sodium atom with a charge +e, we assume a 
spherical surface of radius R centred on the ion and large enough to contain 
the atom. Then the electrical field on the surface of the sphere would be:
<3 s >
Although this equation is similar to the E(r) general equation, it is not 
derived from it but through introducing Gauss’ law.
We can think of this example in two ways. First that we have a 
fundamental theory that can give us all the models that are needed in the 
practical situations related to the theory. In this case the ‘idealised’ 
description given by the theory, equations 3.2 and 3.4, is de-idealised and a 
model of the specific situation is produced, equation 3.5. So in this case the 
way we solve the problem is by going from a theoretical description to a real 
situation; i.e. on a top-down approach. Alternatively, we may start from a 
real situation in which we have an ionised sodium atom and we want to find 
the electrical field for it. We know the general description of an electrical 
field but we do not know the shape of the atom. If we do not want to assume 
that it is a point particle then we need another assumption to find the 
electrical field. This is found in Gauss’ law. Then a model will be 
constructed. This is a bottom-up approach.
It is important to say that even if the phenomenological model was 
constructed by using a theoretical tool with an assumption which is known 
not to be strictly true (Gauss’ law) the output model does not have any 
symbols that do not refer to the real situation (see equation 3.5). Basically 
the model tells us that all equation (3.5)’ symbols refer: the atom has a 
charge +e, this atom can be contained in a spherical space of radius R and E
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is the electric field within that space. In this particular case, it happened that 
by using the top-down approach or the bottom-up approach we end up with 
the same mathematical equation (3.5), because we are dealing with a simple 
situation taken in separation of any outside effect.
Such approaches are choices adopted by physicists, although, 
historically, most of the time, the theoretical representation follows the 
empirical findings. Even in the case at hand the electrical field equation was 
developed and adopted on empirical grounds long before Maxwell suggested 
his theory. Hence, it was adopted by using a bottom-up approach. It would 
be safe to say for these kinds of models, even if they were later incorporated 
in a theory, if the theory turn out to be wrong at any point in the future, they 
will probably continue to hold.
The important point I want to highlight here is that even when a 
model is incorporated into a fundamental theory or its mathematical 
equations are derivable from a fundamental theory, it is still the case that 
there are two ways of thinking of such a model. One is asserting that it is a 
model derivable from the fundamental theory; i.e. from a top-down 
approach; while the other is starting from experimental and phenomenal 
assertions to arrive, with the help of the fundamental theory, to the model; 
i.e. from a bottom-up approach.
Although these two types of theoretical forms can overlap and 
produce the same mathematical part of the model6, nevertheless that does 
not mean that the theoretical model is the same as the phenomenological 
model. Two questions can be raised here: why is the way the model is 
arrived at relevant to the appraisal of the model? And, is the problem a 
matter of complexity? It is an important element in any model to give not 
only the mathematical equation, but also a story that associates the
6 I must say here that some times the fundamental theory will incorporate the 
phenomenological findings into its structure in a way that leads automatically to 
such overlap.
72
Theoretical Dichotomy
mathematical symbols with the real physical situation. This story, as I will 
argue below, is different if the standpoint of the model is theoretical than if it 
is phenomenological. In the theoretical model the story might give a set of 
assumptions in order to fit the mathematical coherency of the theory, while in 
the case of phenomenological models physical coherency takes priority. The 
more complex the model, the easier it is to see the theoretical standpoint of 
the theoretical model in contrast with the phenomenal standpoint of the 
phenomenological model. Because of these different standpoints, the process 
by which the model is arrived at is important. It is the standpoint of the 
model that makes it a theoretical or a phenomenological model.
As I said earlier, the bulk of phenomenological models exist in fields 
that do not have a ‘fundamental theory*. A simple description of what 
physicists do will illustrate the building of such phenomenological models. If 
a new phenomenon is discovered (or built), physicists will try to understand 
it. A group of usual procedures is applied. The first of these procedures is to 
know the conditions in which the phenomenon occurs. Then, the use of 
different experimental activities will provide a set of data. At this point our 
knowledge of the great variety of theories available in physics will be 
important. Physicists will search within all possible theoretical schemes to 
find a mathematical structure that might represent the data. They do this by, 
so to speak, “plotting the data”; they then begin thinking about which of the 
known mathematical forms used in physics can account for something similar 
to the plotted data.
These mathematical forms need not be forms related to the field of 
study of the phenomena. Now, it would not be enough to find a 
mathematical form that expresses the data pattern formally. The physicists’ 
“physical intuition” would lead them to identify the mathematical form’s 
symbols with the properties of the phenomena. Hence, the model would need 
a descriptive body that would identify the symbols in the mathematical form 
with properties related to the phenomena.
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However, ‘physical intuition* does not mean relating the data to an 
existing theory already agreed to cover the phenomenon, but possibly 
changing a tool from an understood theory, possibly in another domain, to 
adopt it to what is studied. Hence, ‘physical intuition’ plays a role in 
presenting a story that can relate the data and the ontological world of the 
phenomenon with some fairly well understood mathematical structure.
Now, the physicists would have a mathematical form and a set of 
possible identifications between the symbols and properties. However, there 
is no formal justification for this identification. They would start to relate the 
different information they have about the phenomenon and to see if they 
could present a consistent story about it. If the outcome story succeeds in 
relating the properties to the symbols, then the mathematical form together 
with the description of the experimental set-up and the story will constitute a 
phenomenological model.
It is important to say that the mathematical structure, which might be 
used to summarise the data, will not provide enough information to 
constitute a model. I do not think, for example, that a phenomenological 
model is merely a mathematical structure. At the same time, it isn’t naked 
data. There is more to it. The story, which provides the basis for how to deal 
with the mathematics in relation with the phenomenon, is as crucial as finding 
a mathematical structure.
A phenomenological model is a type o f theoretical representation 
which stems from the phenomenological level, gives a description o f the 
environmental set-up o f a phenomenon and which aims to give a 
mathematical structure o f the relations related to it with a story that 
presents a coherent account o f the relation between such mathematical 
structure and the phenomenon under study. However, the theoretical 
account provided by a phenomenological model is not as abstract as the one 
provided by a theoretical model.
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3:2:2 The environmental/boundary conditions
The second element in a model, as I said in the definition, is that every model 
has to describe the environmental set-up and/or the boundary conditions 
under which the phenomenon will exhibit itself. The main difference at this 
level is that the theoretical models represent the idealised description of the 
phenomenon in so far as that is related to the set of boundary conditions and 
mathematical bases of the fundamental theory. While the phenomenological 
models describe the environmental set-up of the phenomena, including the 
factors that would allow them to exhibit themselves.
In the simple example I gave in the last sub-section, there is very little 
difference between the two models. Both models accept the same associate 
meaning of E  or R or e0 (in equation 3.5), both accept that in the cases where 
the surface is not very well defined they need a further assumption of a 
surface which might contain all the charge on that surface.
But in more complex cases, like the case of superconductivity, the 
theoretical model gives general boundary conditions such as that the 
superconductor ought to be under a certain transition temperature and ought 
to consist of this and that kind of alloys or substance. Nevertheless, it would 
not be able to specify the exact transition temperature of a certain 
superconductor or the exact chemical combination that allows a certain 
substance to be a superconductor. By contrast, the phenomenological model 
will depend on the experimental results and the ‘rules of thumb7’ to specify 
these quantities and it will plug them into the model, and it defines them in 
accordance with such information.
One might say that the theoretical model might state that certain 
elements in the model are experimentally given, but then the theoretical 
model cannot be accepted as ‘explaining’ these certain elements. In the case
7 See chapter five section one for details.
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of superconductivity, the BCS authors claim that their model explains the 
transition temperature and predicts that the highest possible transition 
temperature would be in the range of 30° K. This was verified as a false 
prediction. The Landau and Ginzburg model presents a different approach, it 
accepts that some of the experimentally verified information need not be 
explained, as long as the model can represent an accurate account of 
the phenomenon.
The phenomenological model gives a detailed description of the 
environmental set-up. But what does this means? A lot of phenomena in 
nature do not exhibit themselves without human intervention. There are two 
types of natural phenomena: one is related to the objective world out there 
without our intervention such as thunder and lightning, earthquakes and so 
on; the second is phenomeno-technology8. The idea here is: objects in nature 
have the ability to exhibit certain phenomena, our rational activity can 
provide the conditions that allow these phenomena to occur. The important 
difference between these two kinds is that the first exist in nature without any 
special environmental set-up while the latter exist in nature by virtue of 
human interventions which manipulate a special environment which allow the 
phenomenon to exhibit itself. In the case of superconductivity, for example, 
the phenomenon of superconductivity itself does not occur unless we put the 
superconducting material into a special environment where the temperature 
can be reduced to the limit of the transition temperature. This is done by 
putting the superconductor in liquid Helium or liquid Nitrogen.
What I want to highlight here is that nature by itself cannot produce 
half of the phenomena studied by physics. A great many are the products of 
our realisation of our experience, i.e. there is nature by itself and 
humanised nature.
8 Bachelard 1984, p 19.
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3:2:3 The story
The third element in any model is the story. In the case of theoretical models 
the story relates the mathematical symbols to the properties of the 
phenomenon. Now, this story should present a coherent account of why the 
phenomena behave the way they do. This coherent account is related to the 
fundamental theory which the model was based on. The story must be able, 
at least, to provide a physical basis for the theoretical model that can 
provide, presumably, good representations of the properties in the field of 
application.
Next chapter I illustrate the case of a theoretical model by looking at 
the model of the electromagnetic properties of superconductivity, which is a 
part of what is known as the ‘BCS theory* (theoretical model, here forward 
BCS) of superconductivity. The BCS is a theoretical model derived from the 
quantum theory. It provides a theoretical basis that relates the phenomenon 
of superconductivity with quantum mechanics. The BCS consists of other 
theoretical models that are related to the properties of superconductivity. 
Some of these models are highly abstract and are driven by the need to 
correlate the model with quantum mechanics. Examples include the 
theoretical model of Cooper pairs, which is essential in relating the BCS with 
quantum mechanics, the theoretical model of the electromagnetic properties 
of superconductors, and the theoretical model of the energy gap. In the case 
of the electromagnetic model the story legitimatises using this or that 
equation from quantum mechanics or the importance of accepting this or that 
approximation which would allow the final result to represent the properties 
of the phenomenon.
The ‘BCS theory aims’ to present, as the author tell us, a microscopic 
theory of superconductivity that ‘substitutes’ for the different 
‘phenomenological theories’ suggested up to that point. Its standpoint is that
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of quantum mechanics. This dependence on a microscopic theory and the 
success in deriving a mathematical structure which will yield approximate 
results to those obtained by empirical findings led the authors to claim that 
they had succeeded in deriving a microscopic (fundamental) theory 
(BCS, 1957).
The BCS story goes as follows. First it assumes a theoretical 
constraint on the way it ought to describe the electrons in superconductors: 
it assumes that ‘in first approximation* each electron moves independently in 
‘some sort of self-consistent field*. By such an assumption they develop the 
Sommerfeld-Bloch individual particle model -- which is a successful model in 
describing normal metals ~  to present a wave function ‘of the metal as a 
whole*. Hence, the normal state is described by the Sommerfeld-Bloch 
individual particle model, but the ground state wave function of the 
superconductors is a linear combination of a many-normal-state 
configuration in which Bloch states are ‘virtually occupied in pairs* (the 
Cooper pair model). This second assumption also depends on purely 
theoretical grounds.
Now the important piece after these two assumptions is to base their 
theory on an idealised model in order to neglect certain aspects which if 
incorporated into their theory would effect the coherency they are seeking. 
The BCS authors say: ‘Our theory is based on a rather idealised model in 
which anisotropic effects are neglected’ (BCS, 1957, p 1178). The line of 
assumptions depending on the microscopic understanding of 
superconductors would continue on and on and at each new assumption they 
would add a further theoretical constraint.
By contrast the story presented by the phenomenological model is not 
as abstract as the story presented by the theoretical model. 
Phenomenological models need not give us an explanation, of why certain 
phenomena behave the way they do, related to ‘fundamental theories’. It is 
sufficient that they give an account of the behaviour of the phenomena, and
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give good predictions. This account is related only to the phenomenal facts 
associated with the particular phenomenon under study.
The story of the Landau and Ginzburg phenomenological model of 
superconductivity goes as follow. The Landau and Ginzburg model starts 
with a well-accepted description of superconductors as having thermal 
energy. The idea that superconductivity is related to thermodynamics is 
already an established empirical fact: resistance depends on thermal 
fluctuation. So by assuming that the superconducting state is a state where 
the electrons transform from disorder to order, Landau and Ginzburg were 
able to suggest that the transition between the normal and superconducting 
state is a second-order transition. This with the help of their ‘physical 
intuition’ led Landau and Ginzburg to suggest an equation to express the free 
energy of a thermal system as a function of an order parameter. They also 
associated the order parameter with the wave function. Then they were able 
to derive a set of equations that can account for the known properties of 
superconductivity as well as to predict new properties.
Both stories use a lot of assumptions to justify their moves, but the 
important difference between the two kinds of justification is that one 
depends on issues raised by theoretical constraints while the other depends 
far more heavily on empirical and phenomenological constraints.
3:3 Between the experimental and the phenomenological
My discussion in the last section concentrated on theoretical representation 
and the two different types of such representation. Let me now turn to the 
other side of the usual dichotomy between theory and experiment: the 
experimental activity in physics. Ian Hacking (1983) argues that experiments 
have a life of their own. Many other historians and philosophers have 
presented similar arguments and have pointed out examples of how 
experiments are developed in physics independent of theory. Peter Gallison’s
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How Experiments End, Bruno Latours’ Laboratory Life and Gooding’s 
Experiment and the Making o f Meaning are all examples of such research. 
Such works highlight the importance of the experimental side of 
scientific practice.
I am interested in a different type of scientific practice. Physics 
provides us with a set of theoretical tools and a set of experimental and 
observational facts. A dialectical interaction between the two sets provides 
our usual best candidates for true representations of nature. I think that 
phenomenological models constitute these best candidates for true 
representations of nature.
For the scope of this thesis, I adopt a simple correspondence notion 
of truth, i.e. that the terms in a theoretical representation correspond to real 
properties of the phenomenon under study. For example, we say “The 
gravitational force acting on a falling body is equal to the mass of that body 
multiplied by the earth gravity (g)”. In such a theoretical description ‘mass’ is 
suppose to refer to the a property the falling body has: its mass; 
‘gravitational force’ to the gravitational force of the earth, etc, Then the 
claim is true if the force is equal to the mass times gravity. Having said that, I 
do not think that any of the other usual notions of truth would challenge 
my position.
Instead of the usual distinction between theoretical and experimental 
practice, I am interested in phenomenological practice, the practice which 
benefits from the interaction between the theoretical and the experimental. 
Physicists have started to recognise this activity as independent of the other 
two, because they want to recognise the important input of both theory and 
experiment in building certain types of models in physics. In high-energy 
physics as well as in superconductivity and polymers, the term 
“phenomenologist” is now widely used to denote people working in 
constructing a specific type of theoretical understanding. This type of 
theoretical understanding departs from the empirical findings related to
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certain phenomena and using whatever theoretical means they have without 
caring much about whether these theoretical means belong to a single 
“accepted” theory.
Whether these physicists want to differentiate themselves from 
theoreticians for merely sociological reasons is something to be explored. I 
think there is more to their attitude than that. Their attitude is supported by 
the complexity and the lack of clarity of the new abstract theories, and the 
failure of some of these theories to give good predictions whereas the 
phenomenological models do provide accurate representations in the field.
As early as 1943 scientists were concerned with the relation between 
theory and experiment. It is, of course, accepted that there is a lot of 
influence from each activity on the other. Max Bom, for example, ended a 
public lecture in 1943 on “Experiment and Theory in Physics” with the 
following statement:
I believe that there is no philosophical highroad in science, 
with epistemological signposts. No, we are in a jungle and find 
our way by trial and error, building our road behind us as we 
proceed. We do not find signposts at cross-roads, but our own 
scouts erect them, to help the rest. ... My advice to those who 
wish to learn the art of scientific prophecy is not to relv on 
abstract reason. but to decipher the secret language o f 
Nature from Nature's documents, the facts o f experience 
(Bom 1943, p 44, emphases added).
The major theme in his lecture was to address the extremists on both sides of 
the theory-experiment dichotomy: On the one hand the extreme German 
experimentalist school which renounced theory altogether; and, on the other 
hand, the claim made by many theorists that
to the mind well trained in mathematics and epistemology the 
laws of Nature are manifest without appeal to experiment 
(Bom 1943, 1).
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He addressed the types of problem that can emerge from such extremes. The 
experimental trend on its own often fails to introduce new experiments and 
to predict new phenomena. The theoretical one, on the other hand, might 
easily, using first principles alone, lead to two contradictory outcomes. Bom 
discusses in some detail the Milne and Eddington case. In that case both 
Milne and Eddington claim to have succeeded in building a theory using a 
priori principles, and yet when we examine these two theories we see that 
they are “widely different and contradictory”(Bom 1943, 44). Bom’s 
message is clear: theory without experiment is empty and experiment without 
theory is blind.
Phenomenological activity had its supporters even before it was 
recognised as an independent practice. Lev Landau, the famous Soviet 
scientist, thought that any theoretical physicist ought to equip him/herself 
with minimal knowledge of important bases in all fields of physics. This 
minimal theoretical knowledge would help the theorist to find appropriate 
solutions for the problems that the experimentalist faces. Landau used to 
teach his students that it is the main job of the theorist to solve the problems 
the experimentalist faces. He himself used to start his day by going to the 
labs and discussing any problems the experimentalists had before going to 
his office9.
Another example is Heinz London, the co-author with Fritz London 
of the London and London model of superconductivity. In his case he was an 
experimental physicist who was interested in doing theoretical physics. For 
example he was the first to suggest the ‘two fluid model’ and the 
‘penetration depth’ on the surface of the superconductor10. In neither case, 
though, did he publish his findings in theoretical journals because he was not 
keen on publishing any work that he had not thoroughly tested in his 
laboratory. His ideas and the experimental tests he did were crucial for the
9 For details see Abrikosov 1973, Ginzburg 1989 and Khalatnikov 1989.
10 I will describe these terms in the next chapter.
82
Theoretical Dichotomy
construction of the London and London model of superconductivity. In fact 
that model would play a very important role in the history 
of superconductivity11.
Nevertheless, the recognition of there being a special kind of activity 
in which theory and experiment interact is in itself something worth 
exploring12. I think that this is due to recognition of a problematic 
development in both activities, especially at the theoretical level.
My attempt to present a new kind of realism depending on 
phenomenological representation relies on such recognition. The 
phenomenological level is not just empirical and it is definitely not just a 
collection of mathematical equations -  it is the inter-relation between the 
observable and the reasonable.
3:4 An example from physics
Let us take the usual example of theory development: Newton's theory vs. 
Einstein's general theory of relativity. While most of us agree that Newton's 
theory is false, we still use some of its models. No engineer, when building a 
bridge, will ever apply Einstein’s general theory of gravity; they will prefer to 
use Newton’s theory. But if you give a problem about the shift of light 
coming from a comet to a scientist, they will think directly about 
Einstein’s theory.
Let us take a careful look at Newton’s theory. We claim now that 
Newton’s theory is false because we have good reasons to believe that the 
theoretical frame in which its models where embedded (that is the frame of 
absolute space and absolute time) is not a good one. Newton’s theory
11 For some details about Heinz London see Gavroglu 1995.
12 Of course interact here does not refer to the old sense where the experiment interacts 
with the theory in order to test it and verify its correctness. Here it means a positive 
interaction where each contributes in constructing a type of theoretical representation that 
departs from the experimental facts.
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suggests two main concepts: the concept of continuous force and the 
concept of universal gravitation. By these two concepts Newton aimed to 
unify the two mechanical models, of Kepler and Galileo. He succeeded in 
presenting a frame in which the Newtonian particle is at the basis; a material 
particle which exists in a system that has the Euclidean geometrical 
dimensions and possess mechanical properties like kinetic energy, potential 
energy, momentum, ... etc. Now this theoretical frame presents a story which 
employs a number of elements that are not derived or derivable from the 
phenomenological level. These elements include concepts such as absolute 
space, absolute time, action-at-a-distance, universal gravitation and inertia. 
The story was presented in his Principia and is very well known. 
Nevertheless, the simple models that deal with the motion of a body from 
point (a) to a point (b) are not affected by such a frame. The importance of 
the frame and its concepts was to present a coherent story to connect the 
laws of universal movement with the laws of motion; to unite the motion of 
light with the motion of wheels.
Einstein’s theory presented a different account, an account which 
provides another kind of unification, that between energy and mass, a story 
which replaces the concept of action-at-a-distance with the concept of fields, 
which gives answers to the anomalies facing the old theory. But also it 
replaces a bunch of theoretical concepts with another bunch aiming to keep 
coherency and to add, as Einstein would say, simplicity and beauty. These 
theoretical concepts include space-time curvature and fields.
mg cos 9
mg
Figure 3.1
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But after such a shift on the high theoretical level, we still find that 
the low-level theoretical models were not affected by any of these points. Let 
me give an example. A box of mass (m) is situated on top of a slope that has 
an angle 0 with the x-axis. If the slope can, due to friction, resist the 
movement of the box by a force R, then the total force which will move the 
box toward the bottom of the slope is given by (see figure 3:1):
F  -  mgcosO-R  = ma (3.6)
where (g) is the constant of gravity and (a) is the acceleration of the box. 
Now in this example we did not mention any of the concepts of absolute 
space or absolute time. Here the mathematical outcome expresses a series of 
observations on moving bodies over a slope with a known friction. It 
depends on our previous knowledge of trigonometry and of a generalised 
model, ‘Newton’s second law, F  = m a \  which might also be inductively 
inferred from direct observations and mathematical knowledge. This model is 
still true, whether we accept an absolute space and time or we accept a 
space-time curvature. It depends only on the phenomenological level.
So, what really happens in low-level representation is that the 
phenomenon will almost dictate the mathematical form via the observed data. 
This is a general practice in physics, as Einstein says:
Nobody who has really gone deeply into the matter will deny 
that in practice the world of phenomena unambiguously 
determines the theoretical system, in spite of the fact that 
there is no logical bridge between phenomena and their 
theoretical principles (Einstein 1935, p 126).
3:5 Building a phenomenological model
Looking at the practice of physics we can see how it is possible to build a 
scientific structure, on phenomenological grounds, without the need for a 
unified theoretical frame. I can give many examples from different domains in
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physics. As I have said, in chapter four I will study in detail how the Landau 
and Ginzburg phenomenological model of superconductivity was 
constructed. But for now I will restrict myself to one simple example.
Let us see how the phenomenological model of capacitance was 
constructed. Certain materials can, if an external pressure influences them, 
produce some kind of electrical potential difference between their sides, if 
they are under the effect of a flowing current. Now, if we put one of those 
materials between two charged plates then that material will have the ability 
to store charge. This material with the two charged plates is what is known 
as a capacitor. The charge can be stored in the capacitor due to the potential 
difference between its plates, and for every type of capacitor the capacitance 
is a constant value. If we want to discharge a capacitor we connect the 
capacitor to a resistor.
When capacitors were discovered, two important theories were 
known in physics: mechanics and electromagnetism. The obvious thing for 
physicists to do under these circumstances is to try to use these two theories 
to understand the new phenomenon. The idea is to use these as tools to build 
a model. The important point at this stage is to see the way the physicists will 
depart from different phenomenological facts and how they will deploy at 
each stage another tool from the well-known theories.
The capacitor is a material; thus the particles (electrons and atoms) 
can be treated as if they constitute a mechanical system which through its 
movement transmits the electrical current from one side to the other. Also, 
capacitors store charge; hence they must be treated as an electrical system. 
So, what kinds of tools can be used to express these two properties of 
the capacitor?
First, on the mechanical side, the electrons have to move from one 
plate of the capacitor to the other; that will justify the use of Newton’s 
second law. But this is not the whole story. The electrons during their move 
through the lattice will be affected by friction and by the chemical bond
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between the atoms (which can be modelled as a kind of oscillation). So, here 
we have three mechanical parts:
1) the movement of particles from one plate to the other
2) frictional force and
3) the chemical interaction (oscillation).
There are three mathematical forms that express these three properties.
Now, to build a model which will map the mechanical movements of 
the electrons through the capacitor, the most sensible thing to do, from the 
‘physicists intuitions’ point of view, is to add these three mathematical forms 
to each other to form the new equation. The outcome force equation is:
F = m ‘% i + f J$  + kx
Here the first term refers to Newton’s second law, giving the force due to 
acceleration of the particles inside the lattice; the second term is the force 
due to friction, while the third is the force due to the oscillation of the 
particles in the lattice. The model would not be accepted at this stage, for it 
is important before the acceptance of any model to verify its accuracy with 
the experimental results. If there were an agreement between the two sides, 
then physicists would accept the model as representative of the studied 
phenomenon. But in this case there is another part to the phenomenon.
The other side is due to the electrical properties. A power source of 
potential V produces a current /, which is equal to the dq/dt where q denotes 
charge; when this current run through the capacitor it will charge the 
capacitor. The capacity in this case is equal to q/V. When the electrical 
circuit is opened the capacitor will start to discharge and produce an induced 
current from the capacitor, i.e. the capacitor will behave as a power source. 
Hence, there will be a movement of electrons from one side of the capacitor 
to the other. This is important for unifying the relation between the 
mechanical model and the electrical model. Putting this information to use 
will give the potential through a capacitor:
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V = L %  + R % + i  ( 3 8 )
where the first term refers to the induced voltage, the second to the voltage 
from resistance, while the third term is due to the capacitance. We can see 
the similarity in the mathematical form between the electrical and the 
mechanical equation. This similarity speaks about the way of presenting the 
data which happen to have the same shape of the plotted carve.
Let us remember the criteria for a phenomenological model: a 
phenomenon is studied and some empirical facts are revealed about it; a 
mathematical equation can express the plotted data; a story should be told 
about how this mathematical equation can represent the phenomenon. Now if 
the model produced captures the empirical facts and can predict the 
behaviour of a similar set-up then we may say that the model is a successful 
one. In our case the model uses tools from Newton’s theory and from 
electromagnetism. Up to the point where we stopped earlier, it seems that 
there isn’t anything more than just applying the best theories we have to a 
special case. Yes, but the model doesn’t stop here. It should give us the 
relation between the two sides, because as we saw, when the capacitor is 
discharging it will generate a mechanical movement inside it. Hence such a 
movement ought to be captured by the model. Here the departure from the 
straightforward application of old theories can be seen: we have two 
equations that represent a certain phenomenon from two different 
perspectives. One uses the effect of forces and concentrates on the 
experimental verification of 'distance x'. So the main variable in the equation 
is (x). The second equation studies potential and the major variable that all 
parts depend on is the charge (q), which is also experimentally verifiable. If 
there is a relation between the two parts then there ought to be some kind of 
a second order relation between the two variables, the distance and the 
charge. One simple mathematical way to do so is by adding to each of the 
two equations a term that can represent its effect on the second variable; that 
is to add a charge term to the first equation and a distance term to the second
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equation. So, the model which represents the capacitance, with the relation 
between the mechanical and the electrical behaviour of the phenomenon, 
would be:
\F= m ^ f  + f *  +kx +Aq 
l V = L % + R *  + *+Ax  (3'9)
where A is an arbitrary constant. It might be said that nowadays we look at 
the problem from a different perspective and what is represented by the 
model can be fully explained by the fundamental theories of today. But a 
careful look into the textbooks in physics will show us that even if a better 
tool is used the model produced is the same model with little change.
3:6 Conclusion
In this chapter I suggested that there exist two kind of theoretical 
constructions in physics, and claimed that one of them is highly abstract 
while the other is more concrete and a better candidate for being a real 
representative of nature. By this kind of distinction I will try to motivate a 
realist position which can accept the no-miracle argument and still overcome 
the difficulties generated by the argument from scientific revolutions. 
Structural realism tried to accommodate the anti-realist attacks by restricting 
itself to a structure-content dichotomy. In this spirit, I have suggested an 
alternative distinction: between phenomenological models and theoretical 
models. This kind of distinction between the two types of theoretical 
construction form the basis for the realist position which I advance and 
defend in chapter five. For now let me turn my attention to a case study in 
superconductivity which exemplifies the theoretical dichotomy I have 
suggested here.
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4:1 Introduction1
Superconductivity
Last chapter I claimed that two main kinds of theoretical forms can be found 
in physics. Theoretical models: that is, models built on a top-down strategy, 
the other kind of theoretical form, I claim, built on a bottom-up strategy, are 
phenomenological models. In this chapter I will illustrate such a division in 
the case of superconductivity. By looking at the key points in the history of 
superconductivity I will show that the BCS theoretical model of 
superconductivity, was constructed by a top-down approach while the 
Landau and Ginzburg model was adopted on a bottom-up approach.
It is important to understand the key historical points in the history of 
superconductivity in order to fully understand the impact of both the ‘BCS 
theory* (1957) and the Landau and Ginzburg model (1950). The Dutch 
physicist H. K. Onnes first discovered the property of superconductivity in 
1911. Of course superconductivity would not have occurred if Onnes had 
not invented a way to condense Helium. Due to that it is fair to say that 
superconductivity is a kind of phenomeno-technology (see chapter five). 
Onnes thereafter detected that metals when cooled to a very low 
temperature, inside liquid Helium (under 4°K), exhibit a strange 
phenomenon: the total disappearance of resistance under a critical transition 
temperature Tc. Later in 1933 W. Meissner and R. Ochsenfeld discovered 
that the magnetic field is expelled inside the superconductor under a certain 
transition magnetic field He (The Meissner Effect).
The first successful attempt to construct a model of 
superconductivity was at the hands of Fritz and Heinz London in 1935 
(section 4:2). Later, in 1950, Landau and Ginzburg developed “an extension 
of the London phenomenological” model “to take into account a space
1 The information in this chapter and in chapter five are collected from studying a lot of 
books and papers on superconductivity of which some are not directly referred to in these 
chapters, nevertheless I included them in the bibliography.
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variation of the order parameter” (Bardeen 1956, 369). They suggested the 
following phenomenological equations2:
where a  and P are experimental constants, \j/ is a pseudo wave function and 
A is the local vector potential (section 4:3).
Bardeen, Cooper and Schrieffer suggested in 1957 a microscopic 
‘theory’ (theoretical model) of superconductivity (from now on BCS), which 
was set up to provide a fundamental understanding of the phenomenon of 
superconductivity. Although they were not the first to introduce microscopic 
analyses of superconductivity, their theoretical model was the first coherent 
and reasonably successful microscopic theoretical model designed to 
understand the phenomenon of superconductivity (section 4:4). I think that 
the difference between these two types of theoretical forms is an exemplar of 
the theoretical division presented in chapter three.
4:2 The London and London Model
In an attempt to present an explanation to the paradoxical findings of 
Meissner, London and London suggested in 1935 that diamagnetism is a 
property of ideal superconductors. This led them to construct a 
phenomenological model: the Londons’ model. This model has two main 
equations:
y / =  0
(4:1)
eih 2
c cwr/Aj, + H = 0
^ ( A j , ) - E  = 0
(4:2)
2 This is known as the MQM (macroscopic quantum model).
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where js is the superconducting current density, H is the magnetic field, E is
the electrical field, c is the speed of light and A is an experimental constant
equal to m/ne^, where m is the mass of the electron, n is the number of 
electrons and e is the electron’s charge.
Superconductors differ from other kinds of conductors by two things: 
the property of no resistance and the expulsion of the magnetic field. 
Superconductors are not “perfect conductors”, although they exhibit perfect 
conductivity3; this is due to the magnetic expulsion4.
In a previous paper, “The Tool Box of Science”, co-authored with N. 
Cartwright and M. Suarez, we argued that the London equations5 were 
constructed on phenomenological bases rather than theoretical. Fritz and 
Heinz London were aware that Maxwell’s electromagnetic equations could 
give the following equation for the relation between the density current and 
the magnetic field:
curlAJ = -±H. (4:3)
When they integrated with respect to time they obtained a non-homogeneous 
equation for H:
Ac2v 2( h ~ h 0) = h - h 0 (4;4)
where Ho denotes the magnetic field at time zero. This means that if the 
superconductor was inside a magnetic field when it was shifted into the 
superconducting phase then the magnetic field should freeze in the 
superconductor. Meissner’s experiments obviously contradict this 
conclusion. So, the London brothers thought that they might accept that a 
single homogeneous solution of equation (4:3) might be considered as the
3 Perfect conductors are a kind of conductors with a neglected resistance, but they do not
expel the magnetic field from it. I.e. when they are exposed to a magnetic field they lose
some of their perfect conductivity. This does not happen in superconductors, due to the 
magnetic expulsion.
4 See Bums 1992, p 10.
5 A full discussion of the London equations and its philosophical implication is presented 
in Mauricio Sudrez 1997.
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fundamental law for the superconducting state upon the experimental 
confirmation for such claim. They say:
One should not use a differential equation like [(4:3)] which 
contains too many possibilities, as it gives nature more freedom 
than it wants. If in reality Ho is always confined to the value 
zero, then this means that
Ac2 V2H = H (4:5)
is to be considered as a fundamental law and not to be treated as 
a particular integral of a differential equation. (London and 
London 1935, 73)
This new “fundamental” law can give us the following relation: 
curlAJ = - i R  (4:6)
which obviously does not give us the same information as equation (4:3). It 
is important to see that the move from (4:3) to (4:6) is not derivational but is 
an inference that depends on the experimental facts.
If we want to play the theoretical game of finding a ground in 
fundamental theories for a phenomenological model through some kind of 
derivation, we find that two ways were suggested for the London equations: 
The first way6 is a direct analogy: derivation from diamagnetism. The second 
is the BCS treatment, which depends on a quantum field theoretical 
derivation using Green functions and Hartree-Fock approximation (I will 
give the result of the derivation in the section 4:4).
Let us start with the first treatment. Consider a long superconducting 
solenoid, as in fig 4.1, where a particle of charge e is fixed to the axis of the 
solenoid by a spring. The solenoid has a current / running through it. When 
we raise the solenoid’s temperature above its transition point the current and 
magnetic field caused by it will die off. At this stage an induced EMF will 
accelerate the particle s around the route C giving the particle an angular
6 See Hall, 1981, p 147.
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momentum mvr, where v is the velocity of the electron and r is the radius. 
From conservation of momentum we assume that there is an electromagnetic 
momentum which is reserved in the charge particle at rest7. The angular 
momentum during the decay of the field is
mvr = er\jLdt , v
J (4:7)
But from Faraday's law:
E = (4:8)270" dt
where f  is the magnetic flux, E is the electrical field. So
e<j>
mvr = „2n
And since
Then
(4:9)
(j> = 2^rA (4:10).
mv = e A (4:11).
We redefine the total momentum P as
T? = mv+eA  (4:12).
where mv is the induced momentum and eA is the electromagnetic 
momentum in the initial rest state of the particle.
Now electromagnetism implies that the current density j is
j = ne\  = ^ - (P  -  eA) (4:13).
7 It is important to mention that this treatment is analogous to the classical treatment of 
kinematic momentum and the dynamical momentum. Feynman gives a good account of 
the example in his chapter on superconductivity: The Feynman Lectures in Physics, Vol.
3, chapter 21.
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C
F i g . 1/ /  A  c h a r g e d  p a r t i c l e  
a c c e l e r a t e d  b y  a  d e c a y i n g  m a g ­
n e t i c  f i e l d .
At this stage to  be able to derive the first London equation, we can go with
F. London’s (1950, 120) suggestion that the current density is divided into 
normal and superconducting currents:
j=  Js+jn
n e 1  (4:14).
j. = ' — Am
H ere the idea o f  the two fluid model9 is important to explain this partition, 
which is a method used to derive the thermal effect o f  superconductivity. The 
idea is that the superconducting material consists o f  two kinds o f  fluids, one 
is the normal part o f  the superconductor while the second is the
9 The idea appeared first in 1934 by Gorter and Casimir, but as Kostas Gavroglu shows in 
his book Fritz London: A Scientific Biography the idea was first suggested by Heinz 
London. See Gavroglu 1995, p 109.
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superconducting part. A figure suggested by F. London, in the (1949) paper, 
can give an example of what is meant by a two fluid model.
These phenomenological models9 were not questioned by any later 
theoretical work. Even in the BCS, the two current densities j n and j s were 
interpreted as j p> which is called the paramagnetic current, and jd, which is 
the diamagnetic current. This interpretation can give a reason to accept the 
first term as a normal and not effective current, while (jd) is the effective 
current density of the superconductor. Eventually that means that the 
superconducting phenomenon is related just to the diamagnetic term and not 
to the paramagnetic, whereas the Meissner effect is related to the 
paramagnetic term, with the assumption of an energy gap. This idea was 
important for the derivation of the BCS, as we will see in the next section.
Normal region
Superconducting region
Figue 4:2
Another thing can be done here. If we take both terms and accept the 
quantum mechanical substitution of the momentum P by iftV, and take n, the
9 These models are phenomenological in my sense because, for example, the two fluid 
model was built on a bottom-up approach, has a mathematical equation (j =js + j „ ), a 
description and a story.
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number density, to be the probability density ^  V , we can derive an 
equation similar to Landau and Ginzburg’s10 phenomenological equation:
where e* = 2e and m* = 2men .
One might say that the first deduction, which applies the idea of 
superconductor as a huge solenoid, is legitimate and mathematically true, so 
we must accept it as a derivation of the London and London 
phenomenological model of superconductivity from fundamental theory. The 
points that must be raised here against such a claim are:
1) The derivation from diamagnetism is for a specific case where the particle 
is attached to the solenoid by a field. This means that the particle is 
external, although not free. On the other hand the superconducting state is 
a state where the phenomenon emerges within the metal itself. Hence, the 
superconducting electrons are internal.
2) If we can assume that the momentum can be divided into two terms, one 
the intrinsic electromagnetic momentum of the particle and the other an 
induced momentum, then we can accept that one of them could be zero 
and the other not. This cannot be the case in interpreting the current
10 From Michael Tinkham, 1974, p. 111.
11 For such an argument see A. Rose-Innes and E. Rhoderick (1988), p 102. Also it is 
important to state that London & London mote in their 1935 paper, that from their 
equations:
j = + iiVyO -  A-  v V a2m m e (4:15).
AcJ = -A
A 2Ac p - ~{j>
“One is very strongly reminded of Gordon’s Formulae for the electrical 
current and charge in his relativistic formation of Schrodinger theory:
.2
4 mmc
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density in superconductors, because both the paramagnetic and the 
diamagnetic currents are functioning at the same time with the same set of 
electrons.
When London & London suggested their equations to model the 
Meissner effect, a number of experimental activities tested the correctness of 
their model. The result of these experiments show that London’s equations 
could give good predictions for the superconducting current, if the following 
conditions are satisfied:
1) H « H C. Otherwise at the boundary zone where H is near the 
critical magnetic field the model failed to predict what happens 
experimentally.
2) The superconducting electron density is constant.
3) The penetration depth is less than the thickness of the sample. 
Hence, when these conditions are not satisfied, a new model should be 
introduced.
So, the difficulties of the Londons’ equations are: first, when the 
temperature T«TC the penetration depth becomes larger and the thickness of 
the "walls" separating the normal and the superconducting states becomes 
larger, too. Experimentally the relation between the penetration depth and 
the thickness of the walls was calculated to be roughly
= x
TJo (4:16).
(To-T)
The second difficulty for the London equations is related to the 
change of the free energy between the normal and superconducting states. As 
Ginzburg pointed out
if we restrict ourselves to the case of a steady field, then 
[London’s equations], together with Maxwell’s equations, are 
sufficient for determining the density j s of the superconducting
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current and the field H in the superconductor. (Ginzburg 1956, 
589)
So, if we want to have a broader understanding of the change from the 
normal to the superconducting state, the London approach is not sufficient. 
Any new theory or model should also aim to account, in addition to the 
Meissner effect, for additional empirical facts:
1) A second order phase transition.12
2) The transition temperature is proportional to the isotopic mass M  of the 
metal nuclei (the isotope effect)13.
3) The thermal vibrations of the atoms are the principal cause of electrical 
resistance in metals at ordinary temperature14, while the superconducting 
state has infinite conductivity.
4) The energy gap.
As Landau and Ginzburg pointed out in the introduction to their
paper:
The existing phenomenological theory of superconductivity is 
unsatisfactory since it does not allow us to determine the surface 
tension at the boundary between the normal and the 
superconducting phase and does not allow for the possibility to 
describe correctly the destruction of superconductivity by a 
magnetic field or current. (Landau and Ginzburg 1950, 546)
To overcome these difficulties Landau & Ginzburg tried to formulate what 
they saw as a generalisation of London’s equation15. This is the topic of the 
next section.
12 Laughlin (1988) 525.
13 Sproull and Phillips 1976. p 380.
14 Ibid., pp 348.
15 A. B. Pippard had also suggested a generalised version of London’s equations in 1953.1 
will not discuss his suggestion here because it is not used any more. It is important to say 
that BCS authors had arrived at a similar equation to that of Pippard:
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4:3 The Landau and Ginzburg model
In 1935 when London and London suggested their solution for the Meissner 
effect in superconductivity, they ended their paper by stating that a more 
general solution for superconductivity might be inspired by studying 
Gordon’s formulae for the electrical current and charge in the relativistic 
formation of Schrodinger theory:
J  = “ t —(vftw* -  y / ) - — ynj/*A4mm me
he , , d y  d y / \  e2
(4:17)
Where y/ here is the electrons wave function. Also, as I mentioned earlier, if 
we substitute /Winstead of P in equation (4:14) and take n, the number 
density, to be the probability density , we will arrive to the equation 
(4:15):
.*2ifie* b
j = -— r ^ V ^  + y/V^ * ) - —~ ¥ * ¥  A (4:15)2m m e
which is the same as the first equation of (4:17). Nevertheless, at that time a
direct connection between a quantum mechanical description and
superconductivity was not proved.
However, Landau and Ginzburg started in fact from this remark and 
from the experimental evidence that showed that Londons’ equations cannot 
give an accurate account of superconductivity. The idea was to try to find 
the correct tools from the existing theories to bring about some kind of 
deduction that will end up with a similar equation to that of Gordon’s, but 
which can be directly related to the field of superconductivity.
It is also important to mention that Ginzburg had also pointed out in 1955 that Pippard’s 
model is a limiting case of Landau and Ginzburg model.
For further information consult: A. B. Pippard, 1953 and Ginzburg 1955
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At that time it was an experimental fact that superconductivity 
exhibited some kind of thermal fluctuation. As I have said, the thermal 
vibration is known to be the cause of electrical resistance. Hence the region 
of no-resistance should be related to what could happen for such thermal 
vibration.
Landau had been working on a theory for the phase transition in the 
solid state. He thought that it could be of aid in their derivation. He 
suggested that the transition from the normal to the superconducting state is 
a second order transition (as in the transition from the ferromagnetic to the 
paramagnetic)16. This means that the thermal vibration of the electrons which 
cause the electrical resistance will be ordered, under the transition from the 
normal to the superconducting state; no thermal vibration will occur any 
more, which implies that no resistance will occur as well. To relate this kind 
of transition to thermodynamics he offered, a ‘guess ‘ for the free energy
|F (A ;7 ’,E)rf3/-, 17 (4:18)
where A is an order parameter which is function of r. Expanding this function 
in terms of power series in A2 we find that
F  = -EA + g0 A2 + A4 +..... (4:19).
The standard text by Tilley and Tilley describe this saying
Landau’s general theory of second-order phase transitions is 
based on the idea that a phase transition could be characterised 
by some kind of order parameter, and a simple postulated form 
for the dependence of the free energy on the order parameter. 
(Tillery and Tillery 1986, 294)
16 As Landau and Ginzburg put it: “Iri the general theory of such transition there always 
enters some parameter [A] which differs from zero in the ordered phase and which equals 
to zero in the disordered phase.” (1950, p 548)
17 J. Schrieffer 1964, p. 19.
102
Superconductivity
Consider the non-vanishing terms. Because it is a second order phase 
transition, the term g* is positive, and the higher order terms can be 
neglected18. Think about the transition from the normal to the 
superconducting states as a transition from disorder to order, and assume 
that the normal free energy has the same form as in thermodynamics, which 
is:
F  - U  - T L  (4:20)
where U is the initial energy. Then in the case of a fixed magnetic field, the 
relation between the superconducting free energy and the order parameter A 
for a cubic crystal can be written as follows:
F  = F = F n + aA2 + —A4 + C 
"  2
<?A
dx,
<?A
dy
<?A
dz
(4:21)
where A, B and C are arbitrary constants, Fs is the superconducting free 
energy, Fn is the free energy in the normal state.
Now, in the case of a variable magnetic field, equation (4:21) must be 
completed by adding another vector potential A which is related to the field 
B (B = Curl A).19 Thus, in order to keep the invariance of the free energy F, 
equation (4:21) must be changed into:
b
F  = F„ +aA2 +^A4 +C 2
B2
< t 2 2 >
Tillery and Tillery continue: the next “crucial insight in Landau and Ginzburg 
was that for a superconductor the order parameter must be identified with 
the macroscopic wave function 'F ’20. Landau and Ginzburg want to arrive at 
a mathematical expression which is similar to those of the current in quantum
18 Second order transition means that g4  is positive in contrast with the first order 
transition where g4  is negative and we can not neglect the rest of the terms.
19 It should be pointed that Bc = Hc under the CGS system and Bc/po = Hc under IS 
system-
20 Tillery & Tillery, p 294.
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mechanics. To get their equation to correspond to that, they ought to identify 
a parameter in their equation with the wave function. The only parameter 
which can be thought of as conveying the same properties as ¥  is the order 
parameter. So, in this sense it was essential to them to identify the order 
parameter with the macroscopic wave function *F. Landau and Ginzburg 
consider such a wave as an effective wave function. They say:
In the phenomenon of superconductivity, in which it is the 
superconducting phase that is ordered, we shall use *F to denote 
this characteristic parameter. For temperature above Tc, *F = 
zero in the state of thermodynamic equilibrium, while for 
temperature below Tc, 'F * zero. We shall start from the idea 
that *F represents some ‘effective* wave function of the 
‘superconducting electrons’. Consequently 'F may be precisely 
determined only apart from a phase constant. Thus all observable 
quantities must depend on 'F and 'F* in such a way that they are 
unchanged when *F is multiplied by a constant of the type eta. We 
may note also that since the quantum mechanical connection 
between 'F and the observable quantities has not yet been 
determined we may normalise *F in an arbitrary manner. (Landau 
and Ginzburg 1950, 548)
They assert that the order parameter is related to the local density of
superconducting electrons ns21 where ns = ^-  = |^ (r)|2. Then by setting the
correct values of the coefficients, depending on the experimental results we 
get:
F  = F . + a * r * + f r 4 + ^ 2eA. - i f t V   ------- \ y /
B 2
( 4 : 2 3 >
21 Bums, p 18.
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It may seem that F has just been modified from equation (4:21) to 
equation (4:23), but this is far from right. Two features of the construction 
illustrate my thesis about the use of theories as a tool for constructing 
phenomenological models: First, equation (4:21) itself had been constructed 
using tools from different theoretical models which are not connected to 
superconductivity. These tools are the phase transition, the assumption that 
the free energy is a function of the order parameter and quantum mechanics. 
Second, equation (4:23) is not derived from quantum mechanics, rather a 
non-quantum mechanical equation (4:21) is reformed in (4:23). This 
illustrates a theoretical influence that functions merely as a way to express 
the experimental results. The physicists see that
this construction of equation [(4:23)], independent of any 
detailed theory of the superconducting state, represented a tour 
de force of physical intuition. (De Gennes and Pincus 1966, 176)
Now from the modification of the free energy in equation (4:23) 
Landau & Ginzburg set AF = 0, to obtain the following equations:
aV + M v  + ^ {-iW-^f)  ^= 0
c (4:24)
j  =  _ l
As we can see these equation have the same form as Gordon’s 
equations even if there is no direct relation in a deductive sense. Gordon’s 
equations are formulated from the relativistic Schrodinger equation, and as 
we have seen Landau and Ginzburg’s equations were the result of reasoning 
about the phase transition in fluids in relation to the free energy.
Therefore, the Landau and Ginzburg model is a theoretical form that 
is directly related to the phenomena at hand, and would be described as a 
phenomenological model because:
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1) It uses the existing theories as tools in constructing a set of mathematical 
equations that can be associated with the known experimental results in 
the field of superconductivity. In this case, although is not essential for 
phenomenological models, these mathematical equations are similar in 
form to previous mathematical forms; the similarity between the Landau 
and Ginzburg’s equations of [4:23] with those of Gordon.
2) It gives a detailed description of the environmental set-up in which the 
phenomenon of superconductivity occurs. That is, the specific factors that 
would allow special types of material to exhibit the phenomenon of 
superconductivity. Some of these factors are the critical temperature, the 
critical magnetic field and the types of materials and alloys.
3) It gives a story that: a) Does not care about the coherency with the high- 
level theoretical forms as long as it presents a coherent and consistent 
account in relation with the facts at the phenomenal level, b) Gives a set 
of identifications that relates the mathematical symbols in the 
mathematical equation with the properties of superconductivity. For 
example it relates the parameters in the mathematical form, like a  and |3, 
with properties in superconductivity like the coherence length and the 
penetration depth; it relates different properties of superconductivity to 
each other; and it describes how these properties manifest themselves in 
relation with the particular conditions of the system. One other important 
example of the identification of the mathematical with the physical is that 
of identifying the order parameter with the pseudo wave function.
Furthermore the Landau and Ginzburg model had been constructed by 
departing from the phenomenon.
The importance of the Landau and Ginzburg model was not 
appreciated in the west at the time it was suggested22. At that time, there was
22 There is a long explanation for such lack of appreciation of the western scientists to the 
Soviet scientists; I will not go into its details. But basically after the Second World War 
the centre of the scientific community was shifted from Europe to America. There the
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no acceptable microscopic theoretical model for superconductivity stemming 
from a fundamental theory, i.e. quantum mechanics, (as I said earlier the first 
one was the BCS). So, when they thought of introducing the wave function 
in their equation there was no derivational justification for such an attempt. 
The only justification was the rationalisation of experimental result. 
However, when the BCS was suggested in 1957, it drew a direct connection, 
as we will see below, between quantum mechanics and superconductivity. In 
1959 Gor’kov, a physicist from the Soviet Union, proved that the order 
parameter wave function in Landau & Ginzburg is proportional to the energy 
gap between the condensed state and the first excited state in the electrical 
distributions of the fluids. This energy gap is also proportional to kT (where 
k is Boltzmann constant). Using this argument he went on to prove that the 
Landau & Ginzburg model was in agreement with the BCS at least for that 
limited case.
As I said earlier Landau’s attitude toward doing theoretical physics 
was very distinctive. He thought that the theoretical physicists ought to solve 
the problems that face the experimental physicists. His idea is to give a 
rational generalisation of the evidence provided on the phenomenological 
level. In his opinion all theoretical physicists ought to equip themselves with 
a broad knowledge of the fundamental theories in physics in order to be able 
to use any of their formulas to solve problems raised out of experiments and 
phenomena. This basic knowledge that the theorists ought to acquire used to 
be called the ‘theoretical/technical minimum’ course23.
dominant approach was that of relating models to fundamental theories. Nevertheless, a 
lot of physicists felt uneasy with this approach to mention but one: Richard Feynman. 
Another factor was the lack of communication and trust during the cold war between the 
Soviet scientists and the western scientists. Gavroglu 1995 gives an instance of this 
difference see pp 180- 266.
23 See Khalatnikov 1989, pp 34-41.
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This spirit was also the motor behind his inspirational model for the 
phenomenon of superfluidity24. In 1941 Landau suggested a 
phenomenological theory of superfluidity. He developed this model in several 
papers (Landau, 1941, 1944, 1947 and 1949)25. This model turns out to be 
very successful and was able to predict properties which were not discovered 
experimentally until years later. The irony in this was Fritz London’s reaction 
to Landau’s model. Although his own early model was driven by 
phenomenological considerations, he did not apply the same attitude to 
Landau’s attempt26. Kostas Gavroglu discusses this in his book Fritz 
London; a Scientific Biography. He thinks that ‘London was convinced that 
Landau’s approach had serious theoretical deficiencies’ (Gavroglu 1995, p 
202). These deficiencies circulate around the way Landau built his theoretical 
representation. Gavroglu emphasises that:
In all his writing and correspondence, London expressed the 
belief that Landau’s theory was a rationalization of Kapitza’s27 
experiments together with the insight provided by Tisza’s28 first 
paper on the two-fluid model. (Gavroglu 1995, 201).
This rationalisation of the experimental is what London disapproved of, 
although he himself as we already saw had adopted such a rationalisation. 
Gavroglu shows that London’s attitude toward the way theoretical physics 
ought to be done changed dramatically after he lived in the United States. 
He says:
24 Superfluidity is the sister phenomenon of superconductivity. Superfluidity is a 
phenomenon which appears in liquid Helium, when under a transition temperature the 
liquid starts to flow without viscosity.
25 Even if the case of superfluidity is a further support to my claim that phenomenological 
models are a better representative of nature than theoretical models, I will not discuss this 
issue here.
26 Gavroglu thinks that there was a shift in London theoretical stands. He starts to change 
his stands to the ‘American way’ after he left Europe to the states. See Gavroglu 1995, pp 
180- 266.
27 An experimentalist from the Soviet Union.
28 A Polish physicist worked with London in Paris during 1937 and was the first to 
suggest that the idea of two fluid model can work for superfluidity.
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It is rather ironic that Landau’s style was now closer to 
London’s own style in his work in quantum chemistry, and 
London’s approach in superfluidity was more reminiscent of the 
American’s style in quantum chemistry that Heilter and London 
were critical about. (Gavroglu 1995, 189)
At the end of that period London started to doubt his own old style. 
He asserted that
Any macroscopic theory has in general to go beyond the strictly 
phenomenological data - the same is for instance the case in my 
‘macroscopic’ theory of superconductivity which also was 
suggested by certain molecular ideas, but, of course, not based 
on them, (in Gavroglu 1995, 203)
However, I think that such a style is not only a characteristic of Landau and 
the European physicists, but it is also a division between two theoretical 
forms, as I argued in chapter three. Even in America there have been people 
like Feynman who value such a style of doing theoretical physics.
4:4 The BCS model
In 1957 the BCS model was constructed starting from the basis of quantum 
field theory, aiming to incorporate the empirical facts stated in section 4:229 
and to build a ‘microscopic theory of superconductivity’. In contrast Landau 
and Ginzburg’s basis was the experimental facts and its aim was to build a 
theoretical representation. The belief that quantum field theory could 
establish a basis for understanding the properties of superconductivity came
29 The BCS paper starts by saying: “The main facts which a theory of superconductivity 
must explain are 1) a second order phase transition at the critical temperature, Tc, 2) an 
electronic specific heat varying as exp (-To/T) near T=0°K and other evidence for an 
energy gap for individual particle-like excitations, 3) the Meissner-Ochsenfeld effect 
(B=0), 4) effects associated with infinite conductivity (E=0), and 5) the dependence of Tc 
on isotopic mass, TCVM = const”, (BCS 1957,1175).
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into place after an accumulation of microscopic quantum models accounting 
for this or that aspect of superconductivity. Hence, the basis for BCS was a 
theoretical one; whereas the basis of Landau and Ginzburg was 
phenomenological.
BCS, like Landau and Ginzburg, recognise that any acceptable model 
of superconductivity must account for the following phenomenological 
aspects: 1) the energy gap; 2) the Meissner effect; 3) infinite conductivity; 4) 
the isotopic effect and 5) the second-order phase transition at the critical 
temperature. Their aim was to construct a model from first principles that 
would incorporate at least these facts.
The main theoretical obstacle in the way of building a microscopic 
theoretical model of superconductivity was the fact that the Sommerfeld- 
Bloch model (1928) gives a good description of the normal state but not of 
the superconducting state. In order to overcome this difficulty, BCS assumed 
that as a first approximation it is possible to neglect the correlations between 
the positions of the electrons. Also it is assumed that the electrons float in a 
field determined by the conducting electrons and the ions.
Another assumption is essential to construct the model. Cooper was 
working on correlations between electrons brought about by the interaction 
between the electrons and the vibrations in the lattice. This type of 
interaction is known as the electron-phonon interaction, and is said to be the 
vital element in superconductivity. This type of electron-phonon interaction 
leads to electron pairing (Cooper pairs). By making these assumptions, BCS 
were able to present a story that can justify why the superconductors do not 
comply with Sommerfeld-Bloch model. BCS say
The electron-phonon interaction gives a scattering from a Bloch 
state defined by the wave vector k to k’= k ± k by absorption or 
emission of a phonon of wave vector k. It is this interaction 
which is responsible for the thermal scattering. Its contribution to 
energy can be estimated by making a canonical transformation
110
Superconductivity
which eliminates the linear electron-phonon interaction terms 
from the Hamiltonian. (The BCS 1957, 1176)
Having justified the use of a modified Sommerfeld-Bloch model and 
the proper approximations which can incorporate any mismatch with what is 
expected of it, BCS turn to how their model in general (as well as their 
model of electromagnetic properties) might benefit from such a modification: 
In the theory, the normal state is described by the Bloch 
individual-particle model. The ground state wave function of a 
superconductor is formed by taking a linear combinations in 
which the Bloch states are virtually occupied in pairs of opposite 
spin and momentum. (BCS 1957, 1176)
Now, the pairing of electrons would allow more than one electron to occupy 
the same state. That is because by such pairing, electrons are shifted from 
being Fermions to being quasi-Bosons. The importance of this point is 
obvious once we recall that electrons are Fermions, which means they are 
unlikely to coexist in the same quantum state. But we can model a pair of 
electrons as quasi-bosons. This assumption is the most important one, 
because, by claiming that the electrons can pair, BCS were able to present a 
Bloch-like model for superconductors.
Let us now turn our attention to BCS’s model of just the 
electromagnetic properties of superconductivity. The BCS authors accept 
that the phenomenological models present equations that can fit the data. 
Nevertheless, they insist that these equations have a poor origin. They want 
to present a clear and straightforward derivation of them from a fundamental 
theory: quantum field theory. As we saw earlier, in the Londons’ equations 
of current density and magnetic field, the connection with a fundamental 
theory, i.e. the derivation from diamagnetism, had two problems: the 
artificial division of the current and the separation between the electrons and 
the heavy mass of the ions. So, BCS first set out what needed to be done: to 
give a physical account of the partition of the current density. BCS suggested
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that such a separation can be interpreted as a separation of diamagnetism and 
paramagnetism:
j ^ + j j  (4:25).
So how can they derive this kind of equation using the quantum mechanical 
approach?
BCS at this stage needed a large number of theoretical tools to build 
their model. These tools were:
1) Previous physical theories such as quantum field theory, electrodynamics, 
diamagnetism, Maxwell’s equations and thermodynamics. These theories 
are what legitimises the mathematical forms constructed by BCS to 
account for superconductivity. If BCS had failed to provide a good and 
tidy derivation using these accepted theories their model would not have 
qualified as a legitimate theoretical model stemming from a fundamental 
theory. Though this may not be the only criterion for being an acceptable 
theoretical model, it is a necessary one.
2) Mathematical tools: The theory uses the quantum field theoretical 
technique of second quantization, the Green function, and different types 
of special approximations such as Hartree-Fock type approximations. 
These are abstract tools that can help to manipulate the existing facts so 
that they can be seen as similar to a given part of an existing fundamental 
theory.
At this stage the model would need a story to justify the way the 
tools are used, and to connect the mathematical parts of the theory to the 
natural phenomena. An analogy here might be helpful. While the story the 
phenomenological model presents is strongly associated with empirical and 
phenomenological findings, the story the theoretical model gives is like a 
sculpture or a painting which the artist meant to be realistic but turned out to 
be surrealist or even abstract. The point here is that the story given by the 
theoretical model uses other accepted theoretical models that might be
112
Superconductivity
justified only if we accept the underlying concepts and principles from the 
fundamental theories.
Although generally physically motivated, the identification of the 
mathematical terms with different sorts of real features in the 
superconducting phenomena does not usually tend to give a good description 
of the phenomena. This point is important because it is this identification that 
gives the mathematical equations of the model a physical meaning.
The BCS model depends on a group of other theoretical models that 
can associate superconductivity with quantum field theory. Firstly, the 
Cooper-pairs (that the electrons in the superconducting state occur in 
correlated pairs that have the same quantum state). These pairs of electrons 
can be created through the electron-phonon interaction -- a second 
theoretical model — which says that electrons interact with a lattice 
producing phonons. This idea was greatly supported when the isotopic effect 
was observed. Materials in nature are a combination of many isotopes, and 
the isotopic effect is the finding that the transition temperature depends on 
the isotopic nuclear mass. The idea that electron-phonon interactions are 
“primarily responsible for superconductivity” seems reasonable, because it 
implies that the vibrational motion of heavy nuclei plays an essential role in 
the formation of pairs of electrons. One must remember that the relation 
between the thermal vibration and conductivity was an established fact by 
that time.
The BCS model also tried to incorporate the idea of the two fluid 
model (a phenomenological model). As we have seen, this model assumes 
that we can imagine the superconducting material to consist of two kinds of 
fluids overlapping one of which is responsible for the normal state and the 
other for the superconducting state. The BCS model claimed that such a 
division can be obtained if we accept that superconductors exhibit both 
paramagnetic and diamagnetic current densities at the same time (equation
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4:14 was modified into equation 4:25). By such an assumption they would be 
able to deal with each property separately.
This model can also help, in addition to the Cooper-pairs, in 
understanding the use of another theoretical model: that of the Fermi surface. 
This is an imaginary surface in k-space (spin-vector space) that separates the 
occupied energy levels from unoccupied energy levels and will define the first 
empty level.
The next step for BCS is to derive the relation between the current 
density and both the potential and the momentum. From these two equations 
all the other known mathematical descriptions of the superconductors' 
properties can be derived. For this derivation, using a quantum field 
theoretical framework, BCS needed to employ all the mentioned models and 
tools from fundamental theories.
But in order to complete the model they need to present a story. 
They start by suggesting a Hamiltonian for the electrons in the 
superconducting state. Then they add the isotopic mass, Ms, and its relation 
to the phonon-electron interaction to see its effect on the non-diagonalised 
terms in the Hamiltonian. Then the diagonalised part was re-normalised using 
“Bloch energies”. Introducing the idea of the Fermi surface allowed them to 
define the occupied states from the first free state. After the model employed 
these elements, the possibility of finding a straightforward derivation from 
quantum field theory is now in hand. The model started by using annihilation 
and creation operators, then Hartree-Fock like approximations and so on, 
and so forth. It arrived at a special kind of wave function which, by defining 
the correct Hamiltonian and accepting a certain gauge where V • A = 0 , in 
which A = 0 if H = 0, gave us a derivation for the paramagnetic and 
diamagnetic current densities:
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This, of course, can be accepted as a straightforward derivation from 
fundamental theory, namely quantum field theory. But BCS admit that their 
task would not have been possible had they not made special assumptions, 
particularly that of the formation of Cooper pairs, that came to be the 
cornerstone of their theory.
It should be stated at this point that both the BCS and the Landau 
and Ginzburg models can account for the most important properties of 
superconductors: i) the penetration depth; ii) the coherence length, which is 
“a measure of the distance within which the superconducting electron 
concentration cannot change drastically in a spatially-varying magnetic field” 
(Kittel 1986, 336) and iii) the energy gap. In the case of the BCS model, 
however, it needs a series of approximations to account for each of these 
three properties. The BCS model gives an account of these properties as a 
consequence of the current density equation 4:26. The results are:
1) The coherence length is £ = a  ^ .
2) The penetration depth is XL(T) = 0 % ^ ) •
3) And the energy gap is A(0) = 2hcoe ^N°y°
Hence, the BCS model fulfils the criteria I suggested in chapter three. 
It is consistent with and derivable from one single fundamental theory
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(quantum field theory), gives a coherent story about type one 
superconductors, and can give an account of the existing empirical findings.
In this chapter I have presented an illustration of the theoretical 
dichotomy suggested in Chapter Three. This case study is very important to 
clarify the points raised in Chapter Three. Firstly, it gives a clear example of 
the horizontal division between high-level and low-level theoretical 
representations. Secondly, it shows that all models, whether theoretical or 
phenomenological, have common elements. Both kinds of model have a set 
of mathematical equations. They both present a description of either the 
boundary conditions or the environmental set-up. They both present a story 
that claims to account for the properties of superconductivity (at the time). 
And they both make use of previous fundamental theories (as tools or by 
derivation). Thirdly, and most importantly, it shows that the crucial 
difference between the two types of theoretical forms is their point of 
departure. While the theoretical models take fundamental theories as their 
basis, the basis for phenomenological models is the experimental and 
phenomenological facts. I will turn my attention now to the philosophical 
implications of such a case study.
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So, only too often, the philosophy of 
science remains corralled in the two 
extremes of knowledge: in the study of 
philosophers of principles which are too 
general and in the study of scientists of 
results which are too particular.1
Gaston Bachelard
5:1 Introduction:
In this chapter I argue, using the information we have on superconductivity, 
that it is unlikely that any theoretical model can represent all kinds of 
superconductors. In contrast, the phenomenological model can, due to its 
flexibility, represent the behaviour of all superconducting materials. Hence, in 
this typical case in applied physics the phenomenological model is a better 
representative of nature than any theoretical models (section 5:2).
I use the features illustrated in this example to argue that 
phenomenological models are generally the best vehicles of representation of 
nature. With such a position I claim to be able to appeal to the no-miracle 
argument as an argument for realism, and also to be able to overcome the 
major criticism toward realism from the argument from scientific revolutions. 
This is the topic of section 5:3.
Section 5:4 will cast more light on the philosophical grounds of 
phenomenological realism and in what ways it is different from other kinds of 
scientific realism.
5:2 Superconductivity and Models
In the previous chapter I argued that Landau and Ginzburg model was built 
using a bottom-up approach, while the BCS model was built using a top-
^rom Bachelard 1968, p 5.
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down approach. The standpoint of the Landau and Ginzburg model was the 
experimental and phenomenological facts; the standpoint of the BCS model 
was quantum field theory. The beauty of this case study is that both models 
aim to arrive at the same known mathematical expression, i.e. that suggested 
by London and London (Gordon’s equations). They both admit that there is 
a need for plugging in some empirical results into the mathematical 
derivation in order to get the result they want, although they disagree on 
which of these elements to accept and the way they take these elements to 
affect the theoretical outcome. They both can account for the elementary 
properties of superconductivity (at the time). And they both make use of 
previous fundamental theories. Nevertheless, the BCS gives a totally
different story than that given by the Landau and Ginzburg model, and the 
two overall models are distinctly different. Let me here discuss the
differences between these two approaches.
Bardeen stated, back in 1956, that:
Anything approaching a rigorous deduction of superconductivity 
from the basic equations of quantum theory is a truly formidable 
task. The energy difference between normal and superconducting 
phases at absolute zero is only of the order of 10-8 eV per atom.
This is far smaller than errors involved in the most exacting
calculations of the energy of either phase. One must neglect
terms or make approximations which introduce errors which are 
many orders of magnitude larger than the small energy difference 
one is looking for. One can only hope to isolate the physically 
significant factors which distinguish the two phases. For this, 
considerable reliance must be placed on experimental findings 
and the inductive approach. (Bardeen, 1956, 276)
So Bardeen, who with Cooper and Schrieffer put forward the BCS model, 
himself admits that any theory departing from quantum theory would need to 
“neglect terms or make approximations which introduce errors which are
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many orders of magnitude larger than” the quantities one is looking for. The 
BCS model needs exactly these approximations to be able to account for 
practical situations.
By contrast, Landau and Ginzburg’s model, relying on “experimental 
findings and the inductive approach”, is able to present a mathematical 
structure that can be consistent with a representation of the phenomena, 
trying to relate different bits and pieces from the shattered information which 
were provided through years of experimentation.
The most important factor in counting BCS as a theoretical model 
related to a fundamental theory, is its use of quantum field theory, i.e. its use 
of a microscopic base for understanding a macroscopic phenomena. On the 
basis of that derivation the BCS model succeeded in achieving the following:
1) The interaction between electrons can lead to the separation between the 
ground state and the first exited state by an energy gap. This can give an 
explanation of the critical field, the electromagnetic properties and the 
thermal properties as a result of the energy gap.
2) The experimental quantity of the energy gap matches that of one 
measured from the electron-lattice interaction, which leads to electron- 
electron interaction.
3) The coherence length and the penetration depth are consequences of the 
BCS formation.
4) Also, as I have shown in the previous section, the London equations and 
so the central phenomena of superconductivity -- no resistance and the 
Meissner effect -- are explained.
5) The quantization of the magnetic flux in the superconducting ring, with a 
charge equal to 2e rather than e, which could be interpreted as a 
consequence of the pairing technique.
It should be stated here that the Landau and Ginzburg 
phenomenological model also depended partly on microscopic factors, and 
also they employed their knowledge of fundamental theories to construct
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their model. Yet nobody counted their model as properly related to a 
‘fundamental theory’. That was primarily because their derivation did not 
give a clear reason for taking the order parameter to be a wave function; and 
also because their derivation was not seen as a straightforward derivation 
from a previous fundamental theory. This attitude toward the two derivations 
can give us a clear idea of the difference between these two types of 
theoretical activity.
Interestingly, the Landau and Ginzburg model has proved to be 
capable of adapting to new properties of superconductivity whereas BCS has 
failed to account for these new discoveries, as we shall see next. In this sense
1 think that Landau and Ginzburg can give an example of the way 
phenomenological models can prove more fruitful than theoretical models.
So far so good, But why did the BCS model in spite of all its success 
fail to maintain its position as the accepted model of superconductivity? Up 
to a certain point the BCS model can be a reliable model in its predictions 
about superconductivity. This is especially the case if we are dealing with 
type one superconductors; that is the type of superconductors that has just 
two phases: normal and superconducting, with a perfect expulsion of the 
magnetic field (Meissner effect), and where the materials are simple metals. 
The problems facing the original BCS model started with the discovery of 
type two superconductors in 1960.
In 1957 the Russian physicists A. A. Abrikosov2 published a paper 
saying that accepting the Landau and Ginzburg model entails that there might 
be another type of superconductor where the superconducting state can 
exhibit some kind of magnetic penetration through the superconductor. This 
was verified experimentally three years later. We now understand that the
2 Earlier in 1955 Abrikosov published another paper, also depending on the Landau and 
Ginzburg model. That paper had been forgotten for a long time. In it he claimed that some 
superconductors might cany enormous current values. This paper turns out to be very 
important in the generalised Landau and Ginzburg model that can account for high 
temperature superconductors.
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superconducting state in type two superconductors is split into a perfect 
Meissner effect region under a certain magnetic field Hi and an ordered 
penetration of the magnetic field in some kind of vortex lines when the 
magnetic field is between Hi and He. (See figure 5: l)3
NormalHc
Super­
conducting
a) Type 1 Superconductor with perfect Meissner effect.
Hc
Normal
b) Type 2 Superconductor.
Figure 5:1
The BCS model managed, using further assumptions, to account for 
type two superconductors. But other kinds of superconductors, especially 
high temperature superconductors, which were discovered in 1986 by G. 
Bednorz and A. Muller, prove more problematic. It is important here to say 
that in all the interpretations of the BCS model concerning the critical 
temperature, the most optimistic one suggests 30°K to be the highest
3 For a simple discussion of this point, consult Bishop, Gammel and Huse 1993, p 28.
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possible critical temperature. Now we have superconductors with (125°K) 
Tc4. So the BCS model cannot be seen as valid for all kinds 
of superconductors.
In a discussion between P. Anderson and R. Schrieffer (1991, p 54) 
on the difficulties facing a theory for high temperature superconductivity, 
Anderson says:
I think few people realize that we now know of at least six 
different classes of electron superconductors, and two other BCS 
fluids as well. Out of these only one obeys the so called 
conventional theory — that is, BCS with phonons that fit 
unmodified versions of Eliashberg’s equations. (Anderson and R. 
Schrieffer 1991, 54)
These superconductors are:
1) Free-electron-like (s-p and lower d-band) metals. These all fit the theory 
and can be predicted.
2) Strong-coupling, ‘bad actor,’ old-fashioned ‘high Tc’ materials such as 
NbsSn and Pb(Mo6Ss). These seem to have phonons, but they have many 
unusual properties in both their normal and superconducting states, and it 
would be rash to assume they fit simple theory. They have, for instance, 
peculiar magnetic properties in the normal states.
3) Organic superconductors. These are still almost a complete mystery.
4) Heavy-electron superconductors. These are now proven to be BCS-like 
but anisotropic-so-called d-wave superconductors, perhaps. No phonon 
mechanism is proposed.
5) BaBi03-based superconductors. These have phonons but cannot fit simple 
theory because their electron density is too low, Coulomb repulsion seems 
nearly absent and they have their highest Tc's at doping where
4 A good historical account of the developments in the field of superconductivity and high 
temperature superconductivity can be found in:
B. Schechter, (1989) and G. Vidali (1993).
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conventional superconductors become normal, that is, at the metal- 
insulator transition.
6) High-Tc cuprates. In addition to their abnormal Tc's, these materials have 
very abnormal normal-state properties.
Anderson continues by saying that it is ‘crazy* to think that the new 
high temperature superconductors can fit the BCS theory since even most of 
the simpler ones do not fit. He says:
Back in the 1960s we may have created the abomination, a 
theory that has become ‘nonfalsifiable* in the Popperian sense in 
that people insist on inventing more and more ingenious ways to 
make it fit any anomaly! (Anderson and R. Schrieffer 1991, 54)
In fact that was quite right on the theoretical level. Even a great 
physicist like A. Pippard said in 1964 about the success of the BCS model: 
This success is so remarkable that I almost believe you would 
forgive me if I were to say there now remain no problems in 
superconductivity. (Quoted by Vidali, p 99)
Nevertheless, most of the physicists of superconductivity were 
reluctant to use the BCS in practice, especially after they found that the 
Landau and Ginzburg phenomenological model could give them the same 
predictions with simpler mathematics. A survey of the textbooks on 
superconductivity can tell us about the role of the BCS. One of the most read 
textbooks was Michael Tinkham’s book Introduction to Superconductivity. 
He writes, in 1974 (three years after the BCS authors got the Nobel Prize in 
physics for their work in superconductivity), that in his book
The emphasis is on the rich array of phenomena and how they 
may be understood in the simplest possible way. Consequently, 
the use of thermal Green Functions has been completely avoided, 
despite their fashionability and undeniable power in the hands of 
skilled theorists. Rather the power of phenomenological theory 
in giving insight is emphasized, and microscopic theory is often
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narrowly directed to the task of computing the coefficients in 
phenomenological equations. (Tinkham 1974, the introduction)
In 1986 after the new discovery of high temperature 
superconductors, the BCS model was questioned and other theoretical 
models where suggested to give an explanation for the phenomena of 
superconductivity. So what did these theoretical models achieve?
Many theorists still want to accept the BCS model claiming that it is 
possible to develop a more general model that depends on the BCS 
assumptions. We saw that the BCS model needs certain assumptions to be 
consistent with quantum field theory and to be able to derive the needed 
mathematical form. I.e. the assumption that electrons occur in pairs in the 
superconducting state, that a derivation from quantum field of the 
paramagnetic and diamagnetic currents in superconductors is possible, and 
that the electron-phonon interaction is responsible for superconductivity. As 
I said all these assumptions are being challenged. In response, some theorists 
claim that some of the experimental observations can support these 
assumptions. These are:
1) It is an experimental fact that most superconductors, even those of high 
temperature Tc, have a “fundamental” charge of 2e. That can be a 
confirmation for the pairing technique suggested by BCS.
2) Some of the experiments conducted on high Tc superconductors indicate 
that there is an energy gap in the superconducting state.
3) Many of the new superconductors have the same properties as 
conventional superconductors, in particular: Josephson tunnelling and the 
vertex structure of type two superconductors.
4) The measurement for the penetration depth of the new superconductors 
agrees with the theoretical calculations using BCS.
At this stage it will be essential to specify what the protagonists in the 
debate mean by the BCS model. One of its authors, R. Schrieffer, suggests 
that the BCS is
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a microscopic field theoretic framework for treating a fermion 
system in which an effective attractive interaction brings about a 
phase-coherent pair condensate, with strong spatial overlap of 
fermion pairs. The energy of a single pair drifting relative to the 
condensate is discontinuously increased by the action of the Pauli 
principle. (Anderson and Schrieffer 1991, 56)
So, in Schrieffer’s view, the BCS is reduced to just its structural 
relation and derivability from the microscopic field theory with a prime 
assumption of the effective interaction that brings about pairs of electrons. 
He wants then to argue that the BCS does not include all the assumptions 
(the energy gap, the Fermi surface, the interpretation of the two fluid model 
as a paramagnetic/diamagnetic currents, etc.) as a part of the theoretical 
model. All these assumptions go into the different models that can be 
constructed using the theoretical frame. He says
I would submit that while many models are required to account 
for these widely different systems, in fact a single (his italics)
BCS theory underlies the physics of all (my emphasis) the 
apparently distinct phenomena. (Ibid. 56)
In effect Schrieffer claims that the underlying theory for all kinds of 
superconductors is the quantum field theory. I cannot see how someone 
could believe in this claim unless he believes that the BCS model is merely its 
mathematical equations. If I am to be a structural realist I might be happy 
about such a claim; it is the mathematical structure that survives through 
scientific revolutions. To the contrary I think that a physical model needs to 
be questioned on its mathematical level and on its physical assumptions. I 
think that the BCS model, contrary to what Schrieffer claims, fails on 
both levels.
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The BCS model cannot be accepted as a successful theoretical model 
unless we associate with it at least5: the Fermi liquid and Fermi surface 
assumptions, the electron pairs (Cooper pairs), the isotropic effect, and the 
single band assumption. Without these assumptions the derivation from the 
quantum field theoretical frame would not be possible and without which a 
successful explanation for the properties of superconductivity is not possible. 
The BCS authors wove these factors into the model through the ‘story*. 
Each of these points can be questioned. In fact, the new theories depend on 
questioning this or that aspect of the BCS model, if not all the model.
Schrieffer himself is developing what he calls the ‘spin-bag theory* of 
superconductivity where he tries to start from the same grounds as the BCS 
model. Nevertheless, the new evidence against the BCS would make it even 
harder for such an approach to succeed. This evidence includes:
1) Treating the Cooper pairs as entities that can be treated as quasi-Bosons 
gives rise to a deep theoretical discussion about the possibility of there 
being pairs of electrons the way BCS suggests6. And the experimental 
evidence for the pairing techniques is too complicated and can be 
interpreted in different ways, particularly in the case of high temperature 
superconductors where the materials are highly complicated and their 
structure is yet to be fully understood. Let us remember that Cooper pairs 
are essential ingredients of any BCS-like ‘theory*.
2) The BCS model is concerned mainly with the superconducting state, while 
for the new superconductors it is their normal state that is more puzzling. 
So it is important for an acceptable theory of superconductivity to 
account for the properties of superconductors in the normal state as well 
as in the superconducting state. BCS fails to do this.
5 Schrieffer might have ignored this fact because he accepts that these factors are part of 
the quantum field theoretical frame. Even if this is the case, the model would not be its 
mathematical equations alone, and it would not be able to account for new discoveries.
6 See for example: Y. Chen, F. Wilczek, E. Witten and B. Halperin, (1989).
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3) The Cu-0 materials have an anisotropic chemical structure; that means 
that the BCS assumption of neglecting the anisotropic effect and dealing 
with idealised materials7 is essentially a wrong thing to do. Let us 
remember Bardeen comments:
One must neglect terms or make approximation which introduce 
errors which are many orders of magnitude larger than the small 
energy difference one is looking for. One can hope only to isolate 
the physically significant factors which distinguish the two phases 
[normal / superconducting]. (Bardeen 1956, 276)
It seems that the BCS made the wrong choice by this idealisation.
1) The extremely high value of Tc, whereas the BCS model predicted the
highest of 30°K.
2) Very small coherence length in high temperature superconductors, in 
comparison with the accepted coherence length limits in the BCS model.
3) A “close proximity of anti-ferromagnetic phases”(Bums, p 3), which is 
not consistent with the BCS.
4) The new high Tc materials do not fit Fermi liquid and Fermi 
sea assumptions.
5) The new high Tc materials must be treated as at least a two dimensional 
system. The BCS treats superconductors as a one-dimensional system.
6) High value for the energy gap that lies in the range 3.5kTc to 8kTc which 
is larger than the isotropic BCS value of maximum 3.5kTc.
7) More importantly, the chemical structure of the new high Tc materials is 
highly important in understanding and in measuring the properties of these 
materials. Also it is an essential factor of superconductivity. The BCS 
claims that superconductivity is not dependent on the structure. (BCS 
1957, 1178)
7 BCS, p. 1178, “Our theory is based on a rather idealized model in which anisotropic 
effects are neglected.”
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Along with this long list of why BCS theory is not accepted any more, there 
are also other experimental constraints that have emerged from dealing with 
new high Tc materials. In an article by P. Anderson (1992, pp 1526-1531), 
he discuss exactly these experimental constraints on having a theory for high 
Tc superconductivity.
It is clear, then, that the BCS model fails to account for 
superconductivity. Also it is clear that the standpoint of the BCS model is the 
departure from the quantum mechanical theoretical frame, so the BCS model 
is a theoretical model as I have already characterised in chapter three. While 
BCS failed to account for the new experimental evidence, the Landau and 
Ginzburg model was able to adopt and to incorporate all the evidence within 
its generalised form.
I think that the major factor in such success is that the Landau and 
Ginzburg model, counter to the BCS, takes the experimental and 
phenomenological facts as its standpoint. The association of the 
phenomenological model with the experimental evidence, and the liberty the 
model leaves for some parameters to be measured experimentally puts it in a 
better position to represent new kinds of superconductors. Hence, the 
phenomenological model proved to be more able to represent nature than the 
theoretical model of superconductivity. Moreover, the phenomenological 
model is able to adapt with the new evidence in the field.
There are many suggestions for a revival of some kind of theoretical 
model for superconductivity8. By far the most important theoretical models 
in the field now are:
8 There is a huge industry of papers and books on how to ground a theory of 
superconductivity. This work was suggested by the discovery of high temperature 
superconductivity.
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1) The spin-bag model which was suggested by Schrieffer and his 
group. This model can be seen as a modification of a BCS 
type model9.
2) The resonating-valence-bond model, suggested by Anderson, 
which does not accept the Fermi liquid argument, and which does 
not take the BCS to be a base10.
3) The Anyon superconductivity model which questions the 
presupposition of Fermi surfaces and Fermi liquids made by 
conventional theoretical models of superconductivity, and works 
from outside the quantum field theoretical framework11.
The striking thing about superconductivity is that it is a phenomenon 
that has two distinguishing properties, zero-resistance and the Meissner 
effect (or magnetic vertex penetration), but these two do not have the same 
known origin. There are, as I already said six known types of 
superconductors and each of them has different normal state properties. The 
chemical properties of some are very complicated and give rise to many 
contradictory results. Theoretical models have so far failed to give a single 
generalised account for these different kinds of superconductivity. Many 
factors have been investigated in an attempt to account for 
superconductivity, but until now all of these factors appear to have 
experimental evidence against them (Anderson 1992).
Of course it is important for any theoretical model not to contradict 
any of the experimental observations that cannot be accepted as exceptions. 
Anderson urged this kind of position in addressing the BCS assumption that 
all superconductors are Fermi liquid type materials:
9 J. R. Schrieffer, X. Wen and S. Zhang, (1989) and J. R. Schrieffer and A. Kampf, Phys. 
(1990a) and (1990b).
10 P. Anderson (1987), (1990); and P. Anderson, G. Baskaran, Z. Zou and T. Hsu, Phys. 
(1987).
11 A collection of the important papers can be fond in: F. Wilczer (1990).
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Here I must appeal to a point of logic. The common response, 
when one makes a firm statement that all of these materials are 
not Fermi liquids because of one or another observation, is to say 
that the observation encounters exceptions among these many 
materials. But that is not the point: if they are all at the same 
fixed point -and they clearly are- it will be non-Fermi liquid for 
all if it is not for any one: it is necessary only to prove the 
negative in one instance. Exceptions are logically irrelevant. 
(Anderson 1992, 1527)
There is no one generalised theoretical model for superconductivity. 
Physicists in the field still use the generalised Landau and Ginzburg 
phenomenological model of superconductivity. This model can equip 
physicists with effective mathematical techniques to predict the behaviour of 
superconducting material or design superconducting devices. Also, it is 
possible to predict new properties out of the model (prediction of type two 
superconductors, prediction of high field superconductors, prediction of high 
current superconductors, etc....). The major factor that makes the 
phenomenological models so powerful is the fact that they are a first level 
abstraction departing from the experimental level.
The experimental observations now seem to indicate that it is 
improbable that we will be able to arrive at a theoretical model of 
superconductivity that departs from existing fundamental theories. This is 
because the essential assumptions for the candidate theoretical models have 
proven to be in contradiction with experiments involving this or that kind of 
superconductors. That leads us, if we want to continue to search for a 
theoretical model derivable from fundamental theories, to one of 
two options.
The first option is to say that the candidate theoretical models are no 
good for superconductivity but some other theoretical model will emerge 
that can account for all the aspects of superconductivity. Of course such a
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point of view does not tell us a lot, because theoretical models should, by 
definition, be derivable from previous fundamental theories. Hence, the 
predictions of the new theory should not be in contradiction with the well- 
confirmed predictions of the previous theoretical models. So this option will 
require a whole new theoretical approach, not just for superconductivity but 
for other domains as well.
The other option is to say that there is more than one theoretical 
model for superconductivity: one for conventional superconductors, one for 
high temperature superconductors, one for organic superconductors, etc.
I do not see either of these two options as necessary. I think if we 
accept that phenomenological models are the representatives of nature, then 
our theories will eventually be merely tools to help us in constructing new 
theoretical tools and new phenomenological models. I think that science and 
scientists will have more freedom by doing that, and that will help them to go 
beyond the theoretical limitations. After all, if all the physicists in 
superconductivity accepted the BCS model, we would have never been able 
to achieve high temperature superconductors.
The story of the physicist Bemd Matthias is in place here. Matthias 
was a German experimental physicist and chemist who had a special 
approach to how physicists should work. This approach was highly 
dependent on the experimental observations. He taught his students that 
approach saying:
Let us look at so many instances of one given phenomenon that 
at least we can get a ... feeling for what the crucial conditions 
are. If we do this, then relying on the correctness of these 
conditions, we can make predictions. This is what I did in
superconductivity  And the fact that these compounds
become superconducting is a justification for this approach12.
12 From Schechter, p49.
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Some of his highly theoretical colleagues thought of his empirical approach 
as alchemy13. Nevertheless, his ‘alchemy’ proved fruitful and a school of this 
type of practice developed.
Matthias was known for his work on superconductivity. He was a 
very important experimentalist who discovered a large number of 
superconducting materials. He started a school of experimental work that put 
the emphasis on phenomenological ways of discovering whether certain 
combinations of chemical compounds can be superconductors. For this work 
he was described as the Mendeleev of superconductivity (Clogoston, Geballe 
and Hulm 1981, p 84). He did not believe that theories gave a true 
representation of nature. His disbelief in the use of theories in 
superconductivity, including the BCS, was based on a simple fact: ‘No 
theorist has actually predicted a new superconductor, let alone its transition 
temperature’ (Schechter, p. 57).
In describing the ways of finding materials with higher transition 
temperature, he rightly claims that all the increases in Tc were the result of 
experimental or semi-experimental approaches. Matthias accepts the 
phenomenological approach toward theoretical forms. Using this approach 
he developed several models.
One of these models was used to identify compounds that would 
have high transition temperatures. As mentioned earlier, the BCS model has 
failed to put forward any clear understanding of why certain materials could 
be superconductors, and, as a result, has failed to predict which material 
could exhibit superconductivity. Alternatively, Matthias and his colleagues14 
were able to apply the phenomenological approach to construct a model to 
find higher transition temperature superconductors. Matthias noticed that 
within the transition elements the ratio of the number of electrons to the area 
of the atom (e/a) is a primary parameter and for superconducting transition
13 Matthias was working in America where his kind of approach was not common.
14 See Hulm, Kunzler and Matthias 1981.
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elements would be between 4.5 and 5. Matthias was able to discover that Nb 
and V compounds would have high transition temperature (at least to what 
was known at that time), NbsSn with Tc = 18 °K using this simple assertion. 
This assertion depends on experimental evidence and some theoretical 
assumptions like the isotope effect and its relation to superconductivity,
Matthias was a major rebel against the acceptance of the BCS model 
as the main model of superconductivity. He insisted that the claim made by 
the BCS model of the impossibility of finding any superconductors with a 
transition temperature more than 25 °K was simply wrong. He kept trying to 
find a combination of chemical substances that would disprove the BCS 
claim, but died in 1980 before finding one. Just before his death he predicted 
that oxide superconductors would provide a new type of superconductors. 
He was proved right. His prediction was examined by one of his students, 
Paul Chu, a Chinese Professor who studied under Matthias at the University 
of California, San Diego, and by two other experimental physicists at IBM 
Labs (Bednorz and Muller) who arrived at the first known high-temperature 
superconductors in 1986.
Matthias* attitude toward theorists can be summarised by this 
quotation from a lecture in 1974. He says that: theorists and their 
predictions:
clutter up the literature, they confuse the mind, and they give all 
of us a bad image. Because if they predict, basing it on 
something, and then fail, we have only two choices. Either they 
[theorists] are stupid, which they aren’t, or they predicted on the 
basis of something that isn’t true. Now which of the two choices 
would you choose? (In Schechter 1989, p 47).
This attitude is exactly what allowed Matthias to continue his investigation to 
find new kinds of superconductors. If it were not for people like him many 
aspects of superconductivity would not have been discovered.
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To conclude: we have looked at a theoretical model (the BCS) which 
had been accepted, as a legitimate straightforward derivation from a 
fundamental theory. We saw that this theoretical model failed first of all to 
predict whether a material can be a superconductor or not, not to mention 
that it failed to account for the new experimental evidence.
Alternatively, we have seen that a phenomenological model (Landau 
and Ginzburg) was able to account for all the known properties in 
superconductivity. It was able to give good grounds to develop predictions 
that proved to be right. It was able to account for the new experimental 
evidence. Although the model fails to give what can be accepted as a 
straightforward derivation from fundamental theory, this did not render 
it false.
5:3 Phenomenological Realism
Yet it is to some such conclusion that we shall 
have to come if we wish to define the 
philosophy of scientific knowledge as an open 
philosophy, as the consciousness of a mind 
which constitutes itself by working upon the 
unknown, by seeking within reality that which 
contradicts anterior knowledge.15
Gaston Bachelard
Up until now I have argued that a different kind of dichotomy on the 
theoretical level can be inferred from observation based on the practice in 
physics. I urged that such a dichotomy cut horizontally between low-level 
and high-level theoretical representations. Here, I want to argue that there is 
a space for a new kind of realism. In what follows I will not put forward 
arguments against realism. I believe that theoretical representations refer to 
real relations between objects, and that the no-miracle argument is the 
strongest argument in support of realism.
15 From Bachelard 1968, p 9.
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Most realists accept that to overcome the pessimistic meta-induction 
a kind of dichotomy is needed on the theoretical level. In accordance with 
my suggestion of a horizontal dichotomy on the theoretical level, I accept 
that low-level theoretical representations do often survive and that they have 
a better chance to do so than high-level one. I call such a position 
phenomenological realism.16
The overall strategy of phenomenological realism could be described 
as being a realist at the empirical and phenomenological levels only. It might 
be cast as a midway approach between instrumentalism, which asserts that 
theories are mere instruments, and realism which claims that theories are 
representative of nature, or approximately so.
Although theoretical models share with phenomenological models 
some of their overall characterisation, the phenomenological models have 
better stakes for being accurate representation of nature. This contrasts with 
the theoretical models which, due to their need to present a neat and tidy 
derivation out of ‘fundamental theories*, have bad stakes.
Although I take the mathematical bases of the so-called ‘fundamental 
theories* as tools to construct models (theoretical and phenomenological), 
my position is not an instrumentalist one. This is because: it accepts low- 
level theoretical models, which I call ‘phenomenological* models, as a real 
representation of nature, which implies that it accepts that some theoretical 
descriptions do refer. Instrumentalism usually asserts that theoretical 
representations at all levels are mere instruments.
I agree with Worrall that there are two major arguments in the 
realism/anti realism debate: the no-miracle and the pessimistic meta­
induction. So, in order to defend my position I ought to show the ways it 
deals with these two arguments.
16 It is important to say here that I am using the physicists’ notion of ‘phenomenological’ 
not that of the German philosophical tradition.
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Let us start with the no-miracle argument. Usually, realists would say 
that it is impossible for our highly empirically successful theories to be true 
‘without what theory says about the fundamental structure of the universe 
being correct or ‘essentially* or ‘basically’ correct*. (Worrall 1989, p 101) I 
put it in a different way. I would say that it is impossible that the low-level 
theoretical representations to be true without what these representations say 
about nature being correct.
Phenomenological models, as characterised in chapter three, are 
generally the best vehicles of representation. These models, as we saw, are 
highly related to the empirical findings. So, it is more probable that what they 
say about nature is correct. It must be said, that even if the 
phenomenological models, when constructed, take the phenomenal facts as 
their starting point. They should, nevertheless, encompass more than just the 
facts they start off with. For they ought to be able to predict unknown 
properties of the phenomenon. This is an important point, because it is 
obvious that a theoretical representation can get an empirical fact right if it 
was constructed taking this empirical fact as a presupposition. So, in order to 
give the no-miracle argument a weight in favour of phenomenological 
models, it is important that these models are able to predict properties of the 
phenomenon not yet known.
As we saw in the case of Landau and Ginzburg’s phenomenological 
model, it was able to predict, before it was observed, the existence of type 
two superconductors. So, in this case it would be impossible that the Landau 
and Ginzburg’s model was able to predict yet unknown properties if what it 
says about nature is not basically correct. This argument is less problematic 
because it is the positive argument for realism.
Let me take the other argument: the pessimistic meta-induction. This 
argument says that deep changes in accepted scientific theories make the 
assertion that the old theories approximate the new only possible by 
stretching the concept of approximation to beyond its breaking point. This
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argument is a strong objection to the realist doctrine. But it is aimed more at 
the high-level theoretical assumption rather than the low-level ones.
In the example given chapter three (3:4), we saw that the change on 
the high-level theoretical assumptions, between accepting the three 
dimensional absolute space and absolute time and accepting the space-time 
curvature, did not affect the truth status of the low-level theoretical 
representation. Physicists still use the phenomenological models associated 
with Newton’s theory because each of these models is related to a specific 
phenomenon. These phenomena are still the same.
Scientific revolutions affect deeply, most of the time, the high-level 
theoretical concepts, relations and basic point of view. In the Newton- 
Einstein case, the programmes that the two theories aim to fulfil are totally 
different. Newton wanted a unification of Kepler-style and Galileo-style 
mechanical models, while Einstein was concerned with the unification 
between energy and mass. On a high-level theorisation, this change can affect 
the whole theoretical frame. Another factor on that level is the mathematical 
information. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the mathematical 
language developed rapidly and new concepts were suggested. These 
concepts were employed in constructing the new Einsteinian framework.
I claim that a change in theory should be seen as a change in the tools 
that are used in constructing models. Let me clarify this point. If a 
phenomenological model is known to represent a certain situation, like the 
movement of a box over a rough surface, then any latter theory should aim 
to produce a model out of its first principles to represent this movement if it 
falls in its domain. That is, to produce a theoretical model which approximate 
the same basic known equation. In the case of Newton’s theory, this would 
be, in a way, by a straightforward application of Newton’s second law. In 
Einstein’s case, this is done by first making some kind of correspondence to 
correspond the new laws to those of the old. Then we are able to claim that 
the Einsteinian theory captures the basic equations of the known model.
138
Phenomenological Realism
Now, looking at this point from phenomenological-model- 
construction point of view: let us assume that we do not have a model to 
represent the movement of a box on a rough surface, and we have two 
theories, that of Newton and of Einstein. Then we can see that there is more 
than one tool to be used in the construction of a model; but, at the end of the 
day, it is not important whether we arrived at the model using the first tool 
or the second tool. The end phenomenological model is the same. Let me 
give an analogy:
Building a radio (transmitter and receiver) can be done in two ways: 
using simple tools in a school laboratory: board, transistors, capacitors, 
resistors, microphone, speaker, ...etc.; and with a simple explanation of the 
use of such tools, one can build a radio. The outcome will not be a brilliant 
manufacture but it will enable us to demonstrate the idea of sending and 
receiving a signal without wires up to 500 metres. The second way is by 
using the latest technology to manufacture a radio. It turns out that many of 
the previous tools are redundant in favour of IC (integrated circuits), and the 
human agent might not be needed directly — the computer robot will do the 
job. Of course the outcome of such manufacture is superior to the laboratory 
radio. But still the outcome in both cases is a radio, and both will 
demonstrate the same phenomenon of transmitting and receiving signals 
without wires. The point that I want to make is that whether we used the 
more advanced tool or the simple one the outcome radio will demonstrate 
the same phenomena.
A phenomenological model, as I mentioned in chapter three, ought to 
give a description of the environmental set-up of a phenomenon, and to 
present a story that gives an explanation of the relations between the 
different elements. This story is also important in relating the mathematical 
structure of the model with the phenomenon. In the cases related to a 
moving body on a rough surface or building a bridge, the environmental set­
up does not change (even if it is not the same elements that are involved. I
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mean here that the material used in building bridges changes because our 
knowledge of the physical properties of materials has developed. But that 
need not change the overall model that the bridge building depends on).
One might say that Newton’s laws, like F = ma, were not about a 
certain restricted domain of applicability, but they were “for all material 
objects moving with any velocity you like” (Worrall 1989, 104). This cannot 
be an objection to the phenomenological models associated with Newton’s 
laws. This is because in these models the domain is restricted by the 
description of the environmental set-up of the phenomenon. These models 
are local. So, phenomenological models associated with Newton’s laws are 
not for all material moving with any velocity. This locality of a 
phenomenological model is an essential aspect of it.
In addition, it is highly probable that a phenomenological model can 
be modified to account for new findings. The flexibility that the phenomenal 
standpoint gives to the phenomenological model helps it to change in 
accordance with the available evidence. But this flexibility does not make the 
model a mere data model. The associated theoretical description elevates it 
from a mere data-model to a low-level theoretical representation. But why 
are phenomenological models flexible?
Phenomenological models give a simple theoretical representation of 
the empirical evidence. I claim, they present a correct picture of nature. Also, 
they have elements that are plugged into the mathematical part from 
empirical findings. These elements can vary depending on which factors are 
crucial to the system under study. Now if new evidence appeared, it might be 
incorporated into the empirical level and then plugged into the model. 
Sometimes this cannot be done. In this case a further modification to the 
model might be needed. It is highly probable that these modifications will not 
alter the basic assumptions of the model.
Of course, I cannot give a general claim that all phenomenological 
models would be able to incorporate new evidence, but I might say that
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successful phenomenological models do. In the case of the Landau and 
Ginzburg model, the physicists were able to modify the model to account for 
the new findings in the field of superconductivity without the need to change 
its basic assumptions.
Let us take another point. As I explained in the introduction of 
chapter three, physicists have a reasonably good understanding of what they 
can accept as having a clear physical meaning. In the case of the 
displacement current there is a widespread agreement between physicists that 
both the electrical field and polarisation have a physical meaning, but they 
also know that the displacement current is a mere mathematical tool that 
helps them to simplify the calculations. The ‘physicists intuition* and the 
‘physical insight’ are but some of the techniques that are used by physicists 
to insure that any concepts, without ‘clear physical meaning’, would not be 
mixed with true representative concepts.
One might say that even simple concepts might not have a ‘clear 
physical meaning’. The ‘mass’ concept, to take but one important example, 
has changed dramatically from the Newtonian view to the modem view. 
How is such a concept viewed from a phenomenological realism point of 
view? The phenomenological models that use the concept of ‘mass’ view it 
from a phenomenal perspective. That is to say that in each phenomenon, like 
a box sliding on a rough surface, the object (box) has a mass.
Our accumulative experience of the concept of mass will no doubt be 
part of the phenomenological model’s intuitive concept of mass. Our 
experience started with the early observations of human kind: that ‘the big’ is 
not necessarily the ‘massive’; that weighing an object can give a more 
‘objective’ observation of its ‘mass’; that the relation between weighing an 
object and the angle of weighing is important and that there is a relation 
between the shape and density of an object and its ‘mass’. All these elements 
will be intuitively part of the concept of ‘mass’ employed in the 
phenomenological model of the box sliding on a rough surface. Nevertheless,
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in all this accumulative experience there is no place for the Newtonian 
theoretical concept o f ‘abstract mass’.
One might argue in response that when we use a mathematical 
equation, even a simple one, e.g. one that specifies that 
[F  = m gcosO -R  = m a \  we are then speaking of an abstract mass. The 
reason, I take it, is because the equation mgzosO has been obtained due to 
our assumption that the box has a centre of mass, and there is a weight 
trajectory from that centre of mass toward the earth = mg. But it is an 
equally plausible account that says that the box mass, whether it is the centre 
of mass or not, has a presumed weight trajectory = mg. The important point 
from a phenomenological point of view is that the box on the rough surface 
has a mass, this mass has a weight trajectory toward earth equal to mg, and 
the effective weight that helps in the movement of the box on the rough 
surface is equal to mgcosO. Here we are using ‘theoretical* information that 
is not related to any cohesive picture of the universe. Whether there is a 
negative mass, or an abstract mass, or the mass of the box is pictured as 
concentrated in a point called ‘the centre of mass’, these are abstract 
theoretical assumptions that go beyond those needed by the 
phenomenological model.
Another objection is in place here. The structural realist, and most 
realists, might say: if you accept that the low-level theoretical representation, 
which uses concepts like E and P, is a representation that holds true about 
nature, then why can’t we extend this truth to the high-level theoretical 
representation? Why, if phenomenological realism accepts that the low-level 
models are the vehicles of representation, should we deny this to 
theoretical models?
First, the pessimistic meta-induction shows us that a lot of theoretical 
forms that we thought had been verified turned out to be false. It is by no 
means possible to accept concepts such as absolute space, absolute time and 
action-at-a-distance as any approximation to the space-time curvature. And
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to accept that the high-level theoretical forms can represent or approximately 
represent nature, the new entities ought to approximate, at least, the old 
theoretical concepts. In the superconductivity case study, theoretical models 
like Cooper pairs or the Fermi sea are questionable. This leads us to reject 
the high-level theoretical forms as a true representative of nature.
Second, concepts like E and P appear in phenomenological models 
because they are, if not measured empirically, easily verified out of the 
empirical measurements. As we saw in the example in the model of the 
electrical field, D did not appear in the mathematical part of the model even 
if we accept that it might be used to arrive at that model.
Third, the process by which the low-level theoretical representation is 
developed is totally related to the phenomenal level and gets its 
representative weight out of this association. The high-level theoretical 
forms, most of the time, function to keep the coherence of the theory; they 
help in simplifying the mathematical calculations of certain properties which 
are otherwise difficult to attain.
To take another point, it might be said that scientific revolutions 
depend on a conceptual shift between the old and new theories. In the case 
of light the shift was from accepting that light consists of particles to saying 
that light is a wave. But a model or a theory that does not make any assertion 
about this matter would not be susceptible to the argument from pessimistic 
meta-induction. The structural realist dichotomy between structure and 
content would be a sufficient reply to such argument. It does not matter if 
the light is composed of particles or of waves, as long as the structure of the 
old theory is preserved.
But, as we saw the structural realist reply has problems with the real 
test field: physics. As Worrall himself indicated, although the idea of the 
composition of light was changing, “there was a steady basically cumulative 
development in the captured and systematised empirical content of optics” 
(Worrall 1989, 108). Without any direct impact from doctrines about the
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constitution of light, the scientific models were dealing successfully with 
refraction, diffraction, interference, reflection, polarisation and the 
photoelectric effect.
Yes, the theories of the time played an important role in building 
these various models, but, at the end of the day, the models did not use the 
abstract theoretical explanation in the models. These models are not mere 
empirical models. The cumulative development was not associated only with 
the empirical findings. The development on the theoretical level between the 
Newtonian picture of light to Fresnel’s theory to Maxwell’s 
electromagnetism to Einstein’s photons to de-Broglie’s wave-particle 
duality, was associated with, if not generated by, new experimental evidence.
At each stage the scientific community was able to produce an 
effective model to deal with the new properties of light. At each of these 
stages some of the tools of the theory of the day were employed. These 
models are qualified to be phenomenological models. In these models the 
theoretical input is important, but it is not as crucial as the effect of new 
experimental evidence. And most importantly in my differentiation between 
phenomenological and theoretical model, the theoretical input to the 
phenomenological model is not as crucial as that to the theoretical models.
Worrall argues that the important factor in the success is due to the 
structure of the theories, which captured the real relations between things, 
or, to put it in his terminology, that they “must somehow or other have 
latched onto the ‘universal blueprint’.” (Worrall 1989, 101) Nevertheless, the 
success depended on more than the structure. The possibility, in the cases 
that were not yet observed, of building an experimental set-up that can 
capture the predicted phenomenon contributed to such success. The 
possibility of associating some of the theoretical concepts with real 
properties, i.e. content, was also important. Worrall himself admits, although 
in a footnote, that the theories were “also guided by what was already known
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empirically about light” (Worrall 1989, 115 my italics). Therefore, the 
success cannot be reduced to one factor: the structure.
In accordance with the points raised in this section I conclude that: in 
the case study discussed in chapter four, the Landau and Ginzburg model is 
an exemplar of phenomenological models. It illustrates various points 
discussed here. First, it allows us to deploy the no-miracle argument: it is no 
miracle that the Landau and Ginzburg model is able to predict unknown 
properties of superconductivity because it is a real representative of nature. 
Second, the Landau and Ginzburg model is a phenomenological model of a 
typical phenomeno-technology type of phenomena. Superconductivity needs 
a special environment, that of low temperature (either under liquid Helium or 
liquid Nitrogen). Also new kinds of high-temperature superconductors need 
a lot of technical work before they would be able to exhibit superconducting 
properties, to the limit that the same technical procedure might produce a 
superconductor and might not. This might depend, according to one 
interpretation, on the number of electrons in the specimen. Third, the Landau 
and Ginzburg’s model, because of its low-level theoretical frame, survived 
through new discoveries.
Let me now turn my attention to a different issue. I think that 
Bachelard’s philosophy is an important source of inspiration.
5:4 Bachelard: the epistemological terrain
In the last section I argued that, in most of the cases at least, the models 
which are still in use, and which were constructed by using tools out of 
‘false’ theories, are the phenomenological models. In general these models 
play the role of mediation between theory and experiment. In this section I 
will turn my attention to draw the lines of similarity between my project and 
that of the French philosopher of science Gaston Bachelard. Bachelard’s aim
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was to reconcile rationalism with empiricism. This is in a way analogical to 
my project of reconciling instrumentalism with realism.
I will start from the last point raised in the last section. Bachelard 
thinks that scientific thinking is essentially a dialectical interaction between 
the mathematical and the experimental. As he puts it in his poetic language: 
To think scientifically is to place oneself in the epistemological 
terrain which mediates between theory and practice, between 
mathematics and experiments. To know a natural law 
scientifically is to know it as a phenomenon and a noumenon at 
one and the same time (Bachelard 1968, 6).
To my mind there is no noumenon behind the phenomenon: the phenomenon 
is the noumenon. So by saying that it is important to know the noumenon 
and the phenomenon at the one and the same time we in fact are saying, if we 
take the physicists' understanding of the phenomenon, that the phenomenon 
is all there is. The whole business of searching for the ‘structure* (or the blue 
print) of the noumenon is not important. Phenomenological realism is about 
the things that exists out there with and without our intervention - not only 
what exists without our intervention. This is of course a point of 
disagreement between my realism and that of structural realism. Structural 
realism claims that we cannot access the relata, Zahar says:
In a unified and highly confirmed theory, the basic relations 
mirror reality while the relata themselves remain inaccessible to 
us(Zahar 1994, 1)
The only reality, in his sense, is the reality of relations between unknown 
objects. But in the scientific practice we, as humans, sculpt the object. Let 
me give an example of how the physicists construct a superconducting 
quantum interference device (SQUID). I will not go into the details but I will 
give the general strategy. First the physicists decide which materials they 
want to use. This depends on the kind of SQUID they want to build, its 
transition temperature, its magnetic properties and so on. They then smash
146
Phenomenological Realism
these materials and heat the compound to 1500 degrees. Then they reduce 
the heat gradually in a very carefully monitored way so that the temperature 
goes down by 150 degrees every hour. At 900 degrees they dig a hole inside 
the specimen. And then they continue to reduce the temperature until it is 
back to room temperature. The SQUID would work after that by putting it 
in liquid helium or liquid nitrogen (and connecting it with an electrical 
circuit). In this case we know the structure (I mean here the mathematical 
structure, in accordance with what structural realism would accept as 
structure) of the mathematics governing the making of SQUIDs (remember 
that to construct a SQUID you need a model of such construction). Also we 
know how to calculate their magnetic and current specifications through our 
knowledge of superconductivity. But also we know the content related to 
such structure, the objects themselves, because we construct them and we 
know how to manipulate them.
Let me now turn to another point. In practice, we do not restrict 
ourselves to a coherent nature, which forces a coherent science so that every 
law of science must be part of a harmonic unified theory. We try to present, 
using the best of our descriptive abilities, local models and pictures that can 
provide us with understanding. Much of the real development in modem 
science was not related to the huge effort delegated for the unification of all 
theories in physics, but was related to technological developments and to 
phenomenological developments in sciences. I do not want to undermine the 
role of theoretical physics. But the role that I think that theoretical physics 
can play is not that of finding the theory of everything. This was and is still a 
dream for many physicists. But the facts are that, whenever a major question 
in physics is answered, thousands of other questions will occur. The conflict 
between human and nature is one of no end. Our rational activity affects 
nature as much as nature affects our rational activity.
I do not mean that the rational construction of science is all that we 
want to know about. Scientific activity is related to both rational and
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experimental activity. Most philosophers of science do not deny this. But the 
important thing here is to see on what we should put the emphasis. For me, 
the emphasis is on the latter. Also scientific theories are theories about 
nature. Now scientific practice is an active practice toward nature. The 
dialectics between our rational observation and nature itself is what leads us 
toward a theoretical structure of which it is reasonable to say that it goes 
some way toward providing the laws which govern nature.
I agree with Bachelard that there is a dialectical relation between the 
rational and the experimental. Bachelard supports a reconciliation tendency 
between the empirical and the rational. In his view this is a way of bringing 
together empiricism and rationalism:
So, if one could translate into philosophical terms the double 
movement which at present animates scientific thought one 
would perceive that there has to be alternation between a priori 
and a posteriori, that empiricism and rationalism in scientific 
thought are bound together by a strange bond, as strong as the 
bond which joins pleasure and pain. Indeed the one triumphs by 
assenting to the other: empiricism needs to be understood; 
rationalism needs to be applied (Bachelard 1968, 6).
The important point for Bachelard is to find reconciliation between 
mathematics (or better: mathematical physics) and experiment. He says that 
the relation between mathematics and experiment developed through 
extended solidarity. When the experiment comes with a new message about a 
new phenomenon, the theoretician starts to modify the current theory, in the 
hope that it will provide an explanation to understand the new phenomenon. 
Through this modification - which is a posteriori indeed - the mathematician 
provides a theory that, after it is partially modified, explains the newness 
(Bachelard, 1981, p28).
On the other hand also the experimental physicists will try to search 
for the correctness of a theoretical prediction when what the theory predicts
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has not been tested yet. So the practice of science depends on both sides of 
scientific activity at the same time, without saying that the theory will lead 
experiment or that the empirical findings are all that matters. Bachelard 
summarises the correlation between the theory and experiment in two 
questions: Under what conditions can we explain an accurate phenomenon? 
(Accurate here is an important word, because the mind is essential for 
accuracy.) And under what conditions can we provide real evidence to 
support the validity of a mathematical system for a physical experimentation? 
So the new scientific spirit needs two kinds of certainty. First the certainty 
that the rational is associated with reality in a way that allows the rational 
science to deserve the name scientific realism. Second, the certainty that 
rational arguments, which explain the experiments, ought to be already part 
of our experience. Bachelard wants of his position (applied rationality) to 
assert that there is no rationality in vacuum, and no disjoint experience 
(Bachelard 1981, p31-32).
I also agree with Bachelard in rejecting conventional realism because 
of its static frame. On the contrary he believes that:
The experimental as well as the mathematical conditions of 
scientific knowledge change with such rapidity that the problems 
confronting the philosopher are posed differently every day. To 
follow scientific thought, one must reform the rational 
frameworks and accept new realities (Bachelard 1968, 42).
Bachelard thinks that conventional realism puts the realism of laws above the 
realism of things and of facts. He thinks that there are, as an addition to the 
realism of things and of facts, two faces for reality. On the one hand it is 
realising the rational, i.e. trying to realise a predicted phenomena out of a 
theoretical representation. This is practised in science through phenomeno- 
technology; these phenomena if they were not suggested by the scientific 
activity, would not be experienced. And on the other hand there is the 
technological realism (Bachelard 1984, p 5), which reveals properties of
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nature even without our fully understanding those properties, and which 
leads us to search for new models and new structures. So we are not 
revealing the underlying structure of the world, as structural realism claims, 
because the phenomeno-technology which we are realising through our 
science would not demonstrate itself without our intervention and therefore 
its reality is not independent of our intervention. This would not mean, as 
some might think, that Bachelard’s position is an anti-realist one. Because he 
thinks that there is another level of reality: the level of realisation. Our 
intervention is not something out of reality; it is in reality and hence a part of 
that reality. This leads him to the notion of objectivity. He says:
One does not point to the real, one demonstrates it. This is true 
particularly in cases involving an organic phenomenon of some 
kind. When the object under study takes the form of a complex 
system of relations, then it can only be apprehended by adopting 
an appropriate variety of methods. Objectivity cannot be 
separated from the social aspects of proof. The only way to 
achieve objectivity is to set forth, in a discursive and detailed 
manner, a method of objectification (Bachelard 1984, 12).
Of course there is the well-known interpretation of Bachelard which 
concentrates on the ‘social aspects of proof, that is the social 
constructivist’s interpretation. According to that view, the real challenge to 
the realist position is captured in the questions.
How can experimental or experimentally tested knowledge, 
including its theoretical explanations, “be about an independent 
reality,” if the phenomena on which it is based (the experimental 
processes and results) do not occur “naturally” but have to be 
artificially produced and maintained in special laboratories? If not 
only the knowledge of experimental processes and results but 
even their existence is essentially dependent on the work done by
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human beings, how can we refers to human-independent reality? 
(Radder 1996, p 77).
This type of interpretation concentrates only on the social aspect of 
the phenomeno-technology. Bachelard, as I read him, does not challenge the 
reality of the phenomenon as part of nature. Instead he challenges the claim 
that it would have been possible (even in principle) for such a phenomenon 
to be produced in nature without human agency. Reality for Bachelard is the 
reality that puts the human in the centre of it, not as a passive observer but as 
an active agent who helps in pushing the potentialities of nature to its limits. 
Bachelard asserts that any phenomeno-technology would not be possible in 
principle unless the environmental set-up, which is a human-dependent set­
up, occurs. For example, neither electrical networks nor the electrical 
currents running through them, either in America or in South Africa, would 
have been possible except via human activity. This is because in all cases 
when you want to build an electrical network and to get an electrical current 
to run through it you need generators, which are essential human-dependent 
technological equipment.
I think that a realist position can accommodate Bachelard’s point of 
view. How? Well, by accepting that human activity itself is part of nature; 
that is to say that human-dependent nature is part of reality. This is a simple 
answer to a very complex issue, but I do not see why, our activity which is 
embedded in nature and which is totally related to nature ought to be thought 
of as unreal. Hence, the reality of phenomena includes the reality of the 
human agent that helped the potentialities in nature to exhibit themselves, 
these potentialities which would not have exhibited themselves without 
human intervention. Bachelard characterised the development in scientific 
discovery as follows:
The essence of scientific psychology would then lie in the 
reflection whereby experimental laws are transformed into rules 
for discovering new facts. This is how laws become co-ordinated
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with one another and how deductive thinking is introduced into 
inductive science. Scientific knowledge accumulates, one might 
say, without taking up additional room in the mind, and this is 
one difference between scientific knowledge and empirical 
erudition: Science uses tested methods to filter facts (Bachelard 
1984, 136).
Bachelard’s main interest is in saying that the real practice of science 
is to build a mathematical model which captures the phenomena, and is able 
to predict new phenomenon, new reality through experience (experiment). 
There is no simple reality studied by scientists, whether it is object, 
phenomenon or event. The scientific reality is a coupling between a 
mathematical model and a technological structure.
5:5 Summary
In this chapter I argued for a new kind of realism, departing from practice in 
physics, which is able to retain the no-miracle argument and to overcome the 
argument from pessimistic meta-induction. Phenomenological realism asserts 
that phenomenological models hold a true representation of nature while 
high-level theoretical forms fail to do so.
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The Bohr-Einstein Debate
6:1 Introduction
The Bohr-Einstein debate is one of the most important and the most 
highlighted debates in the history of physics. Although the points of dispute 
are very important, it might be said that the crucial factor that makes the 
debate so important is the fact that it is between the two individuals that we 
associate with modem physics: Einstein for his general and special theory of 
relativity and Bohr for his association with quantum mechanics and the 
atomic theory. In spite of all the attention given to this debate, some puzzling 
points are yet to be understood.
For one, why, in spite of its clarity, was Bohr’s starting remark on 
Einstein’s thought experiments: ‘I cannot understand it’? Bohr had a very 
good idea about Einstein’s complaints and yet it seems he could not 
understand Einstein’s simple presentations! Another point is related to the 
great effort Bohr made in restructuring Einstein’s thought experiments. Why 
was it important to Bohr to restructure the experiments? Had Einstein missed 
any point in his presentation or was there another important factor? These 
questions and the type of realism that Bohr might accept are the topic of 
this chapter.
In the Bohr-Einstein debate, Einstein tried to highlight the theoretical 
difficulties of the quantum theory. When the matrix formulation was 
introduced in 1927 and Bom suggested his probabilistic rules, Einstein was 
deeply worried about the probabilistic nature of quantum mechanics. “God 
doesn't play dice” was his famous reaction.
The Bohr-Einstein debate started officially in 1927. The first round 
was conducted during the period between 1927-19301. There they discussed 
the following points: the uncertainty principle, wave-particle duality and the 
complementarity principle. The second round took place in 1935 when
1 An earlier round of debate took place during the early twenties. I will not comment on it 
here See Pais (1993).
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Einstein with two other collaborators (Podolsky and Rosen) wrote their 
famous paper: “Can Quantum-Mechanical Description of Physical Reality Be 
Considered Complete?” which is known as the EPR paper.
The second round has influenced and activated a major part of the 
philosophical and physical debate about the foundations of quantum 
mechanics. It was accepted as a Bohr victory over Einstein. Later, Bell’s 
papers2 on EPR opened the possibilities for many real experiments in 
quantum optics and quantum mechanics. EPR -- especially in Bohm’s version 
of it (1951, 1952 and 1958) — touched very sensitive points: the formulation 
of quantum mechanics, locality, causality and the completeness of quantum 
mechanics. When I wrote my masters’ thesis, the EPR debate helped me to 
articulate an important question which is still at the base of my studies, 
maybe in a more complex form. That is of the relation between theory and 
experiment in physics and the relation between our knowledge about the 
world and the world in itself. At that time I looked into one angle of this 
relation, that of the relation between thought experiments and real 
experiments. I compared the EPR thought experiment with the realisation of 
the EPR-B3 by Aspect & al.
In the previous chapters I took that point to a new horizon: the 
relation between both theoretical and experimental work and the phenomena 
in nature. The main idea, which I will argue for in this chapter, runs as 
follows. Einstein and Bohr are theoretical physicists who express two types 
of theoretical approach. While Einstein was a fundamental theorist who 
approached theory-building on top-down bases, Bohr was a bottom-up 
theorist. I argue that the crucial difference between Bohr and Einstein was 
the point o f departure from which we ought to build our theoretical 
understanding of physical phenomena and the process by which such 
theoretical representation is built.
2 See Bell 1964 and 1966.
3 EPR-B refers to Bohm version of the EPR experiment.
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Einstein believed in a unified theory. This kept him thinking that there 
will be a simple and beautiful theory that must entail all phenomena of 
nature. He believed that the mathematical structure of the unified theory is 
the real representative of the universe. Einstein wanted the theory to give 
complete answers for all the problems facing it without use of any other 
method. His examples originated in the theoretical structure of quantum 
mechanics. Bohr on the contrary starts from putting the hypothetical 
situations into plausible, if not possible (at the time), experimental set-ups 
and then taking quantum mechanics to be a tool to build models of these 
set-ups.
In the debate Einstein tried always to prove the inconsistency of the 
quantum theory by starting from its premises to arrive at a hypothetical 
experimental situation where the inconsistency is visible. Such an attitude is 
the direct opposite of Bohr's. Bohr always, as I will argue, started from the 
experimental and phenomenal to build the theoretical representations and 
descriptions of physical reality which can be expressed in a model: a 
phenomenological model. The mathematical schemes do not give us the 
descriptive power but the models do.
Bohr’s concern was mainly about the type of story associated with 
the phenomena in quantum mechanics. His concern wasn’t the formalism of 
quantum mechanics, but of the physical meanings that would be ascribed to 
such formalism. So, the important point for him is to find the correct way in 
which the formalism can model any suggested experimental set-up. I agree 
with Henry Folse4 that Bohr is a kind of a realist, and I will show through his 
debate with Einstein that his worries were from a realist standpoint. But his 
realism is not compatible with that of other realists at his time. This 
disagreement between his standpoint and that of other realists has given the 
impression that he is an instrumentalist.
4 See his 1985, 1986, 1989, 1990, 1993, Heray Krips also claims that Bohr has a kind of local 
realism (Krips, 1993)
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I think that Bohr, like the vast majority of physicists, knew well what 
he should accept as a representative part of a theory from its mere 
instrumental part. I will advocate that if a realist position can be attributed to 
Bohr then that position should be, if any thing, a kind of phenomenological 
realism. Let me first turn to give a more careful look at his arguments 
and concerns.
6:2 Bohr’s Philosophical Grounds
In order to understand Bohr’s position in the Bohr-Einstein debate it is 
important to understand his philosophical position. Bohr holds an idea that 
any complete theoretical description ought to have a pictorial description 
that would relate it to the physical system. This idea is cashed out in quantum 
mechanics by the quantum postulate (section 6:2:1) and the complementary 
principle (section 6:2:2). The complete theoretical description is related to 
natural phenomena. Bohr accepts that the new physics forces a new 
understanding of natural phenomena (section 6:2:3). These elements, along 
with his idea of objectivity, would shape his attitude toward realism and 
knowledge (section 6:2:4).
I claim that Bohr accepted a dialectical concept of knowledge that 
stresses the importance of human intervention as a part of objective reality. 
He accepts that what he calls ‘theoretical descriptions’ are real 
representations of nature. Such ‘theoretical descriptions’ are not related, 
according to Bohr, to one theory but use all accepted theories in physics as 
tools to construct them. These ‘theoretical descriptions’ are in my 
terminology phenomenological models. Bohr accepted that there is another 
important element in these theoretical constructions: the pictorial 
representation of a model. These philosophical positions are what shapes 
Bohr’s idea of realism.
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Bohr took the quantum postulate to state a major difference between a 
classical system and a quantum system: quantum systems have an inherited 
property of being discrete. What is the quantum postulate? According to 
Bohr the quantum postulate
attributes to any atomic process an essential discontinuity, or 
rather individuality, completely foreign to the classical theories 
and symbolised by Planck's quantum of action (Bohr, 1928 89).
Bohr adopted such a position as early as 1913, though he did not 
formulate its importance for quantum mechanics until Heisenberg 
constructed the matrix formalism. A puzzling dilemma for Bohr was to 
reconcile the wave mechanics of Schrodinger with matrix mechanics. Bohr 
accepts the quantum postulate as a real representation of the phenomena 
occurring in the quantum world. This postulate seems to be in contradiction 
with the wave mechanics which Bohr took as a good model for the wave 
aspects of a quantum system. In the next section I will discuss Bohr’s answer 
to this dilemma.
As I mentioned in chapter three, there are two kinds of models 
constructed with the aid of their theories. The difference depends on the 
process of building them and on their point of departure. Bohr was a 
theoretical physicist who thought that ‘theoretical descriptions’ are not built 
out of simple mathematical formalism — like the principle of least action—, 
but up from experimental and phenomenological grounds5. Heisenberg 
acknowledged this fact when he said that Bohr’s
insight into the structure of the theory was not a result of 
mathematical analysis of the basic assumptions, but rather of an 
intense occupation with the actual phenomena, such that it was
5 I will argue in secession 6:2:3 that Bohr’s concept of phenomena is different from that of 
a phenomenalist like Mach.
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possible for him to sense the relationships intuitively rather than 
derive them formally.
Thus I understood: knowledge of nature was primarily 
obtained in this way, and only as the next step can one succeed in 
fixing one's knowledge in mathematical form and subjecting it to 
complete rational analysis. (Heisenberg 1967, 94-95)
This is one of the major ways Bohr’s standpoint disagrees with that 
of Einstein, who thought that theories should give a ‘complete ’ description 
o f the physical system out o f their mathematical formalism. The difference 
between the two standpoints is crucial to the way we ought to understand 
the debate. While Bohr’s concern was the quantum phenomena and the ways 
they ought to be represented, Einstein’s concern was the consistency 
between the new theory and other existing theories in physics. For now, let 
us see Bohr’s idea o f ‘theoretical description’ at work.
The first important theoretical work for Bohr was the model of the 
atom, or, as it is known now, the old quantum theory (or, sometimes, Bohr’s 
model). In 1911 Bohr was a newly graduated physicist and was searching for 
a research project that he could work on. He went to Cambridge to work at 
the Cavendish with Thomson, and there he met Rutherford6.
At that time Rutherford was working on his model of the atom in 
Manchester. Rutherford, as we know, had suggested, in line with a series of 
experiments, that the atoms must consist of a massive positively charged 
nucleus with negatively charged particles surrounding it. The problem with 
Rutherford’s model was its inconsistency with the mechanical representations 
known at that time. The classical picture ends up by saying that, if such a 
description is given to a system, the electrons ought, when a loss of energy 
by radiation occurs, to collapse in a spiral-like path toward the nucleus. This 
means that the outcome spectrum should be a continuous spectrum of
6 For more details see Pais 1993.
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radiated light. Experimental evidence shows instead that the radiation 
spectrum is a 'line spectrum'.
In his PhD thesis Bohr did not accept classical mechanics as a 
suitable framework for all situations. He claimed that classical mechanics 
cannot provide a solution for the chemical atom. In his view, a break from 
the classical picture is inescapable. Electrons are not free, reacting with 
different particles, but are bound. This attitude makes him a suitable 
candidate to tackle the challenge of experimental facts provided by 
Rutherford’s experiments, and he was able to conceive a solution.
The newly discovered phenomenological facts indicate the failure of 
theories then current. Bohr used these facts as a starting point to construct a 
new model. Now, given the well-corroborated fact that classical mechanics 
could not solve the puzzle, Bohr searched for other tools and models that 
could be combined in constructing a descriptive model of the 
phenomena occurring in atoms. The first of these models was Planck’s 
quantum of energy. The experimental result shows that the spectrum is a line 
spectrum with a discontinuity in the distribution of energy. So, it is justified 
to claim that there is an analogy between such a distribution and Planck’s 
quanta of energy. Rutherford had claimed that the electrons should be in 
orbits around the heavy nucleus. So Bohr suggested using a second model: 
the planetary system. The electrons orbit round the nucleus on closed orbits 
with different energy levels. The third tool is taken from reformulating 
Einstein’s 1905 paper on the photoelectric effect: when an atom radiates 
energy it means that the electron jumps from one energy level to another 
energy level emitting a photon with an energy equal to Planck’s constant 
times the frequency.
In technical terms Bohr’s model states the following:
1) Electrons move in circular orbits of radius r. They are restricted to these 
orbits due to the requirement that the angular momentum be an integer 
multiple of Planck’s constant:
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m w  = £  (6.1)
This use of Planck’s notion of quanta allows Bohr to define his 
concept of the quantum postulate for the first time. The atomic system is 
discrete. The values of its variables, like the angular momentum, are not 
continuous, but jump from one value to another by a factor of an 
integer n.
2) The electrons in their orbits do not radiate even if they are in a rapid 
movement; they are in a stationary state with a definite value of energy E.
3) Electrons can transfer from one stationary state to another either by 
absorbing or radiating energy with a frequency:
v = Mir  (6.2)
4) As a consequences of 1-3 the energy of each level (each possible orbit ) 
can be given for an atom with a nuclear charge Ze and electron charge -e 
and mass m:
„ 2 7r2e4Z 2m const.E  = _ _  = _ — ^ e V  (6.3)
h n  n
This point is another instance of Bohr’s quantum postulate: the energy, in 
this case, is not continuous but jumps by an integer factor (n = 1, 2, 
3...). In such a presentation of the quantum postulate we can see its 
importance in Bohr’s programme. Bohr did not think that the numerical 
agreement between the mathematical result and the experimental results is 
a sufficient factor. He felt that it is important to represent a clear physical 
picture of the quantum system. This picture ought to be presented in an 
unambiguous language. The quantum postulate provides the physical 
picture for the mathematical equations. This is conveyed in the model by 
the pictorial model of the atom: a heavy nucleus with electrons moving 
in orbits.
The essential basis for Bohr’s model was his suggestion that the
phenomena we encounter at the atomic level are ‘completely foreign’ to that
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of classical level (although classical language and models are used in 
constructing the quantum models) in which a description of discontinuity and 
individuality is brought in to account for the puzzling results of experiments. 
Bohr continued to hold this kind of dual description of quantum systems: on 
the one hand, he accepts that these systems are alien to classical level; but, 
on the other hand, he still accepts the importance of classical language in 
constructing models to represent the quantum system. Bohr believed, as 
Folse claims (Folse 1985 and 1986), that the quantum postulate is a real 
(true) description of the situations in the quantum world. Bohr accepts that a 
true ‘theoretical description’ consists of:
1) A description of the experimental (environmental) set-up of the 
‘natural phenomena’. As we saw in his construction of the model 
of the atom he gave a detailed description of the environmental 
set-up of the atom and the reasons he thinks that such an 
environment cannot be represented using classical mechanics.
2) Mathematical formalism. These are tools chosen from more than 
one of the current accepted theories. In Bohr’s model these where: 
planetary system, Einstein’s photoelectric effect and Planck’s 
quantum of energy.
3) Pictorial description that would represent the phenomenon in 
everyday language. An example of such a pictorial representation 
is the quantum postulate in Bohr’s model.
4) A story that relates the mathematical formalism with the physical 
reality. This is conveyed in his discussion of the movement of the 
electron orbits around the nuclei, the excitation of the electrons 
and their movement from one orbit to another and how could the 
suggested mathematical formalism explain the experimental 
findings like the line spectrum and why electrons hold in their 
orbits and do not collapse into the nuclei.
Such a ‘theoretical description’ is a low-level theoretical
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representation that satisfies the definition of a phenomenological model laid 
out in chapter three.
This way of doing physics -- trying to capture an intuitive description 
of physical phenomena as a first step, then searching for a mathematical 
scheme which might fit the description, not the other way round — was the 
way Bohr did physics from the early stages of his work, and continued to 
hold throughout his life. Heisenberg indicates that by saying:
Bohr was not a mathematical minded man, but he thought about 
the connection in physics. He was, I would say, Faraday, but not 
Maxwell.
... there was a different sort of way of doing physics, ... 
one doesn't bother too much about the mathematical scheme.
That is a later trouble. One first tries to see how things are 
connected- what they really mean. I would say that is really quite 
contrary against that kind of thing which Dirac does because 
Dirac starts from extremely nice mathematical schemes and never 
starts from the connections. This kind of physics which 
Faraday[,] Bohr and Ehrenfest tried to do really starts from the 
connections. (Heisenberg 1963, 30, quoted in Folse 1986, p99)
As I mentioned in chapter three, each model in any theoretical 
representation contains a story that helps in linking it with the real physical 
system. Bohr thought that the second important tool, which would shape the 
story associated with models of the quantum world, is the complementarity 
principle.
Bohr accepts that each system has its model relative to its 
environmental set-up. This model is a representative one. However, when 
Bohr starts to speak about quantum mechanics as a theory, he changes his 
tone. He puts his instrumental hat on. I will come back to this point in sub­
section 6:2:4, but for now let me tackle the world of complementarity.
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As I already mentioned that Bohr’s main interest is to present a physical 
pictorial meaning for the mathematical schemes of quantum mechanics that 
are accountable to the phenomena. At the early stages there were two 
mathematical schemes: Heisenberg’s matrix mechanics and Schrodinger’s 
wave mechanics. Bohr was very worried about Schrodinger’s wave 
mechanics. He was worried because the ontological bases of Schrodinger’s 
wave mechanics were waves, while the ontological bases of Heisenberg 
matrix mechanics were particles.
Bohr also disliked Heisenberg’s attitude toward wave mechanics 
(Beller 1992, 171-175). Heisenberg’s only concern was to prove the 
compatibility between the two mathematical schemes, or, even better, to 
prove that his matrix mechanics is a better mathematical scheme than that of 
Schrodinger. Heisenberg tried, therefore, to present the uncertainty principle 
in a way that underlined an ontology which accepted photons and electrons 
as point particles. Also, as discussed in Jammer’s book, The Conceptual 
Development o f Quantum Mechanics (1966, 323-361), Heisenberg wanted 
to apply Einstein’s method in quantum mechanics. Heisenberg thought that 
he can reverse
the question and - instead of asking how nature can be described by a 
mathematical scheme -  postulated that nature always works so that 
the mathematical formalism can be applied to it. (Jammer 1966, 325) 
This is exactly the type of theoretical attitude that Bohr discarded. For him 
the mathematical scheme is arrived at from the question ‘How can nature be 
described by a mathematical scheme?’
Bohr had a different programme in mind than that of reconciling the 
two mathematical schemes. “Bohr would not like to say that nature imitates 
a mathematical scheme, that nature does only things which fit into a
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mathematical scheme”7 (Heisenberg 1963, 15). Because of that he wanted to 
think about the real quantum phenomena at the atomic level.
In the Como lecture, Bohr, counter to Heisenberg, tried to present 
the uncertainty principle not as the consequence of a mathematical scheme, 
but as arising from well-established experience8. The dispute with Heisenberg 
was related to the underlying ontology in the quantum world. The world of 
natural phenomena is rich and it is not possible to capture it within one 
mathematical scheme. Even if we can capture the behaviour of the quantum 
systems in terms of matrix mechanics, it is still a necessity to understand why 
it is possible to capture it by wave mechanics. Bohr considered both schemes 
as mathematical tools to deal with a rich nature. Heisenberg, on the contrary, 
thought that if it is possible to prove mathematically that both schemes might 
be equivalent then there exists no problem9. It is a matter of preference 
whether we want to talk in terms of wave mechanics or of matrix mechanics.
Bohr was not worried about the equivalency between wave and 
matrix mechanics but about the physical description of the phenomena in the 
quantum world. The experimental evidence, at the time, clearly indicated, in 
Bohr’s opinion, that particles behave as 'waves' and as 'particles'. Moreover, 
the experimental set-up always has a measuring instrument which cannot be 
interpreted as a quantum mechanical device. From this accumulation of 
layers of complexity, the complexity of Bohr’s argument of complementarity 
emerges, as we will see.
Bohr starts by indicating that the observation of a classical 
phenomenon can occur without disturbing it:
Indeed, our usual description of physical phenomena is based
7 This is not to say that a mathematical scheme cannot represent nature, with the rest of 
the theoretical representation.
8 See for detailed account of the uncertainty principle and from different points of view: 
Folse 1985,1986,1993; Krips 1987, 1993. Pais 1993.
9 At that time, Schrodinger’s proof of compatibility between the two schemes was not yet 
known.
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entirely on the idea that the phenomena concerned may be 
observed without disturbing them appreciably. (Bohr, 1928, 88)
In contrast:
the quantum postulate implies that any observation of atomic 
phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency of 
observation not to be neglected. Accordingly, an independent 
reality in the ordinary physical sense can neither be ascribed to 
the phenomena nor to the agencies of observation. (Bohr 1928,
89)
It is important to see the careful way Bohr puts his sentences: “any 
observation of atomic phenomena will involve an interaction with the agency 
of observation not to be neglected.” This interaction will not affect the 
existence of an independent reality, but this independent reality will not be 
independent “in the ordinary physical sense”. Later he rephrased the idea by 
specifying that the interaction is a real and physical interaction of the 
measuring instruments with the quantum system, and this interaction will 
serve as the objective conditions that “define the conditions under which the 
phenomena appear”. He says:
The crucial point, which was to become a main theme of the 
discussions..., implies the impossibility of a sharp separation 
between the behaviour o f atomic objects and the interaction with 
the measuring instruments which serve to define the conditions 
under which the phenomena appear. (Bohr 1949, 210)
Hence, Bohr has a different sense of objectivity. An ‘objectivity* which, on 
its face value, appears, if looked at from a classical perspective, as irrational. 
But it is far from being irrational. The only difference is that it takes a 
dynamic sense of objectivity, as we will see below.
This leads us to the next layer of complexity. Bohr accepts that each 
particular set-up provides the ways in which we ought to apply the quantum 
postulate:
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The circumstances, however, that in interpreting observations 
use has always to be made of theoretical notions entails that for 
every particular case it is a question of convenience at which 
point the concept of observation involving the quantum postulate 
with its “irrationality” is brought in. (Bohr 1928, 89)
The classical notion of observing a physical system does not 
(necessarily) involve disturbance, and the classical description of the physical 
system can be presented in an unambiguous way. However due to the 
interaction with the measurement instrument, an “unambiguous definition of 
the state of the system” in the classical sense “is naturally no longer 
possible”. In order to restore clarity we ought to change the way we think 
about the description of the physical system. Bohr saw the change in terms of 
the possibilities of combining dialectically both theoretical entities with 
empirical outcomes:
Indeed, in the description of the atomic phenomena, the quantum 
postulate presents us with the task of developing a 
“complementarity” theory the consistency of which can be 
judged only by weighing the possibilities of definition and 
observation (Bohr 1928, 90).
That is, there is a complementarity between the theoretical “definition” and 
empirical “observation”. This “complementarity mode of description” is not a 
subjective judgement in which the observer can, by merely wishing or 
thinking, decide whether to observe this or that aspect (i.e. whether we want, 
in the case of the wave and particle duality, to observe the wave aspect of the 
system or the particle aspect of it); but, of objective conditions in which there 
would be one possible observation (of two non-commuting observers) in a 
particular set-up. As Bohr puts it:
The complementary mode of description does indeed not involve 
any arbitrary renunciation of customary demands of explanation 
but, on the contrary, aims at an appropriate dialectic expression
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for the actual conditions of analysis and synthesis in atomic 
physics. (Bohr 1948, 317)
The complexity is built further as another factor is brought in: the 
experimental evidence. At the experimental level, for example, it did not 
seem possible, at that time10, that a single experimental set-up can both be a 
set-up to observe the particle aspect of a quantum system and a set-up to 
observe the wave aspect of that system. In his discussion of this point Bohr 
starts with the nature of light:
The two views of the nature of light are rather to be considered 
as different attempts at an interpretation of experimental 
evidence in which limitation of the classical concepts is expressed 
in complementary ways. (Bohr 1928, 91)
Of course the same can be said about the elementary particles. The “recent 
experience” and “the very expression of experimental evidence” prove that 
“here again we are not dealing with contradictory but with complementary 
pictures of the phenomena”.
Let me put this argument in an experimental perspective: in the two 
slit experiment there are two possible experimental set-ups (at that time): the 
first is related to fixing the two slit frame and losing the momentum 
information while gaining position information. The second is by leaving the 
two slit frame loose in a way that can give us information about the 
momentum while losing information about the position of the particle. Bohr 
accepts that the first experimental set-up gives the particle picture while the 
second experimental set-up gives the wave picture. Both pictures are 
important in order to describe the quantum phenomena; therefore it is 
important to have a complementarity mode of description that incorporate 
these two kinds of experimental evidence, without needing to change the
10 Even now, it is not clear that we can have such a set-up. The current experiments 
related to the quantum optics, that claims the ability to have such combination are, to say 
the least, controversial. See for instant my article ‘Three types of complementarity’ 
(forthcoming).
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existing mathematical tools. This point is crucial in Bohr’s discussion with 
Einstein, as we will see bellow.
Here we have a quantum system that cannot be described in the same 
way as the classical system. Each experimental set-up allows the observation 
of one of two non-commuting pictures. But we have a classical language that 
is essential to present an unambiguous description of the quantum system. To 
this point, Heisenberg (1972, 137) tells us a story about a discussion between 
Bohr, Bloch, Carl Friendrich and himself. They were on a skiing holiday. One 
night, while they were washing the dishes after supper, they were discussing 
the importance of language in scientific discourse. The discussion arrived at a 
peak, at that point Bohr said:
Our washing up is just like our language. We have dirty water 
and dirty dishcloth, and yet we manage to get the plates and 
glasses clean. In language, too, we have to work with unclear 
concepts and a form of logic whose scope is restricted in an 
unknown way, and yet we use it to bring some clarity into our 
understanding of nature 
In this simple paragraph Bohr summarised his idea of an unambiguous 
language. So Bohr accepts that our daily language and the need for 
unambiguous communication forces us to use classical concepts to express 
concepts alien to classical physics using complementary pictorial techniques: 
For this purpose, it is decisive to recognize that, however fa r the 
phenomena transcend the scope o f classical physical 
explanation, the account o f all evidence must be expressed in 
classical terms. The argument is simply that by the word 
‘experiment’ we refer to a situation where we can tell others 
what we have done and what we have learned and that, 
therefore, the account of the experimental arrangement and of 
the result of the observations must be expressed in unambiguous 
language with suitable application of terminology of classical
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physics (Bohr 1949, 209).
In the classical physics language we have two pictures: waves and particles. 
Both of these pictures are important to the quantum system. Here comes 
Bohr’s bright idea: complementarity. This complementarity can be expressed 
at all these levels: complementarity between two experimental set-ups, 
complementarity modes of description and complementarity pictures 
combining for the quantum system the two classical pictures: waves and 
particles. In sum, a phenomenological model. The only missing element is the 
mathematical expression. This as Bohr argues can be found in the uncertainty 
principle.
Bohr wanted to relate complementarity with Heisenberg’s bright idea 
of uncertainty. He did not accept Heisenberg’s way of representing 
uncertainty. Nevertheless, he was very enthusiastic about it, to the extent 
that he sent a copy of Heisenberg’s paper to Einstein with a letter, where he 
said: ‘This article, probably marks a very momentous contribution to the 
discussion of the general problems of quantum theory.’ Here Bohr chooses 
his words ‘the general problems of quantum theory’ exactly because he 
thought of the uncertainty principle, as it was formulated by Heisenberg, as a 
theoretical contribution to the language of the quantum theory which would 
help it to overcome some of the disadvantages it had in contrast with the 
clarity of the classical theory. Bohr added
through [Heisenberg’s] new formulation we are given the 
possibility to harmonize the demand for conservation of energy 
with the wave theory of light, while in accord with the nature of 
description, the different sides of the problem never come into 
appearance simultaneously (Bohr to Einstein April 1927).
Here, it is clear that Bohr wanted to have the uncertainty principle as a 
theoretical tool connected to his idea of complementarity with [i.e. the 
mathematical element in his theoretical description (model)]. But the 
important point for Bohr is the way such an element ought to be brought into
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the picture. He accepts that the experimental evidence, and not any 
theoretical justification, are what lead to belief in the use of the uncertainty 
principle. Speaking about Heisenberg, Bohr said:
In particular, he has stressed the peculiar reciprocal uncertainty 
which affects all measurements of atomic quantities. Before we 
enter upon his results, it will be advantageous to show how the 
complementary nature of the description appearing in this 
uncertainty is unavoidable already in an analysis of the most 
elementary concepts employed in interpreting experience. (Bohr 
1928, 92)
The uncertainty principle is the outcome of the complementarity picture (i.e. 
the picture that combines in it two non-commuting instants: waves and 
particles), not the mathematical schemes. So, in Bohr’s reconstruction of the 
uncertainty principle he starts from the many experimental situations that 
would demonstrate the ultimate uncertainty of finding a value if a choice had 
already been acted on to find its complimentary value to a high degree of 
precision. In such a presentation he insists on the view that the uncertainty 
relation is an outcome of the pictorial elements of the quantum system, such 
as his sentence: ‘the essence of this consideration is the inevitability of the 
quantum postulate in the estimation of the possibilities of measurement.’ 
(Bohr 1928, 98) This would be demonstrated by the different ways the 
accuracy of measurement of position or momentum might be affected by the 
measuring equipment. Finally in the context of the relation between 
momentum measurement and position measurement Bohr says:
Just this situation brings out most strikingly the complementary 
character of the description of atomic phenomena which appears 
as an inevitable consequence of the contrast between the 
quantum postulate and the distinction between object and agency 
of measurement, inherent in our very idea of observation. (Bohr 
1928, 103)
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However, Bohr continued to accept the need for classical terms:
[complementarity] is suited to embrace the characteristic 
features of individuality of quantum phenomena, and at the same 
time to clarify the peculiar aspects of observational problems in 
this field of experience. For this purpose, it is decisive to 
recognise that, however far the phenomena transcend the scope 
of classical physical explanation, the account of all evidence must 
be expressed in classical terms. (Bohr 1949, 209)
Bohr accepts that in the case of different experimental conditions, ‘however 
far the phenomena transcend the scope of classical physical explanation’, we 
need to use classical terms in describing the phenomena. He accepts that the 
classical concepts are accurate tools. In this he is exhibiting another feature 
of his kind of realism. It is possible to use any previously accepted tools in 
physics in order to present an accurate representation of a physical 
phenomenon. Bohr employed the classical concepts in order to present 
unambiguous complementary pictures which exhausts the possible 
information about the object (i.e. the information produced from the different 
experimental set-ups which implies that the quantum system behaves as 
particles in particular cases and as a wave in others). He says:
[Consequent] evidence obtained under different experimental 
conditions cannot be comprehended within a single picture, but 
must be regarded as complementary in the sense that only the 
totality of the phenomena exhausts the possible information 
about the objects. (Bohr 1949, 210)
For Bohr, complementarity is the only way we can exhaust the information 
about the quantum phenomena.
However, even if complementarity was presented as an 
unambiguous solution to the phenomena in the quantum world, it generated
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deep confusion both in the physics and in the philosophical communities.11 
Even Heisenberg who believed that he and Bohr were in agreement that the 
uncertainty principle is a special case of the more general complementarity 
principle, said in 1959 that the complementarity principle
has encouraged the physicists to use an ambiguous language, to 
use the classical concepts in a somewhat vague manner in 
conformity with the principle of uncertainty...When this vague 
and unsystematic use of the language leads into difficulties, the 
physicist has to withdraw into the mathematical scheme and its 
unambiguous correlation with the experimental facts (Heisenberg 
1962, p).
It should be stated at this point that while the uncertainty relation12 is 
a mathematical relation which puts an epistemic limitation to what can be 
measured in principle in quantum mechanics out of two non-commuting 
observables, the complementarity principle acknowledges the importance of 
using both “observables” in describing the quantum mechanical systems.
As any quantum mechanics text book will describe, the relation 
between any two non-commuting observables is given by a general 
commutative relation {if [A,B] * 0 then A and B are said to be non­
commuting} which expresses the general idea of not being able to ascribe an 
exact measured value to two observables represented by non-commuting 
operators at the same time. The wave-particle duality, or let us say the 
relation between the position operator and momentum operator, will be just 
one of many and it will have no special place as a quantum postulate. In 
quantum mechanics if you pick any two observables, the possibility of them
11 Many philosophers have discussed this point see for instant Folse 1985, Howard 1993, Fine 
andBeller 1993, Krips 1987.
12 I do not want here to inter into a foundational debate about the uncertainty principle and its 
role in quantum mechanics, but let me point out that there are many ways in which it is possible 
to go around the limitations imposed by the uncertainty principle to get readings of two non­
commuting observables. See the work of Paul Busch and also the experiments conducted by 
Kiawt et. al., Greenberger et. al. and Home et al in relation to the principle.
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being non-commutative is high. As Wigner mentioned in an interview in 
1963, after the Como lecture von Neumann commented, saying: “Well, there 
are many things which do not commute and you can easily find three 
operators which do not commute.” (In Jammer 1966, 354) Bohr knew this 
fact and was not addressing it in his lecture. His aim was not to address the 
mathematical schemes of quantum mechanics but rather to understand how 
to provide ‘theoretical descriptions’ of quantum systems.
The problem that motivated Bohr to adopt the complementarity 
principle as a solution to the wave-particle duality might not mean anything 
from an anti-realist or an instrumentalist point of view. An anti-realist or an 
instrumentalist would not care about the underlying ontology of the quantum 
world. He or she would be concerned about the extent to which the 
mathematical scheme would be successful in finding empirical outcomes. He 
or she would be concerned merely about the empirical adequacy of the 
mathematical (theoretical) scheme. On the contrary these issues are 
important for a realist because it might differentiate between what might be 
accepted as a representation of nature and what might be merely driven by 
theoretical motivations and do not represent nature.
Hence, if Bohr was an anti-realist he could have adopted a position 
similar to that of Heisenberg and need not have troubled himself with the 
issue of presenting a clear description of the quantum phenomena. But 
Bohr’s extreme interest in this issue revealed his priorities. Let us now turn 
our attention to the next points in Bohr’s philosophical position: natural 
phenomena and physical reality.
6:2:3 Natural Phenomena
Bohr has a distinct concept of phenomena. He was one of the first 
physicists/philosophers to clearly indicate that the concept of phenomena in 
physics differs in a subtle way from that used in the philosophical tradition.
174
The Bohr-Einstein Debate
Bohr clearly dissociates himself from the Machian ideas of phenomenalism 
(see Faye 1991). Furthermore I think that Bohr also was aware of the 
importance of dissociating himself from the German tradition of 
phenomenology. Bohr tried over and over throughout his work to clarify 
what he means by phenomena. Toward the end of his article “Discussion 
with Einstein” (1949), where he tried to condense his arguments for an 
interpretation of quantum mechanics, he pointed to this explicitly:
Meanwhile, the discussion of the epistemological problems in 
atomic physics attracted as much attention as ever.... In this 
connection I warned especially against phrases often found in the 
physical literature, such as ‘disturbing of phenomena by 
observation* or ‘creating physical attributes to atomic objects by 
measurements’. Such phrases, which may serve to remind of the 
apparent paradoxes in quantum theory, are at the same time apt to 
cause confusion, since words like ‘phenomena’ and ‘observation’, 
just as ‘attributes’ and ‘measurements’, are used in a way hardly 
compatible with common language and practical definition. (Bohr 
1949, 237 my emphasis)
He went on to discuss the point which he thought is the more 
puzzling: phenomena. He said:
As a more appropriate way of expression I advocated the 
application of the word phenomenon exclusively to refer to the 
observations obtained under specified circumstances, including 
an account of the whole experimental arrangement. (Bohr 1949, 
237-238)
Bohr’s concept of a phenomenon is related to the whole experimental 
arrangement. Take for example Bohr’s favourite example, the electron 
behaving as a wave. In this case Bohr would say that the natural 
phenomenon “electron behaving as a wave” would occur “only if an 
experimental set-up so and so is in place”. So the natural phenomenon here
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is: “the electron behaves as a wave in the case of a certain experimental set­
up”. Then, the description of a phenomenon would need more than a mere 
description of an empirical result.13 Hence, a mathematical scheme that 
would yield the empirical result would not be sufficient as a description of 
the phenomena. The experimental conditions (or the environmental set-up) 
are crucial in building the model:
It is certainly more in accordance with the structure and 
interpretation of quantum mechanical symbolism, as well as with 
elementary epistemological principles, to reserve the word 
‘phenomenon’ for the comprehension of the effects observed 
under given experimental conditions.
These conditions, which include the account of the 
properties and manipulation of all measuring instruments 
essentially concerned, constitute in fact the only basis for the 
definition of the concepts by which the phenomenon is described. 
(Bohr, in Folse 1985, 157-158)
A phenomenon, according to Bohr, is not to be interpreted without 
the whole experimental set-up and the concepts related to it. In the case of 
Bohr’s example: “electron behaves as a wave”, the electron will exhibit the 
wave aspect only if the experiment is set in such a way that will allow the 
electron to exhibit the wave aspect. Now there might be a different set-up 
which prevents the possibility of the occurrence of the wave aspect. If this 
happens, then Bohr would accept that these two set-ups are “mutually 
exclusive experimental arrangements”.
Bohr accepts that the theoretical description is a real representative 
of the natural phenomena and the elements that are described, element of 
those phenomena. For him every element in the mathematical formalism of
13 An implicit premise here is the acceptance of instrumentalists that mathematical 
schemes yield successfully empirical results, and for that it would be a successful 
description.
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the theoretical description should have a counter part in physical reality. In 
the case at hand, he would say that the theoretical description -- which 
represents the phenomenon of ‘electron behaving as a wave* with the 
experimental set-up that produces such a phenomenon -- is a real 
representation of the natural phenomenon, and every element in that 
description would refer to its counterpart in reality: real electron, a wave like 
behaviour, and so on.
So, Bohr believes that there are electrons, as well as photons and 
other quantum particles, and if he believes that there are electrons then some 
attributes should be given to electrons. But because he believes that the 
quantum mechanical phenomena related to the electrons can give two 
mutually exclusive attributes to the electrons (particles and waves), and he 
accepts that all possible outcomes related to electrons must be a part of any 
complete description of the quantum mechanical system, he thought that 
complementarity might save the day. He says:
phenomena defined by different concepts, corresponding to 
mutually exclusive experimental arrangements, can be 
unambiguously regarded as complementary aspects of the whole 
obtainable evidence concerning the object under investigation 
(Bohr 1938, 24-25).
Even if Bohr took intervention from human activity to be crucial in 
dictating the environmental set-up of a phenomenon, he wanted an objective 
criterion for what a phenomenon can be:
The extension of physical experience in our days has, however, 
necessitated a radical revision of the foundation for the 
unambiguous use of our most elementary concepts, and has 
changed our attitude to the aim of physical science. Indeed, from 
our present standpoint physics is to be regarded not so much as a 
study of something a priori given, but rather as development of 
methods for ordering and surveying human experience. In this
177
The Bohr-Einstein Debate
respect our task must be to account for such experience in a 
manner independent of individual subjective judgement and 
therefore objective in the sense that it can be unambiguously 
communicated in the common human language. (Bohr 1960, 
9-10).
So even if the present standpoint regards physics as the development of 
methods for ordering and surveying human experience, it ought to be 
‘independent of individual subjective judgement and therefore objective*. But 
Bohr was very much aware that some of the methods in physics will probably 
not be able to provide knowledge that is objective in the sense of 
‘corresponding* to the world as it is. For all physics knowledge is fallible and 
likely to change:
Only by our experience itself do we come to recognize those 
laws which grant us a comprehensive view of diversity of 
phenomena. As our knowledge becomes wider, we must always 
be prepared, therefore, to expect alterations in the point o f view 
best suitedfor ordering o f our experience.... The great extension 
of our experience in recent years has brought to light the 
insufficiency of our simple mechanical conceptions and, as a 
consequence, has shaken the foundation on which the customary 
interpretation was based, thus throwing new light on old 
philosophical problems. (Bohr1934 1-2)
In this sense even quantum theory would be one of the ordering schemes in 
which we should be prepared to expect alteration.
6:2:4 Knowledge and Realism
Bohr’s philosophical grounds are those of a realist. Nevertheless, 
Bohr accepts that some of the theoretical concepts are not realisable. Those 
are elements of high-level theoretical representations. I agree with Folse that
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an anti-realist tendency in Bohr’s writing can be attached to his instrumental 
attitude toward theories:
Thus this 'instrumentalist' tendency in complementarity could 
support characterising Bohr as an anti-realist with respect to 
theories. But this form of anti-realist does not compromise 
Bohr's robust realism with respect to the reality of atomic 
systems (Folse 1986, 102)
But I add that Bohr’s realism was not about atomic systems only but also 
about all the potentially referring terms of the ‘theoretical description’ (not 
the theory as a whole). Bohr was a realist about both atomic structure and 
about elementary particles. He accepted that the description of these 
quantum systems is a real representative of them with all its theoretical input. 
This means that, for Bohr, the models describe the natural phenomena.
Bohr also dismissed Machian type scepticism about what might be 
known about atoms:
We know now, it is true, that the often expressed scepticism with 
regard to the reality of atoms was exaggerated; for, indeed the 
wonderful development of the art of experimentation has enabled 
us to study the effects of individual atoms.
However, at the same time as every doubt regarding the 
reality of atoms has been removed and as we gained a detailed 
knowledge of the inner structure of atoms, we have been 
reminded in an instructive manner of the natural limitation of our 
forms of perception (Bohr 1934, 103).
To further understand Bohr’s realism I ought to explain his concept 
of knowledge. Bohr asserts that it is important to understand knowledge in 
its environment:
...For objective description and harmonious comprehension it is 
necessary in almost every field of knowledge to pay attention to 
circumstances under which evidence is obtained (Bohr, in Beller
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1992, 147).
Bohr has a dynamical concept of knowledge. He thinks that knowledge is 
obtained by a process of interaction between natural phenomena and 
experience. Knowledge is objective only to the extent that we humans can 
communicate it in an unambiguous way. Bohr says that:
The lesson of atomic physics has been that we are not simply co­
ordinating experience arranged in given general categories for 
human thinking, as one might have liked to say in expressions of 
physical philosophy, but we have learned that our task is to 
develop human concepts to find a way of speaking which is 
suited to bringing order into new experience and, so to say, being 
able to put questions to nature in a manner in which we can get 
some help with answer. (Bohr, from a transcript of Compton 
Lectures 1957, in Folse 1985, 235-236).
So, the task of knowledge is to develop concepts that bring order into new 
experience, and to state the right questions, that is, the questions for which 
nature can help in finding answers.
The dynamics of knowledge expresses itself clearly in the history of 
science. There, the dynamics between theoretical description and empirical 
observation “lead to the recognition of relations between formally 
unconnected groups of phenomena”. When such a recognition occurs it 
“demands a renewed revision of the presupposition for the unambiguous 
application of even our elementary concepts” (Bohr 1938, 28). In another 
place Bohr presents yet a stronger claim:
The main point to realise is that all knowledge presents itself 
within a conceptual framework adapted to account for previous 
experience and that any frame may prove too narrow to 
comprehend new experience. Scientific research in many 
domains of knowledge has indeed time and again proved the 
necessity of abandoning or remoulding points of view which,
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because of their fruitfulness and apparently unrestricted
applicability, were regarded as indispensable for rational
explanation. (Bohr 1958, 67-68)14.
So Bohr never had confidence that we would ever arrive at one 
theoretical scheme that we would stick with, and each of our theoretical 
schemes needs to be revised with the developments in science. This revision 
contributes toward the “clarification of the principle underlying human 
knowledge” (Bohr 1937, 289-290). The new experience should be
established on an objective basis. This needs a new ‘means of
communication’ that can represent natural phenomena in an unambiguous 
way. This need for an unambiguous representation is a difficulty which 
constantly confronts every scientist.
Having presented Bohr’s philosophical grounds let me now go into 
the Bohr-Einstein debate.
6:3 The Debate
In this section I will concentrate on the first round of the debate. I will not 
discuss the second round, because it raised a cluster of issues that are beyond 
the scope of this thesis.
As I said earlier in 1927 Bohr worried about the physical 
interpretation of the new formalism of quantum theory. Bohr and Heisenberg 
worked on a daily basis to resolve the conflict between Schrodinger’s wave 
mechanics and matrix mechanics and to suggest a way out of the problems of 
the non-compatibility between these two schemes. Heisenberg was worried 
mainly about the mathematical structure of the problem and he ceased to 
recognise Bohr’s worries. Bohr went on a skiing trip for six weeks. It was at
14 Let us compare such a position with Bachelard when he speaks of the new scientific 
spirit: ‘above all we must recognize the fact that new experience says no to old experience’ 
(Bachelard, PN p9).
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that time that he formulated his principle of complementarity, while 
Heisenberg wrote at the same time his paper on the uncertainty principle.
In 1927 the experimental information gave theoretical physicists a 
very shallow picture about the quantum world. The main experiments which 
had an impact on the theoretical debate were the Stem-Gerlach effect in 
1922 and the Compton experiments in 1924. This left the theoretical 
physicists open to a different type of game: that of suggesting and debating 
hypothetical situations in which quantum mechanics should be applied and 
trying to figure out if the answer given for these hypothetical situations can 
be satisfactory from a theoretical point of view. Einstein was not happy 
about either the uncertainty principle or the complementarity principle. He 
thought that in spite of the mathematical accuracy of quantum mechanics and 
its agreement with experiments (a handful), it cannot be accepted as a 
complete theory. For him, there had to be another theory that can give the 
same level of accuracy in its mathematical results but does not carry the 
related philosophical baggage15.
As I said there were few experiments to make any supportive 
arguments for or against quantum mechanics. Einstein tried hard to suggest 
thought experiments to disprove the completeness of quantum mechanics. A 
theory is complete in Einstein’s sense when it can account for every element 
in physical reality.
Bohr presented his recollection of the events of the first round of the 
debate in his contribution to Schilpp’s volume in 194816, Albert Einstein: 
philosopher-scientist. The story of the debate goes as follows. When Bohr 
gave his famous lecture, “the Como lecture”, Einstein was not there. But 
later that year they met in the fifth Solvay conference. Bohr claimed that 
Einstein’s main concern was that the ‘causal account in space and time’ was 
abandoned in quantum mechanics.
15 For a discussion of Einstein’s position see Fine 1986.
16 Bohr 1949, pp 201-241.
182
The Bohr-Einstein Debate
However, Einstein’s concern was related to the coherency between 
the new theory and previously accepted physical theory. As Arthur Fine 
argues in his book The Shaky Game, Einstein’s criticisms of quantum theory 
during its early years are expressed in five points. These are:
1) the equations of the theory are not relativistically invariant; 2) 
it does not yield the classical behaviour of macroscopic objects 
to a good approximation; 3) it leads to correlations among 
spatially separated objects that appear to violate action-by- 
contact principles; 4) it is an essentially statistical theory that 
seems incapable even of describing the behaviour of individual 
systems; and 5) the scope of the commutation relations may not 
in fact be so broad as the theory supposes. (Fine 1986, 28)
It is clear from such a list that Einstein’s concern was with the type of theory 
quantum mechanics is, and whether it would be compatible with other 
fundamental theories. Here Einstein took the mathematical formalism as the 
major element in the theory.
This standpoint was the drive behind his construction of a series of 
thought experiments. He started, according to Bohr’s reconstruction, with a 
very simple experimental set-up:
According to quantum theory, in the case of a single slit between a 
source and a photographic plate, if a particle is shot at the slit, the theory 
cannot provide an accurate prediction of the exact point at which the particle 
would hit the photographic plate. The best it can provide is a probabilistic 
percentage for the particle to hit any given region. In such case, there will be 
an agreement between the theory and the experiment, given that the 
experiment is repeated a sufficient number of times. Einstein pointed out that 
if in a given single experiment the particle is recorded at a point (A) on the 
plate, that directly leads to the impossibility of observing any effect of that 
particle at any other point (B) which lies at a distance from (A). This would 
create a contradiction: The theory predicts that there is a possibility that the
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particle will hit (B), while if the particle was found to be at (A), then it is 
impossible that any trace of the particle can be found at (B).
Einstein raises here two points: one is about the statistical nature of 
the experimental set-up and whether this statistical nature is associated with 
the system itself or with the description of the system. Einstein wants to 
maintain that the statistical nature ought to be similar to that occurring in 
classical situations. He thinks that quantum mechanics with its statistical 
nature leaves plenty of questions unanswered, especially the question of 
defining an exact energy and momentum of the particle at all times. He thinks 
that there ought to be a “fuller description of the phenomena” which can 
“bring into consideration the detailed balance of energy and momentum in 
individual processes”(Bohr 1949, 213). That is to say that the particle can 
have a definite position with a definite energy, while at the same time has a 
precise momentum. This is related to the second point: the wave-particle 
duality and the theory constrains the description that can ascribe both the 
particle aspect and the wave aspect to the system. Einstein asserts that the 
theory cannot ascribe both aspect to the system at the same time cannot give 
us a full description of all the elements in physical reality.
Bohr’s reply to such arguments begins, as he usually does, from 
stating the experimental set-up and analysing whether it is consistent, given 
the quantum postulate, to accept the argument. In this simple case, Bohr 
would state that the experimental set-ups that might provide information 
about the position and the momentum of the particle are different in fact. He 
explained that there exist two possible set-ups.
The first is similar to that suggested by Einstein. This set-up, 
according to Bohr, provides the basis for the phenomenon ‘particle behaving 
as a wave*. In this phenomenon when the particle interacts with the slit it will 
undergo a change of momentum (Ap) which, according to the uncertainty 
principle, will lead to the impossibility to find the energy of the particle. This 
means that the experimental set-up will exhibit latitude in the location of the
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particle. The particle is behaving as a wave, which means that there is a 
possibility that it might hit the photographic plate at any point within a given 
region. But at the moment of measurement of the particle (where it hits the 
photographic plate) there will be another interaction between the particle and 
the measuring instrument and at that point the particle is behaving as 
a particle.
Now the model of the phenomenon ‘particle behaving as a wave’ 
uses tools from quantum mechanics to give us a general prediction to where 
the particle might hit the photographic plate. But also it contains a 
description of the experimental set-up and the story that describe why the 
particle behaves like a wave after interacting with the slit and how the 
particle alters its momentum when interacting with the slit. The story also 
tells us how we can detect that the particle is really behaving as a wave. This 
detection is not done on a single experiment basis but on an ensemble. Now 
Einstein is saying that in a single experiment the theory can not give us a 
description of both the wave and the particle aspects of the particle. Bohr 
answers this by saying that what counts is not the theory but the model 
which describes one of the two aspects at a time. And because it is a model 
of the phenomenon ‘particle behaving as a wave’ it needs not account for any 
other phenomenon like ‘particle behaving as a particle’. Also the statistical 
nature of the model is not associated with the quantum theory but is 
associated, according to Bohr, with the ability to detect experimentally the 
wave behaviour of the particle.
The second set-up suggests a shutter in front of the slit: in this case 
the interaction between the shutter and the particle would allow additional 
latitude in the kinetic energy of the particle. This set-up has an uncertainty in 
the energy AE. Then in accordance with the uncertainty relation, there is a 
latitude in the exact time when the particle interacted with the shutter (The 
outcome of such an interaction would be (AEAT * h)).
Einstein’s question is related to what extent we can control our
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knowledge of the momentum and energy so that we would obtain a 
specification of the state of the particle after passing through the slit. Bohr, in 
reply, claims that
as soon as we want to know the momentum and energy of these 
parts [the shutter and the diaphragm] of the measuring 
arrangement with an accuracy sufficient to control the 
momentum and energy exchange with the particle under 
investigation, we shall, in accordance with the indeterminacy 
relations, lose the possibility of their accurate location in space 
and time. (Bohr, 1949 215)
In the case presented by Einstein, it is the assumption that both the 
diaphragm (with the slit) and the plate have a well-defined position that 
would not allow, in accordance with quantum mechanics, an exact prediction 
of the point where the particle might hit the plate. However, if in a similar 
case we have a sufficient latitude in knowing the position of the diaphragm 
(with the slit), then it is possible (in principle) to control the interaction 
between the slit and the particle. This would lead to the possibility of 
predicting the path of the particle from the slit to the plate.
Although this experimental arrangement is very simple and was 
familiar to physicists working in the field at that time, Bohr’s first reaction 
toward Einstein’s example was to say that he could not understand what 
Einstein meant. The notes taken by Kramers and kept in Bohr archives show 
that Bohr’s reply to Einstein’s simple objections starts by saying: ‘I feel 
myself in a very difficult position because I don’t understand what precisely 
is the point which Einstein wants to [make]. No doubt it is my fault.'17
What Bohr did not understand was not the experiment but the 
process in which the experiment was presented. Einstein complained about 
the theory while Bohr’s own concern was the description. Because of that
17 In Pais 1991, p 318
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Bohr insisted on representing the whole picture every time he wanted to 
reply to any of Einstein’s critiques. He accepts that each particular 
experiment had its own description. So, in every case he needs to explain the 
detailed circumstances related to that case and how it is possible to construct 
the related quantum mechanical description.
To the case at hand, after explaining in detail the experimental and 
phenomenological facts (i.e. the way the experiment is set-up and the way 
the particle would react to the different set-ups: e.g. the loose diaphragm 
versus the fixed one), he asserts that in the quantum mechanical description 
we have to deal [..] with a two-body system consisting of the 
diaphragm as well as the particle, and it is just with an explicit 
application of conservation laws to such a system that we are 
concerned in the Compton effect where, for instant, the 
observation of the electron by means of a cloud chamber allows 
us to predict in what direction the scattered photon will 
eventually be observed. (Bohr 1949, 216)
It is clear here that this quantum mechanical description is pretty much 
related to the experiments at hand. Here Bohr does not talk about the 
quantum formalism; rather his concern is how to capture the intuition behind 
the experiment and what would be in fact possible to be performed 
experimentally. Moreover, Bohr insisted that these two experimental set-ups, 
the one with fixed diaphragm and the one with loose diaphragm, are mutually 
exclusive. For him this point ‘clearly brings out the complementary character 
of the phenomena.’ (Bohr 1949, 215)
Einstein took the debate a step farther and suggests another simple 
argument using the two slit experiment: It should be possible to suggest an 
experimental set-up in which it would be possible to measure through which 
of the two holes the particle entered. Here we see the theory-driven attitude 
of Einstein at its best. He asserted that the framework of contemporary 
physics does not accept that the act of observation affects the observed
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system in a way which we cannot control. The ultimate challenge is to plot 
the set-up that might give us the exact knowledge without affecting the 
observed object in an uncontrolled way. He suggests the following 
experiment.
In the last suggested set-up, another diaphragm with two slits is 
installed between the first diaphragm and the photographic plate. An electron 
source (or photon source) emits electrons to the first diaphragm (with one 
slit). Then the output electrons beam targets the second diaphragm (with two 
slits), lying at a distance d from the first diaphragm. This distance is at most 
twice the electrons beam wavelength. If the first diaphragm is fixed, quantum 
mechanics predicts that the outcome on the screen will exhibit an 
interference pattern.
Einstein proposed supporting the first diaphragm with a spring which 
can be affected by the slightest movement of the diaphragm. The momentum 
exchange between the particle and the first diaphragm will, presumably, 
define the position of the particle at that point, and then decide through 
which of the two slits it will pass toward the screen without distorting the 
interference pattern. Bohr relies on this last point, along with the uncertainty 
principle in the case of position and momentum, to prove that if this 
apparatus is secured then the first diaphragm will be affected by the 
uncertainty principle. The change in momentum of the diaphragm will 
eventually change the position by an unknown factor; the more precise the 
momentum measurement will be the less we can speak about the position of 
the slit. That affects the interference on the photographic plate with a factor 
equal to the uncertainty in the position of the first diaphragm. As Bohr says: 
In fact, if c d  is the small angle between the conjectured paths of a 
particle passing through the upper or the lower slit, the 
difference of momentum transfer in these two cases will, 
according to [E=hvand P = ha], be equal to haco and any 
control of the momentum of the diaphragm with an accuracy
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sufficient to measure this difference will, due to the 
indeterminacy relation, involve a minimum latitude of the 
position of the diaphragm, comparable with ^5 [and] the number 
of fringes per unit length will be just equal to aco and, since an 
uncertainty in the position of the first diaphragm of the amount 
of ^  will cause an equal uncertainty in the positions of the 
fringes, it follows that no interference effect can appear.(Bohr, 
1949, 217)18
Einstein’s other experiments suggested in that period evolve within 
the same argumentation still even if they were more complex in form. One of 
these other experiments (was suggested in 1930 in the sixth Solvay congress) 
is the clock in a box with a radioactive source. Even though Einstein tried to 
use a complex line of argument employing the special theory of relativity, the 
underling concept was to oppose complementarity. Bohr’s reply uses also 
the uncertainty principle to prove the impossibility of finding two non­
commuting variables simultaneously (in this case time and energy). The last 
attempt in this first round was made in a very short paper (two pages) 
published in Physical Review in 1931 under the title ‘Knowledge of Past and 
Future in Quantum mechanics’19 with Tolman and Podolsky employing 
concepts from relativity theory.
To conclude: I showed in this chapter that Bohr was a realist of a 
special kind. Then I showed that the main difference between Bohr and 
Einstein is their treatment to the theoretical forms. While Einstein insisted on 
a top-down approach, Bohr adopted a bottom-up approach. I think that the 
spirit of the Bohr-Einstein debate is a debate between a structural realist 
exemplified by Einstein and a phenomenological realist exemplified by Bohr.
18 We know now that the interference had nothing to do with the uncertainty principle (in 
the mathematical sense), but still at the experimental level the disappearance of the 
interference fringes in the two slit experiments was thought to occur whenever the set-up 
violated the situation in which the uncertainty principle should be applied
19 Einstein, Tolman and Podolsky 1931, pp 780-81.
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